

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THE EDUCATIONAL THEORY OF J. G. FICHTE

A CRITICAL ACCOUNT, TOGETHER WITH TRANSLATIONS

BY

G. H. TURNBULL

Professor of Education in the University of Sheffield

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PREFACE

THIS book is an attempt to fill a gap in the English student's knowledge of the History of Education by bringing together the material for a just appreciation of the important contribution to the development of educational thought made by a theorist who has hitherto, strange to say, been almost entirely ignored in this country. Few of Fitche's writings on education have been translated into English and, so far as I am aware, there is no adequate account of his theory in our language.

The translations here given comprise, I believe, the whole of Fichte's writings on education with one very important exception, his "Addresses to the German Nation." The Addresses contain the most complete account we possess of the principles of Fichte's educational theory and his detailed criticism of Pestalozzi and are, therefore, indispensable to a knowledge of his views. Through the kindness of my publishers I am permitted to refer the reader of this book to a translation of the Addresses made by Mr. R. H. Jones and myself and published in 1922 by the Open Court Publishing Company, particularly to those parts which deal mainly with education, viz., Addresses I to III, IX to XI, paragraph 80 in Address VI and paragraph 178 in Address XII.

The Introduction is expository as well as historical and critical. It seemed necessary to include a systematic account of Fichte's theory because his ideas are nowhere fully set out by him but lie scattered in the eleven volumes of his works and elsewhere.

I am indebted to the Open Court Publishing Company for their kindness in permitting me to make full use of my article, entitled "Fichte on Education," which appeared in "The Monist" in April, 1923. My thanks are due also to Messrs. Brockhaus, of Leipzig, for permission to publish a translation of the "Plan for arranging exercises in speaking" from the second volume of "Fichtes Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel" and to Messrs. Haessel, of Leipzig, and Dr. Hans Schulz, publishers and editors respectively of "J. G. Fichtes Briefwechsel," for permission to include a translation of Fichte's diaries from the second volume of that work.

G. H. T.

SHEFFIELD, *March*, 1926.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

1762	Born at Rammenau, near Dresden, May 19th.
1770-1774	Brought up at Niederau by Pastor Krebel, under the protection of Baron von Miltitz.
1774-1780	At school at Pforta.
1780-1784	Studied theology at Jena and Leipzig.
1784-1788	Private tutor to various families in Saxony.
1788-1790	Tutor to the son and daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Ott, at Zurich. His Diary belongs to this period.
1790	Began the study of Kant's philosophy in Leipzig.
1791	Visited Kant at Königsberg. Published the *Critique of all Revelation.*
1791-1793	Tutor to the children of Count von Krockow at Danzig.
1793	Married Johanna Rahn and settled in Zurich.
1793	Visited Pestalozzi at Richterswyl.
1794	Appointed Professor of Philosophy at Jena.
1799	Resigned his Chair as a result of the charge of atheism.
1799	Settled in Berlin.
1804	Wrote the *Aphorisms on Education.*
1805	Appointed Professor of Philosophy at Erlangen.
1806-1807	Lived in Königsberg on account of the French invasion of Prussia, and studied Pestalozzi's educational writings.

1807 Drew up the *Deduced scheme for an Academy to be established in Berlin.*

1807-1808 Delivered the *Addresses to the German Nation.*

1810 Appointed Professor of Philosophy at the new University of Berlin.

1814 Died, January 27th.

INTRODUCTION

THE facts of Fichte's life have been adequately stated so often[1] and are probably already so well known that it is not necessary to repeat them here. It is interesting, however, to consider the influences which helped to mould his educational ideas; his home life, his school and University training, his experience as a tutor and University lecturer, and his acquaintance with the theory and practice of other educators.

It seems that Fichte remained at home until he was about 8 years of age.[2] During this time he received little formal instruction, but was constantly in touch with nature and no doubt helped his father to make ribbons, cultivate the garden and fields and tend the flocks. When the day's work was over his father gave him informal instruction in reading, including the learning of verses from the Bible, and told him the legends of the country and tales of his own journeys in Saxony and Franconia. Fichte admits that between his mother and himself there was the most striking similarity of mind and body. He inherited from her his violent, masterful and impetuous nature, while his firmness and resoluteness were due in no small measure to her influence. Moreover, her strictly religious views undoubtedly affected his outlook even in those early years. It seems that while still quite young

1. See Bibliography.

2. There is much conflict of opinion on this point. Léon seems to suggest that he left home in 1769; Smith suggests 1770 or 1771, while Vogt puts the date as late as 1772. Fichte's son says that his father was 8 or 9 when he left home, and I think we shall not be far wrong in deciding that it was in the early part of 1770.

the boy showed signs of unusual ability, in particular a command of fluent speech; he could, for instance, recapitulate the sermon, a feat which soon attracted the attention of Wagner, the village pastor, who allowed him to come frequently to his house to receive instruction.

When he came under the protection of Baron von Miltitz, a neighbouring landowner, he was sent to Niederau, where he lived with Pastor Krebel until he went to the well-known school at Pforta, near Naumburg, in 1774[1]. From Pastor Krebel he probably received his first formal instruction in studies; he must, for example, have commenced to learn Latin and Greek. The early separation from his parents does not seem to have weighed heavily on young Fichte. Indeed, in later life, as we shall see, he thought so little of family education that he advocated its abolition and the complete separation of children from their parents.

Of his school life at Pforta, where he spent six full years from 1774 to 1780, comparatively little is known; but his stay there must have influenced profoundly his views on education. The school was a boarding-school, founded in 1543 by Maurice of Saxony for the purpose of training gifted youths from all parts of his territory for the public service at the public expense. It was endowed with the buildings and other property of monasteries which had been abolished. The pupils were selected according to their ability and lack of means, and a knowledge of the rudiments of Latin was assumed. They were prepared for the University by a course of studies which usually lasted five or six years, extending as a rule between the ages of twelve and twenty. After

1. It has long been doubtful whether Fichte attended the town school at Meissen. The latest evidence (Schulz I, p. 1) seems to prove that he attended for about a year, probably from 1773 to 1774.

further study at one of the territorial Universities, such as Leipzig, the students returned to serve their sovereign either in clerical or temporal appointments.[1] The curriculum consisted mainly of languages, religious instruction and the rudiments of the sciences. Latin was the chief subject, the aim being fluency and correctness of speech ; it was also the language of instruction and in this way ear and tongue were easily and effectively accustomed to the foreign idiom from childhood. Greek ranked next to Latin in importance in the curriculum but occupied a much inferior position. It was not treated as a living language like Latin, and the serious scholar alone regarded it as a necessary accomplishment. Religious instruction culminated in dogmatic theology. Rhetoric and dialectic were included among the subjects of study in the upper classes, public orations and disputations being a regular institution. The rudiments of arithmetic, geometry, physics and cosmology were taught according to the old system, while instruction was also given in singing and music. From 1773 onwards, and therefore in Fichte's time, the German language occupied a rather more prominent place in the curriculum. Instruction invariably took the form of setting lessons to be learnt by heart and hearing them afterwards. Discipline was very strict ; the rod was the chief instrument of training and instruction, and was used to punish not only wilful misconduct but also forgetfulness and incapacity. The boys lived in cells like monks ; they were allowed out only once a week and then under supervision and for the purpose of visiting particular playgrounds. With their teachers they formed a little community and had a definitely fixed mode of life.

1. For an account of these schools see F. Paulsen : *German Education Past and Present*, pp. 65 ff.

The special encouragement of private study was intended to counteract the possible faults of this system of education and its methods. The pupils were allowed to work as they pleased; they might therefore learn to work for themselves, become accustomed to keep order and devote themselves to study in competition with one another, undisturbed by the distractions and temptations of social life. When later, therefore, Fichte suggested self-contained and isolated institutions as the means of reforming national education he was really appealing to his own experience of school life.

When Fichte entered this boarding-school at the age of 12 he was in a very real sense alone in the world, because he was thrown upon his own resources and forced to depend upon his own strength. At first everything tended to drive his thoughts in upon himself. His quiet pensiveness was an object of ridicule to his school-fellows and as yet he lacked sufficient self-possession to ignore this and sufficient courage to disclose his difficulties to another. After running away to escape the oppression of his senior, however, and confessing everything on his return to the Rector, he was much happier and found study an interesting occupation. We know that he read Robinson Crusoe and that it made a deep impression on him. Moreover, when he became one of the senior scholars, he found that they read secretly a great many books which were imbued with the new spirit of free inquiry. He was himself soon deeply engrossed in the fervent piety and lofty feeling of Klopstock's religious epic, the "Messias," and in Lessing's writings on history and literature, especially the polemical religious pamphlets written in 1778 against Pastor Goeze of Hamburg, whom Lessing regarded as the champion of literal orthodoxy and

the enemy of science and freedom of mind, and against whom he denied that the Bible is in any way indispensable to the Christian religion. These two writers had a profound influence on Fichte ; from them, especially from Lessing, he learned to think without dogmatism and independently of all authority in matters of religion. The education in the humanities which he received at Schulpforta, reinforced by his own study then and later of writers like Rousseau, Montaigne, Lessing, Wieland, Goethe and Kant, undoubtedly contributed to set before him the ideal of humanity.

Little need be said of his University education as a theological student from 1780 to 1784, first at Jena for a year and then at Leipzig. He attended courses in religious history and exegesis and in philology. He soon perceived that, far from having philosophy as a servant, theology needs for its own intelligibility the independent solution of such philosophical problems as that of God, the freedom of the will and immortality. From his study of Spinoza he learned the moral and religious importance of the problems of philosophy, the pure unity of the first principle, the intelligibility as well as the necessity of all things and the absolute reality of all existence in its eternal essence. He found in Spinoza the origin of the idea which was familiar to him from Lessing's religious writings and which had fascinated him in his school-days, the idea of free thought applied to religion. It is noteworthy for the whole direction of his later philosophy that it was the problem of human freedom which excited his interest early in his University career. He accepted Spinoza's doctrine of determinism for a time until, in fact, in 1790 he began his first study of Kant's philosophy and was converted to a belief in moral freedom and the inherent moral

worth of man. For financial reasons he did not complete his theological course; in 1784 the widow of his patron, Baron von Miltitz, stopped the allowance which had been paid since the latter's death in 1774, and Fichte seems to have gradually abandoned theology for philosophy.

Intermittently for the next nine years, from 1784 to March, 1793, Fichte acted as tutor in various parts of the country. From 1784 to 1788 he was in different households in Saxony, "not without honour," as he himself quaintly puts it. He was certainly a private tutor at Wolfshain in May, 1787; indeed he was probably there as early as March, 1786. From September, 1788, to March, 1790, he was employed by Mr. and Mrs. Ott, of Zurich, as tutor to their children, a boy of 8 and a girl of 7. Among the many schemes which he planned for his future while at Zurich in 1789 the one most prominent in his mind, according to an entry in his diary on August 2nd, was that of trying to obtain a post as tutor to some prince and of writing a book on the subject beforehand.

For a very short time in June, 1791, he held a tutorship at Warsaw in the house of a Pole, the Count von Plater, while from October, 1791, to March, 1793, he was tutor to the family of the Count von Krockow at Danzig. He was unable to keep any post for long owing, it is said, to his proud temper and original ideas on education. He wanted to arrange a generous, comprehensive and systematic education, but was usually thwarted by the caprice and prejudices of others. He felt keenly the disagreeableness of the private tutor's profession; as he says, he was compelled to look upon imperfections which would ultimately entail the worst consequences, but was hindered in his endeavour to establish good habits in their stead. In 1791 he hoped to give up the profession for

ever ; but it was not to be until 1793, though at Danzig his lot was happier than it had been in many previous posts.

We are told[1] that at Zurich his pupil, Susette Ott, absolutely hated his manner and that neither she nor her brother Kasper derived any permanent stimulation from him. The post, however, was one of peculiar difficulty and Fichte's lack of success must not be urged too strongly against his ability as a teacher. In other and more favourable circumstances we know that he taught with great interest and sympathy, therefore with success, and that he educated not only intellectually but above all morally. His son speaks of him as one of the most excellent teachers he ever had the opportunity of knowing.

Of Fichte's activity as a University teacher we know a great deal. After his conversion in 1790 from determinism to belief in moral freedom and the inherent worth of man, he confessed to an all-engrossing passion, the desire to influence and ennoble his fellow-men ; he declared that the more he acted the happier he seemed to be. His particular aim in life was in fact to reform completely the moral disposition of his age.

His success as a University lecturer at Jena was immediate and remarkable. The vigour of his thought, his moral intensity and practical earnestness combined with his skill in oratory to make him a stimulating and convincing teacher. He was, however, much more than an academic teacher in the ordinary sense of the word. He lived his philosophy, and never believed merely in absorbing himself in thought without expressing himself energetically in action. His philosophy influenced his views on education and supplied the motive for his activity

1. Schulz I, p. 33 note.

as a teacher. His contemplation of the world as it was, the feebleness of man's powers compared with the strength of his desires and passions, aroused in him the demand for a better world. He does not mean by this the substitution in some miraculous way of a new world for the old ; he is convinced that the present world itself must become different and better. This demand throws a tremendous burden of duty and responsibility upon the man who, like Fichte, loves his fellow-men ; he must never, under any condition, cease to labour for their ennoblement ; he must never give up hope in them. As a University teacher, therefore, he aimed more at educating his pupils than at instructing them. At Jena, for instance, he tried to reform the manners of his students and to develop and cultivate their moral and intellectual powers. He gave general moral lectures on Sundays in the hope of influencing their moral life, and sought to suppress their associations because he saw that they were productive of much harm. Again, although his elaborate and minute plan for the creation of a University at Berlin was not carried out, he did not refrain from setting himself to reform the bad features of student life there from the very beginning in 1810.

In 1804 he wrote his *Aphorisms on Education ;* the occasion was a project for taking into his house some of his friends' sons and educating them along with his own son Hermann, who was then 8 years old. We know that again in 1808 much of his time was occupied with the problem of the boy's education. We know, too, how anxious Fichte was that the boy should be educated properly from the very beginning. In 1799, during an absence from Jena, he writes to tell his wife that the child should be her first and only care, that she is not firm

and cool enough with him, and that unless she is most careful she will make him an ill-taught, obstinate boy, which would grieve his father most sorely, for no greater misfortune could befall him on earth than that this child should be spoiled. It should be their first care not to let his character be spoiled, for he has it in him to be a wild knave, as well as an honest, true, virtuous man. She must not try to lead him at this age by persuasion and reasoning ; the first thing is that he should learn obedience and subjection to the mind of another.

It is important to estimate the influence which Pestalozzi exercised upon the development of Fichte's educational ideas. We are told that the two men first came into personal contact at Zurich, owing to the fact that Fichte's fiancée, Johanna Rahn, was a friend of Pestalozzi's wife. We are not told when the two men first met, but it may very well have been in Rahn's house between 1788 and 1790, when Fichte was a tutor at Zurich and Pestalozzi was resting and writing at Richterswyl after the failure of his undertaking at Neuhof. However that may be, it is certain that Fichte knew of Pestalozzi's ideas before he ever came to Zurich ; we know that as early as July 24th, 1788, he had read and approved of " Leonard and Gertrude," although in his opinion Pestalozzi had not gone far enough because he had failed to take the upper classes into consideration. It is equally certain that after his marriage in the autumn of 1793 Fichte renewed his acquaintance with Pestalozzi, who was then writing pamphlets on the political principles of the French Revolution. In December of the same year the acquaintance was cemented into friendship by a visit of several days which Fichte and his wife paid to Pestalozzi at Richterswyl. The two men had much in common ;

both were revolutionary thinkers with democratic tendencies; both had ardent faith in the demand for liberty and in the claims of reason, and both were enthusiastically anxious to work for the moral progress of humanity. Social, political and educational topics provided them with ample material for discussion.

It appears that Pestalozzi showed Fichte his work and explained his comprehensive plans for the education of the people. Fichte realized their importance and, impressed both by Pestalozzi's personality and by his ideas, promised all possible support in the very different career which he himself might pursue. He encouraged Pestalozzi to write a philosophical account of his educational ideas, which would explain and justify them and at the same time unify them by building them into a sound and complete system. He also advised Pestalozzi on the claims to priority of publication of some of his work and must have exchanged views with him on the subject of Kant's philosophy, for we find Pestalozzi congratulating himself that his experience had led him to many of the same results as Kant. Finally, we are told that in January, 1794, Fichte was writing a commentary on "Leonard and Gertrude" in the light of the principles of the Kantian philosophy.

We hear little more of the connection between the two men until the winter of 1806-1807 when we find Fichte, an exile in Königsberg, studying the writings of Pestalozzi once more in order to get a thorough grasp of his educational system. We are told that he was incited to these efforts by Nicolovius, the disciple and friend of Pestalozzi, who was afterwards a responsible official in the ministry of public instruction in Prussia. After a careful study of Pestalozzi's writings, especially of "How

Gertrude teaches her children" and "A glance at my views and essays in education," the latter of which Pestalozzi had published at Leipzig in 1807, Fichte declared that they furnished the true remedy for the ills of mankind, as well as the only means of enabling people to understand his own *Wissenschaftslehre* or Science of Knowledge. The sequel to this judgment of Pestalozzi's writings appeared in the "Addresses to the German Nation," delivered in the winter of 1807-1808, in which Fichte hailed Pestalozzi as the saviour of his people and sought to prepare the way for the realization of his ideas on education.

It is probable that Fichte and Pestalozzi, or at least Fichte's wife and Pestalozzi, were always in correspondence with each other. At any rate we know that Fichte's wife sent Pestalozzi a copy of the "Addresses," for we have his reply dated 10th March, 1809.

That Fichte was well acquainted with Pestalozzi's educational theory has already been indicated; there is nothing to show that he was acquainted with any of Pestalozzi's practical activities as a schoolmaster. In fact Fichte says in 1808, "Up to the present we have not desired to see anything of it (*sc.* Pestalozzi's art of instruction and education) in actual practice, because we wanted first to provide ourselves with a definite and clear conception of the inventor's true intention."

Between the educational theories of the two men there is very extensive agreement in principle which need not be described in detail here, because it has already been done elsewhere.[1] It will suffice if some of the main points of agreement are set out.

Both were educators of humanity in the fullest sense of the word; they wished to do something for mankind

1. e.g., by Vogel.

and never ceased striving to create a new world. Their conception of humanity was not limited to a particular class or to one nation; they advocated universal education, education for all men. They held man's final purpose to be the attainment of moral freedom and independence; they conceived the process as development from a life governed by natural instinct to one ruled by moral knowledge based on reason. The education of the individual meant for them, therefore, the full development of what is truly human in man, i.e., the full development of all his inherent dispositions and capacities. Fichte put it in this way: "To educate a man means to give him opportunity to make himself complete master and ruler of his whole power"; Pestalozzi spoke of educating man to be man. Fichte held that to educate the pupil for a particular class is certainly superfluous and usually pernicious too; while Pestalozzi maintained that training for occupation and class must always be subordinated to the general aim of human education. Yet it must not be thought that they ignored the claims of the community in education; it was no one-sided individual education and no utilitarian training for the most necessary needs of the present that they advocated. By gradual stages the perfection of the human race is ultimately to be achieved, and the individual is educated in order that moral life may really exist in the race. This view accounts for the optimism concerning the future of man which both combine with dire pessimism concerning their own generation, which seemed to them to be characterised by material self-seeking. Their fundamental criticism of the existing system of education is the same, that it has not really influenced the lives of its pupils; they agree that for the capricious and blind system that prevails a

definite and deliberate art of education must be substituted.

In the general conception of the process of education both embody the same principles. They regard will as the chief factor of psychical life and hold that psychical life is everywhere and in each individual the same, being subject to universal laws. The seeds of development are immanent in psychical life and develop in a certain order and at a definite rate when stimulated by perception. Man is therefore originally neither good nor bad; he decides for good or evil according to his own free will, and the aim of Fichte and Pestalozzi is to secure as far as possible the free choice of good by submitting the individual to the formative influences of community life. They do not regard all men as equal; rather do they emphasise the natural inequality of men and insist that the process of education must keep pace exactly with the evolution of the pupil's powers. Moreover, they consider that the process is applicable equally to boys and girls, and advocate a system of co-education which embraces the same curriculum for both sexes.

Since they regard the moral culture of the individual as of the first importance, morality is for them the criterion of the worth or worthlessness of every activity in life. Morality, however, is possible ultimately only through self-activity; it is in the exercise and development of self-activity, therefore, that the essence of education consists. Now an intellectual training which encourages clear perception will develop self-activity, and is valuable, therefore, not as an end in itself but as a means to the development of morality. It is formal mental training then which is of such peculiar importance in the eyes of Fichte and Pestalozzi; the knowledge that results there-

from is a mere by-product. This view causes them to regard science as having in itself no particular or independent value. They undervalue the sciences and overrate as subjects of the curriculum mathematics and especially language, to which they give pride of place because, as Fichte says, learning a language means learning to think. Both of them emphasize, however, the importance of developing the physical powers of the pupil. Alongside instruction, therefore, they range work like gardening, agriculture, cattle rearing and handwork, which will make the pupils self-supporting and thereby help their moral development as well as fit them for their future occupations. Besides, both believe that these manual occupations will enable their schools, once they are started, to become self-supporting. Their theory that psychical life is subject to universal laws is used by them to support the view that there can be only one good method in the art of education, while of course their demand for self-activity on the part of the pupil makes them condemn all methods which involve mental passivity, like the mechanical exercise of the memory.

But although the resemblance between the theories in principle is striking we must not think that the two men were in any sense dependent upon each other. Apart from the difference in their ages—Pestalozzi was sixteen years older than Fichte—both men were far too independent in mind to be blind followers of each other. Besides, of course, their interests lay generally in very different spheres, and in education in very different aspects of the problem. Pestalozzi was above all the practical schoolmaster whose theory was constantly undergoing change as the result of his practice; while Fichte was the speculative philosopher who considered the problems

of education only because of the dire distress of his country. This fact accounts for many differences of detail in their views on education. In spite of his interest in education Fichte realized that his own vocation lay elsewhere, in philosophical study. "The task of my life," he says, "is rather to leave behind me a clear insight into the highest principles. . . . . I have indeed taught from my youth up and recently I have taught my son; but the aim has always been the future scholar and I have never practised popular instruction. I have no outstanding inclination for either." His educational theory was deduced by abstract thought from first principles without reference to experience, with the result that he makes large absolute demands which take no account of practical school work. His power of abstraction robbed him of feeling for life, of the power of adaptation to school conditions. On the other hand, Pestalozzi's philosophical equipment was very disproportionate to his skill in teaching and to his practical schemes for education. He arrived at his theory by intuition, based on a rich fund of living experiences of men and life, with the result that his demands are moderate and practical.

In spite of their agreement that morality is the aim of education they differ as to its real meaning and content. For Pestalozzi morality is subjective; for Fichte it is objective. Fichte finds the essence of morality in service on behalf of the community; Pestalozzi considers that morality is quite individual and cannot be shared by any two people. They differ in their views of the State; for Fichte there is such a thing as the ideal State, which every man is to serve with all his powers; there are to be no purely individual aims. To Pestalozzi the idea of the perfect State is simply absurd; there is always conflict

between the interests and claims of the individual and the State, and the individual is the only proper basis for the real ennoblement of human nature. Again, Fichte sought to reform the whole educational system, while Pestalozzi confined himself to the education of poor, neglected children. Moreover, Pestalozzi valued home education highly, except in cases where the influence of the home environment is unwholesome, whereas Fichte advocated the abolition of family education, for a time at least. Finally, in the actual process of education Fichte will have an A.B.C. of the sensations precede Pestalozzi's A.B.C. of the perceptions, because he holds that sensations and not perceptions, as Pestalozzi thinks, are the simplest elements of consciousness.

Besides, Fichte had his own independent criticism of Pestalozzi's theory to give. This does not mean that he failed to appreciate it ; indeed, he was probably the first of their contemporaries to grasp completely the greatness of Pestalozzi. He contended that Pestalozzi had found the sole remedy for all the ills of mankind, though he had sought much less, only the salvation of poor, neglected people. He maintained that the limitations and paltriness of this purpose were the common source of all the mistakes in terms and proposals contained in Pestalozzi's system of instruction, mistakes such as making reading and writing practically the aim and climax of popular education and considering language the best means of developing clear ideas.

Fichte valued Pestalozzi's ideas because they contained the foundations of the social reforms which had become necessary and also the elements of his own ethical theory. But he felt that Pestalozzi's ideas were infinitely greater than Pestalozzi himself and that even the latter

did not realize what he had achieved. Pestalozzi was certainly the first prophet of national education; but he had thought only of the education of the poor. Fichte carried this thought to its final conclusion. It seemed to him that Pestalozzi's scheme of popular education, if fully developed into national education, would raise the mass of the people, remove every difference between them and an educated class and might have the power of helping nations and the whole human race to rise from the depths of their misery.

He realized, too, that Pestalozzi did not fully understand the truth but grasped it by intuition, that he felt, rather than proved, his views to be true. In other words he considered that Pestalozzi's work lacked theoretical foundation and that the absence of this meant at times contradiction between what he did and what he meant to do. Thus, for example, Pestalozzi's scheme for beginning the perceptual training of the child with a knowledge of his body really contradicted his principle of beginning with the subject, just as the memorizing of words before they were understood was in opposition to his principle of training in direct perception. This absence of clearness and consistency in Pestalozzi's views Fichte attributed to the fact that Pestalozzi lacked training in philosophy, and one of Fichte's correspondents insists that Fichte has given the ideas of the "holy blockhead" Pestalozzi the form which was so much needed and which some people had erroneously claimed for them.

Similarly, on the other hand, although Pestalozzi recognised the greatness of the service Fichte had rendered him in the *Addresses*, a service which had for him, his work and his aims results which no man's words had ever had, and although he recalled in later years that his conversa-

tions with Fichte had greatly illuminated his mind and exalted his heart, I feel that no one could say with justice that Pestalozzi drew any real inspiration from Fichte.

Among other men who helped to mould Fichte's educational theory we may mention Rousseau, Kant and Bernhardi. We know that Rousseau, whose works Fichte read in early youth, exercised great influence upon him, stirring him to the inmost depths of his being and inspiring him to work for the economic, political and moral independence of his people. We know, too, that Fichte read Rousseau's *Emile* while he was a tutor at Zurich from 1788 to 1790. Like Rousseau, Fichte is an apostle of liberty. Both of them believe love of the good to be innate, and Fichte emphasizes, with Rousseau, the fact that it is society, not nature, that corrupts us. We may compare with Fichte's conception of the aim of education Rousseau's ideal, not to train man to be an obedient subject but rather to cultivate all that is human in him, to foster his full and unfettered individuality by the development of all the powers implanted in him by nature. With another fundamental principle which Fichte champions we may compare Rosseau's view that no one can acquire either moral or intellectual culture except through his own exertions and experiences.

The debt which Fichte owed to Kant in philosophy and ethics is undoubted and acknowledged, and the influence, especially in ethics, must have extended to his educational views. Kant's actual pronouncements on educational topics were so scanty that we need not look for any direct influence, but we may note and compare with Fichte's scheme Kant's view that public education is preferable to private, because children brought up at home will first learn and then propagate the faults of their

parents. Kant, like Fichte, regards the education of the individual as essential. According to Fichte, however, this education must never lose sight of the interests of the community and particularly of the nation of which the individual is a part ; in this respect he completes Kant.

Bernhardi was a philologist and second master at the Werdersche Gymnasium in Berlin, of which he became director in 1808. He was on intimate terms with Fichte's family and taught young Hermann Fichte Greek. Fichte acknowledged fully the debt his views on education owed to the long discussions he had had with Bernhardi. He speaks of Bernhardi as an able and excellent teacher, the guardian and stern protector of the ancient thoroughness, and says that Bernhardi and he have been so long in agreement concerning what is set down in the Deduced Scheme of 1807 about the improvement of schools that it would be difficult to decide which of them is the real author of the idea. Fichte adds that he considers Bernhardi indispensable if any reformation of schools is undertaken.

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The impulse to appear in public as the champion of educational reform came to Fichte from his study of the distressful condition and dire need of his country in the years 1806 and 1807. Napoleon's campaign of 1806, culminating in the severe defeat of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt and in the disastrous Treaty of Tilsit, had reduced Prussia to a state of abject subjection to France and Napoleon. Fichte, who had fled from Berlin in October, 1806 and remained in Königsberg during the winter, returned to Berlin at the end of August, 1807, to find Prussia completely humiliated and the French troops still in occupation of the city. It seemed to him that

the activity of the German race was restricted and fettered and its very existence threatened by the encroachments of the foreigners; thenceforward its development would be determined by the alien power that governed its fate.

Fichte was not content with realizing the dangerous position of his country; he probed deeper into the underlying causes. His investigations suggested to him that the State had collapsed at the first serious attack upon it because of the decay and corruption of the government of the country. The symptom of this decay in the foreign politics of the State was the deliberate neglect of all the ties by which its own safety was bound up with the safety of other States. The sign of corruption in the government of the country was its slack and feeble rule. The disintegration of the State was apparent also in the severance of those ties of hope and fear that unite the members of a community. Normally the individual fears the consequences which misconduct against the community will bring upon him in this life; the weakness of the government in frequently failing to punish neglect of duty had robbed this fear of its impulsive power. Similarly, the government's evil practice of rewarding individuals for reasons other than that of services rendered to the community had caused hope of earthly reward to become ineffective as a motive in the life of the individual. The motives of hope and fear in regard to a future life which religion establishes in the individual had been destroyed by the purely material calculations of the prevailing intellectual movement, which not only killed the moral sense but treated ideals like love of fame and national honour as illusory phantoms. The members of the State, therefore, no longer restrained by fear of it and spurred on by greater fear of a foreign power, had disloyally

abandoned it to its fate. The rulers, abandoned and betrayed on all sides, had been compelled to purchase their further existence by submission and obedience to foreign schemes, while those who in battle for their country threw away their arms had had to learn to wield them bravely under foreign colours against their mother country.

To Fichte these facts were but signs of more deep-seated corruption. He will not lay the blame on the particular persons who happened to have been in the highest places, and declares it is useless for Germans to blame one another for the existing state of affairs. It is everyone's fault; it is the whole spirit of the age that has brought such misery upon them. The State has got into its present position because of the lack of religion and morality in its citizens. The motive of everyone's actions has been mere material self-seeking; this has spread until it has mastered everyone, both subjects and rulers, and become their sole motive in life. The result has been complete destruction and the irony of a foreign power forcing upon them in place of their own selfishness other aims which they had formerly refused to accept.

Such Fichte believes to be the present state of his country. He conceives his generation to be living in the third great epoch of human life on earth.[1] This is the epoch in which mankind frees itself, directly from the rule of reason as an external ruling authority, indirectly from the dominion of reason as instinct, generally from reason in any form, and gives itself over to absolute indifference towards all truth and to unrestrained licentiousness.

Having investigated the causes of this terrible state of affairs, Fichte examines possible remedies, means

1. For these epochs see note to p. 1 of the Addresses.

whereby the nation may raise itself from this state of abject dependence. He holds that this resurrection cannot be effected by resistance; that was useless when the nation was still in possession of all its powers, and is, therefore, of no avail now that the nation has been deprived of the greater part of them. Nor can it be accomplished by government holding the reins firmly and strongly; that might have availed earlier, but now the hand that appears to hold the reins is really steered and guided by an alien hand. Again, the nation cannot obtain its independence by looking to the conqueror; naturally he will hold fast to the advantages he has won and exploit them in every way, unless he is cowardly and weak, in which case he will soon fall a prey to another conqueror, without the original captives being in the slightest degree better off. No one, he believes, can help the Germans in their present position but themselves; they must find the remedy and apply it. The only effective remedy he believes to be a complete regeneration, the creation of a totally new order of things, the formation of an entirely new spirit for the age. That alone can avert the downfall of the nation and preserve its existence; that alone can raise it from its state of abject dependence and restore to it an individuality that is self-supporting and quite incapable of any dependence upon others.

Such regeneration can result only from the education of the nation to new life. Fichte believes the existing system of education incapable of achieving this, and finds in it two main defects. It has been futile because it has not even touched, far less trained, the roots of impulse and action in life; secondly, it has failed because it has been given only to a small minority and not to the whole people, on whom in truth the commonwealth rests.

The existing system of education has failed because it has not touched the roots of impulse and action in life; it has trained only a part of man. Now, the parts of man are will and understanding. In the training of will the existing system of education has failed almost completely; the educator has lacked clear knowledge of morality, the aim of education. The very recognition of, and reliance upon, free will in the pupil is the first mistake of the old system. Its admission that in spite of all its efforts the will remains free, that is, hesitating undecided between good and evil, is a clear confession of its impotence and futility. It is not that the existing system has failed to bring before the eyes of the pupils some sort of picture of a religious, moral and law-abiding disposition, of good habits and of order in all things, or has failed to exhort them to copy such pictures in their lives. These things it has done; but it has stimulated and developed the wrong motive, that of sensuous enjoyment, believing that the pupil cannot otherwise be influenced or controlled at all; with the result that the moral motive, if developed afterwards, has come too late and has found the heart already occupied.

Hitherto material hope and fear have been employed as the sole motive for setting all life in motion, instead of pleasure in the right and good for its own sake. That is why many men have remained children all their lives, needing for their satisfaction the approval of neighbours and believing they have done nothing right unless they have pleased the latter, instead of being able to rise above the judgment of others and satisfy themselves by knowing what is contained in the moral world and being able to sit properly in judgment on themselves.

Fichte complained that education had been too much

" influencing the pupil," and too little " interaction with the pupil," and that it had aimed, consciously or unconsciously, not at developing the inner power of the pupil, not at training him for his own use and as the instrument of his own will, but at making him a soulless instrument to be used by others, thereby accustoming him always to await stimulation from without. He complained that hitherto there had been no *art* of education, that the system had been based on a false conception of the destiny of man, in that it wished to educate him under the influence of the church for bliss that could begin only after death. He maintained that it had a false conception of the nature of man, in that it burdened him with original sin. He held that it educated him not for manhood, but for a particular occupation. Especially did he contend that it did not take into account the enormous unconscious influence of adults on children, which made the latter like their parents and substituted an eternal vicious circle for a steady development. The simplicity, innocence and natural faith of the young in the greater prefection of adults has made it possible for us, he says, to infect them with our corruption ; this means that each generation is more corrupt than the previous one, because its education takes place of itself without our will, in so far as children educate themselves to be like their elders. Usually the great majority of us are thoroughly perverse. In contact, therefore, with us our children must inevitably become corrupt.

Moreover, education has been defective in the development of the understanding. It has not aimed at stimulating regular and progressive mental activity, from which knowledge would result incidentally ; it has aimed definitely at a certain amount of knowledge.

Moreover, this was not a knowledge of the laws which condition all possible mental activity ; it was a knowledge of the actual qualities of things as they are. It involved, therefore, purely passive reception by means of the power of memory and was completely at the service of things.

That is why under the old system of education the pupil generally learned unwillingly and, therefore, slowly and but little, and why extraneous motives had to be introduced, learning not being attractive in itself. When memory is used alone and without any purpose in view the mind is passive rather than active, and it is easy to understand that a pupil will be very unwilling to enter into this passive state. Besides, acquaintance with strange things and their properties, which have not the slightest interest for the pupil, is a poor recompense for the passivity inflicted on him. His aversion was overcome, therefore, in various ways ; by raising hopes of the usefulness of this knowledge in the future, by asserting that it alone would enable him to make a living and a reputation, and even by immediate punishment and reward. In this way knowledge was made the servant of material welfare from the very beginning ; and in order to influence the pupil at all, this education, the content of which was quite incapable of developing a moral sense, was obliged to implant and develop moral corruption in him and to unite its own interests with his corruption. There were exceptions, of course ; but it was the greater natural talent of these pupils which, enabling them to learn willingly and, therefore, well, helped them to overcome the moral corruption of the environment and keep their characters pure. Natural inclination gave them a practical interest in the subjects and, guided by their happy instinct, they aimed at producing knowledge, far

more than at merely receiving it. Moreover, education usually succeeded best with those subjects, like Latin, which it allowed to be practised actively, simply because the development of mental activity by means of instruction produces pleasure in knowledge and so keeps the mind open for moral training, whereas purely passive receptivity paralyses and kills knowledge, just as it inevitably corrupts the moral sense completely.

The existing system of education strove merely to produce some skill in the affairs of the sensuous world and was quite silent concerning any supersensuous world. The world of the senses was generally accepted as the only true and really existing world; education brought the pupil into contact with it first and led him on to thought that was for the most part about it and in its service. Education not only assumed, but also taught its pupils from early youth onwards, that man has a natural aversion from God's commandments, and further, that it is absolutely impossible for him to keep them. What else could be expected of such instruction, if it were taken seriously and believed, than that each individual should yield to his absolutely unchangeable nature, should not try to achieve what has been represented to him as impossible and should not desire to be better than he can be? Indeed, he acknowledged the natural sinfulness and wickedness attributed to him, because baseness in God's sight was represented to him as the sole means of coming to terms with Him. The religion of the past even separated the spiritual life from the divine and procured absolute existence for the spiritual life by apostasy from the divine life. It used God as a means to introduce self-seeking into other worlds after the death of the mortal body, and reinforced self-seeking in this world by fear

and hope of these other worlds. Such a religion was obviously a servant of selfishness.

Fichte complained that the child was given words instead of things and modes of speech instead of sensations ; the words became dead letters, in which the child was immersed. The system did not let the pupil cling to perception but drove him thence to shadows in the form of words and to abstract ideas which became ever more shadowy and more removed from reality. This was a complete reversal of the correct order.

Fichte's second main criticism of the existing system of education is that it has been given only to a small minority and not to all ; it has not been national education. As a rule education had been a privilege of the higher classes only and the private concern of the parents, who arranged it to their own satisfaction ; their children were usually sent to school simply because schooling would some day be useful to them. There was public education of a sort—one might even call it national education in a very limited sense ; but it was simply education for salvation in heaven. Its essential elements were reading, with writing if it could be managed, and the Christian religion. Otherwise the development of man was left to experience of actual life and to the blind and casual influence of the society in which he grew up, and all other education was purely vocational. As soon as the rulers of the people became clear about the true aim of government, however, and realized that the sphere of State action lies in the visible world, it was evident to them that anxiety about the eternal salvation of their subjects was not their concern. Thenceforward they considered that they were not obliged to contribute to educational institutions ; if they ever made an exception, it was in favour

of institutions for higher education, which shed their splendour far and wide and brought fame to their patrons. The education of the people, on the other hand, soon fell into a state of increasing decay after the Reformation and remained neglected ; yet the people are the real foundation of the human race, who always restore culture, and on whom in turn it must continually react. The primary object in teaching reading and writing—the spread of Christianity—was soon forgotten and these subjects, which were formerly means, became ends in themselves. The more enlightened the State considered itself, the more firmly it seemed to believe that it could attain its true purpose merely by means of coercive institutions and without any religion and morality in its citizens, who might do as they liked in these matters.

Fichte's criticism of the age, though severe, seems historically justified. Arndt wrote of the same period : " The evil from which the country suffers most is the weakening of character. The present generation is like an old man who has become childish."

Moreover, his keen insight rightly diagnosed the faults of the existing system of education. Popular education could scarcely be said to exist at all in Germany at the end of the 18th Century. Luther had certainly proclaimed the need for it ; but the elementary school, which he really created, had for a long time been merely a class for the teaching of the Catechism. With a few isolated exceptions the children of the lower classes learnt at school only reading and writing, and that very indifferently ; in the Protestant countries they also learnt their catechism before confirmation, but even the duty of teaching this was generally delegated by the pastor to the parish clerk. The teacher's post was often filled by a

zealous workman, an old soldier, or even some servant out of employment who gathered the children together for an hour or two on Sundays to teach them reading and writing as well as he could. To such people was the education of the people abandoned towards the end of the 18th Century.

Of course there were exceptions, as has already been indicated. Francke, the founder of Pietism, laboured earnestly and successfully in Halle from 1695 until his death in 1727 to make the children Christians. He established a free school, an orphanage, secondary schools for boys and girls and a training college for teachers, which together provided accommodation for more than 2,000 pupils and which subsequently became models for similar institutions in other parts of the country. Rochow, touched by the material and moral wretchedness of the rural population in his own part of the province of Brandenburg in 1772, founded village schools at his own expense in which reading, writing, counting and Christian morality were taught. His schools were successful and won for him the approval and support of the Government of Frederick II, but he was opposed by the clergy, naturally perhaps, for he would not let them have anything to do with his schools. The reactionary government of Frederick William II did not continue the experiment which, although a step in the progress of education, had no other result at the time than once more to attract the attention of Prussian statesmen to the necessity of organising the instruction of the people independently of the church and to demonstrate to them the possibility of such organisation.

In addition to the efforts of Francke and Rochow on behalf of the education of the lower classes, we must

remember that some of Pestalozzi's experiments in education date from the last quarter of the 18th Century. He conducted what we might call an industrial school at Neuhof from 1774 to 1779, taught orphan children at Stanz for a time in 1798 and helped to educate the children of the townspeople of Burgdorf from 1799 to 1804. But he was comparatively unknown before the Burgdorf period and his real influence on the educational practice of the time dates from the opening of the institute at Yverdun in 1805 It is certain that his efforts had little effect upon the education of the masses before Fichte delivered his Addresses in the winter of 1807.

The education of the upper classes was in many respects scarcely more satisfactory than that of the lower classes; it was individualistic and intellectual, and, therefore, incomplete. The aim was to educate clever, intelligent, reasonable men, fit for their worldly occupation. The training of the understanding was, therefore, the chief aim of instruction; such moral education as was attempted was based on custom and resulted only in unintelligent action and ignorance of motives. The results were unfortunate for the nation; the educated and moneyed class became cosmopolitan and took no interest in their own country, being in fact quite indifferent to and unappreciative of national affairs. The chief evil of the time was egoism, the worst form of selfishness; the only virtue seemed to be the furthering of one's own advantage. Moreover, the uneducated masses of the nation were frivolous and easy-going and had little or no understanding of national problems. Other factors no doubt contributed to the downfall of Prussia and to the destruction of German power, but it is a justifiable criticism and a historically true judgment that the false

educational principles of the time did the country infinite harm by keeping the people in a state of dependence and in dangerous ignorance of social, communal and state affairs.

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His survey of the existing system of education forces Fichte to the conclusion that a complete change in the system is the only sure means of preserving the existence of the nation and of enabling it to rise again to new life. Once education has been put right, it will be easy to set in order the other concerns of humanity.

The new system which Fichte advocates is intended to produce a totally new order of things and to begin a new creation by developing men of a type quite different from what has been usual. Since he holds that the presupposition of all practice in education is a system of ideas or conceptions of what is to be, we would do well to enquire what aims he sets before education.

The ultimate purpose of society is the regeneration and ever-increasing ennoblement of the human race until it is animated by the highest morality and consciously and voluntarily orders all its relations according to reason. This purpose is achieved only when earthly and sensuous creatures are transformed into pure and noble spirits who are impelled solely by their taste for the right and good, provided with an understanding that always recognises the right and good, and equipped with full physical and spiritual power to carry out their will on every occasion. Such people will conceive it to be their duty to carry on the sublime work of the benefactors of the human race by making those around them wiser, happier and better; they become eternal through the permanent effect of their influence upon mankind.

Since moral action is the ultimate purpose of the world-plan and the supreme vocation of man, education must aim at morality ; it must succeed in producing men and women who are inwardly and fundamentally good. The well-developed character must be no chance result ; it must be definitely intended, deliberately pursued and inevitably produced.

Now morality does not consist either in withdrawal from the world for the purposes of pious contemplation and devotional introspection or in striving after sensuous enjoyment for its own sake. It consists in vigorous action upon the external world for the sake of the community, whereby the individual forgets himself and at the same time becomes more free and increases the supremacy of reason over nature. To be moral, action must be quite uninfluenced by external motives and occasioned solely by internal necessity ; it must be conscious, independent and spontaneous. Its highest and purest form is action undertaken solely in the clear conviction of duty, which brings no accompanying delight and enjoyment to the doer but merely meets with his cold, calm approval.

Since spontaneity is a characteristic of moral action, we must determine whether self-activity can be awakened and developed in man. Fichte assumes that this is possible on the ground that the foundations of everything, though no more than the fundamental tendencies, are inherent in man's nature and proceeds to consider what roots of impulse and action there are in man upon which education may work for the development of morality. He finds in every human being one fundamental and ineradicable impulse, the tendency to action, which however takes two forms. In so far as man is a rational being this impulse appears as a striving towards freedom, towards indepen-

dence of everything external to him ; in so far, however, as man is an empirical and finite being, compelled by his own nature to postulate a non-self, a world of sense, in opposition to his own bodily self, the impulse appears as the instinct of self-preservation striving towards a purely selfish enjoyment of the world. The moral problem is solved by acting upon the world of sense with the ultimate purpose of emancipating oneself entirely from it, because in this way the two forms of the impulse are united, the aim of the first form being superimposed upon the sphere of action of the second form.

At times we feel that Fichte himself was not quite clear concerning man's moral endowment. For instance, in several passages he condemns as fallacious the assumption that everyone loves and wills his own material welfare and that the child is innately selfish, on the ground that its truth would make moral education impossible, and maintains that love of the good is innate in every child. It seems probable, however, that he really means us to understand that man's nature makes it possible for him either to be selfish or to love what is good and right, and that the character ultimately produced in man is determined by the particular course of his education.

If this is the correct interpretation of his views, then the problem for moral education is to prevent the instinct of self-preservation, the natural form of the original impulse, from getting the upper hand in the individual and leading him to sensuous enjoyment and material self-seeking. This is achieved by feeding the impulse upon a picture or clear idea of what is right and good, so that impulse and insight fuse to form love of what is right and good for its own sake, which in turn stimulates its possessor to realize the good in his life, man's love being

the sole and infallible motive of his will and actions. Thus, as it were by translating the fundamental impulse into consciousness in the form of clear ideas of what is right and good, self-seeking is avoided altogether and cheated of its development. Unless this is done the impulse appears in consciousness as a dim feeling, which finds satisfaction in love of self and sensuous enjoyment.

But what of the early years of life before the child has formed an ordered system of ideas of right and wrong and can distinguish between good and evil? Is moral education impossible during this period? Again, how is it possible that when he is able to grasp it the idea of what is right and good is so attractive to the child that it enlists his love on its behalf? Fichte has an answer which suffices for both questions. So ineradicably fixed in human nature that moral culture may always be connected with it there is the instinct of respect, which in the child takes the form of simple faith in the higher perfection of adults and becomes the desire to be respected by them and to measure by their respect for him how much he should respect himself. It is this instinct which alone renders moral education possible and enables grown-up members of society to convey to children ideas of right and wrong which will influence their future conduct. It is in and by society, therefore, that man is educated to attain the highest aim, the subordination of all natural impulses in the service of morality.

Yet we must remember that morality cannot be produced in man by compulsory or artificial measures, like threats of punishment or promises of reward. It must develop in him of itself; man can become virtuous only by his own exertions. We must respect the freedom of our fellows to do what they choose to do; we must

not hinder them or meddle with them against their will, for this would be unjust. Nor may we hope to induce morality in children by means of theoretical arguments, founded on reason and on their own insight; such arguments presuppose a knowledge of good and evil in the persons addressed and assume also in children more reason than we attribute to ourselves, for most adults act from inclination rather than from rational conviction.

Any deliberate attempt therefore to educate the child to virtue is doomed to failure because it will kill the inner moral sense and produce hypocrites and double-dealers. As external social relationships develop and become clear to the child morality will awaken in him and gradually grow in the quiet places of the soul, provided that we surround him with good examples and keep everything base and vulgar away from him. The good example will win his respect and will stimulate in him the desire to respect himself by doing something worthy of respect. He will wish to respect others in so far as they have made themselves worthy of his respect, and to respect himself in so far as he has done something worthy of respect; in other words he will gradually form a standard of self-respect.

The arrangements made in the educational institution will also aid in the process of moral development by showing the children clearly the difference between mere legality, or obedience to law, and true morality, which consists of voluntary self-sacrifice for the welfare of the community. The child who disobeys the laws and regulations of the school is punished; the child who obeys is not praised but is encouraged to make voluntary sacrifices on behalf of others. These sacrifices receive appropriate recognition in private from the particular teacher whom

the child has chosen as his adviser in matters of conscience; public recognition might corrupt. The result is the development of self-control by the subjection of selfishness.

For Fichte, therefore, moral education is not theoretical instruction but practical training, especially in habit. The child is to become accustomed by practice to speak the truth and to obey. Then some day the educator will proclaim to the child the moral law, not to speak or act wittingly and deliberately against his conscience; the realization of this law brings the child inner composure and becomes for him the source of integrity, which is the mother of all virtues.

In another passage Fichte declares that wherever possible education must be merely interaction with the pupil, not influence upon him. It is difficult, however, to see how he reconciles this statement with the training in self-respect, obedience and self-control by means of example and social approval which has just been described.

But moral action is not only free and spontaneous; it is also intelligent and conscious; it is action in accordance with ideas, for it is performed only in the clear conviction of duty. It is in this connection that mental training plays its part in the process of moral education. Mental activity is developed in the pupil in order that he may create for himself a picture of the ideal moral order of life, a picture which is not a copy of reality but rather its prototype. Unless it is created voluntarily by the pupil, it will not be sufficiently attractive to fuse with his love and become a motive in his life, impelling him to work with all his might to realize it. How then are we to ensure that children do create this picture of the ideal moral order of life? Fichte will have children separated from

their parents and living in a separate self-contained community, the organization of which will reflect the ideal order of moral relations and so serve as the model from which the child will sketch his picture. The constitution of this community will be based on the assumption that all its members are capable of love for the ideal order. Legislation will certainly prohibit various actions and punishment will be employed if necessary to enforce these prohibitions. But there is no need to anticipate that fear of such punishment will react unfavourably on the moral development of the pupil ; it teaches him, not to act, but merely to refrain from certain actions ; besides, he will be told clearly that control by punishment or by threat of punishment marks a very low stage of civilization. The distinctive feature of the communal life, however, and that which will promote morality, is that every member will be expected voluntarily—compulsion must be avoided here at all costs—to work for the community in some definite way by helping others or by undertaking responsibilities of various kinds. No reward, not even praise, is to be expected or bestowed upon the voluntary worker, who must learn that he is only doing his duty ; his reward is the pleasure of doing something for the community.

It is easy to test whether the volunteer's picture of the ideal order is true, clear, vivid and spontaneously created, because this is a question of knowledge ; for the individual the test of its correctness is the feeling of truth which accompanies it only when it is true. He who volunteers habitually for further tasks and joyfully performs them shows by his deeds that he is burning with love and zeal for the ideal order of life. He knows what is contained in the moral world ; his will is stable and infallible ; he is his own judge and independent

of the verdict of others; his moral education is complete.

But we have assumed a certain kind of mental activity; is it really possible? Once more Fichte feels justified in asserting that man's mental nature is subject to one fundamental law, which is that he strives to engage directly in thought, such spontaneous mental activity giving him the greatest possible pleasure. Education, therefore, need only develop this spontaneous activity.

Fichte holds that the individual attains his knowledge of the world by his own activity. Working unconsciously, that activity produces the world of sensation which we assume, by a very natural error, to be external to ourselves. Active reflection on sensation gives rise to perception. The activity of understanding fixes the perceived objects, on which in turn the activity of judgment freely reflects. Finally, reason is the absolute power of abstraction. The development of knowledge, therefore, results from a progressive alternation of productive and reflective activity, while ultimately all knowledge is a knowledge of self.

Intellectual education must start, therefore, from the self, which is to be experienced as the support of the simplest contents of consciousness; the latter are for Fichte the sensations which are given directly to the self. The child begins by reflecting on the states of his own inner life; he has to recognize and express the impressions which arise in him and the needs he feels. Intellectual education must guide the pupil to perception and root him in it, so that his mind is ever alert and self-possessed.

Moreover, this intellectual education is morally valuable, because it gives man the elevating certainty of freedom. Insight into the fact that the consciousness

of something external to him is nothing but the product of his own power of representation makes mortal man feel free and rescues him for ever from the fear which humiliates and tortures him. The moral value of education to spontaneous mental activity lies further in the fact that the expenditure of energy involved always gives rise to pleasure, which is pleasure in an activity that is free from sensuous interests. Moreover, although such pure activity is not morality itself, it is the general condition and form of the moral will ; for will, as an activity that pursues aims, implies the power to create freely and spontaneously ideas of aim and of our possible influence. We do not act because we know ; we know because we are destined to act.

Again, the creative mental activity which is to be developed in the pupil is an activity according to rules, which gradually become known to him. This activity, therefore, produces clear understanding of the general and infallible laws of natural events and human life. Such clear knowledge of the relations and laws of natural and human life is morally valuable in itself.

Mental development, therefore, is not the chief and original aim of education, but only a condition and means of moral training ; knowledge is only a secondary product in the development of will. Nevertheless the mental training, though acquired but incidentally, remains for the pupil an ineradicable possession and the ever-burning lamp of his moral love. Moreover, learning thus spontaneously and for the sake of learning, he will learn much and will learn it correctly, unforgettably and with the greatest possible pleasure. Again, since knowledge is never developed in him without love, none of the knowledge he possesses remains dead and cold within him when

the possibility of its coming to life arises; but all of it inevitably influences life, so soon as life requires it. Finally, no matter how small or great the total amount of knowledge which he may obtain as a result of education, he will certainly have developed a mind that is capable of grasping every essential truth and of reflecting for itself and susceptible to instruction from others.

Individuals differ in developed mental capacity, because experience varies in its action on the human mind and in its development of capacity and talent, determining thus the different kinds of individual character.

The development of man's body must proceed simultaneously with the development of his mind, each individual being exercised thoroughly in every possible use of his physical powers and accustomed to effort and hardship. Care for the body, like development of the mind, though useful and therefore important for the future vocation, aims mainly at making and keeping it a proper tool for morality by strengthening and increasing its health and beauty.

Moral and mental training, however, do not comprise the whole of education. Man is not only a member of human society; he is also a link in a higher spiritual order. An education which is concerned with the whole of a man's being must, therefore, train him to religion. Fichte considers that morality and religion are one, in the sense that both are a reaching-out towards the supersensuous, the former by action, the latter by belief. Religion is the knowledge of the indwelling of our life in God which answers man's final question and solves for him the last contradiction, thereby bringing complete unity into his understanding, making him perfectly clear to himself and delivering him from every foreign yoke. It is not

needed as a motive for action in the regulation of the ordinary affairs of life in a well-ordered community; morality suffices entirely for this purpose. Religion has but two spheres of action; an immoral and corrupt society, and the re-creation and maintenance of the social order, for instance by the ruler, who must look for his model not in the social order itself but beyond it. The universal national education is not concerned with either of these spheres; the knowledge of religion obtained by the pupil, therefore, is not practically applied; it is only in later life, and provided that he rises to a higher stage of social relations, that he will need religion as a motive for action.

Religious education aims at producing inward religiousness of heart and a knowledge of the higher spiritual order. The former is the attitude of submission to One who is above everything sensuous which comes of the feeling that He *is*. We must not attempt to teach this attitude systematically; that would be fatal, for it would kill the inner sense for religion and produce the hypocrite. The feeling and the attitude will come of themselves as a result of our whole system of education. This establishes integrity in the hearts of our pupils, and produces in them the habit of thinking and acting virtuously by making them obedient, grateful and patient, and by keeping them from vanity, conceit and harshness of judgment. It brings them into the society of enthusiastically religious men who know how to communicate their enthusiasm to others and whose example is a demonstration of the religious life. Finally, it trains them in suitable devotional exercises, such as prayer, which are the most powerful and effective means of attaining to religiousness of heart.

Theoretical instruction concerning the divine should

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not be attempted unless and until religiousness of heart is awakened. When it is given it should be such that the children can understand it and perceive its connection with their lives and its influence upon them. When the pupil is old enough to take part in the religious activities of a church, the minister of his particular persuasion may instruct him in its doctrines. The educational system will rigorously avoid any interference in this matter.

Education will produce a knowledge of the higher spiritual world-order by stimulating and guiding the pupil to create spontaneously in thought a picture of this order. He will then realize clearly that what really exists is the spiritual or divine life that manifests itself in living thought, and will learn to keep holy his own spiritual life and that of every other human being as eternal links in the chain of manifestation of the divine life. Education can easily test whether the pupil's picture of the spiritual world-order is true, clear and spontaneously created, because this is a question of knowledge.

Moral, religious, intellectual and physical training therefore comprise for Fichte the whole of education. Aesthetic training he subordinates entirely to moral training. Aesthetic pleasure he regards simply as the result of the harmonious agreement of what is with what should be in morals. Everything appears beautiful to man in so far as he removes whatever to his spiritual eye is distressing, distorted and ugly. There is only one criterion in education, the promotion of culture and morality. Art, like everything else, is to be judged by this standard. Nothing, he says, is aesthetically beautiful that is not morally true ; the better the man, the better the artist.

The education which Fichte proposes is not to be given to any particular class ; all must have it because

all are human beings and because the intention is to mould the sum total of individuals into a corporate body. It is to be universal national education. What then are the institutions by which he will have this education carried on ?

Fichte's view of the home as an educational institution changed profoundly during his lifetime. His earlier view of the function of the home as an educative influence is contained in his *Science of Rights* (1796) and *Science of Ethics* (1798). The parents must educate the child because it is their duty to preserve it—by which he means apparently, to preserve its physical well-being—to foster its freedom and to enable it to become a moral being by developing its faculties and giving it moral guidance. The parents alone are to lay down the principles of their child's education and decide when it is complete. Even when it is complete it will still be the duty of the child to venerate its parents and the duty of the parents to care for the child, because they know the child's character better than anyone, having seen it grow and helped to develop it. But the child is in no wise the property of its parents ; their control over it is based solely on their duty to educate it.

The radical alteration in Fichte's opinion of the home as an educational institution seems to have taken place between the writing of the *Aphorisms on Education* in 1804, when he still regarded the family group as the ideal educational community, and the delivery of the *Addresses* in 1807. In these he asserted that, especially among the working classes, education cannot be carried on in the home. Like Plato, he would put educators in the place of parents and prevent any contact between the latter and their children. He denies that the father

has naturally the right to educate his child and reap the love and devotion which that relationship implies.

This change in Fichte's attitude towards the home was really the logical consequence of his low estimate of contemporary society and his anxiety for the moral improvement of the next generation, together with his conception of child nature and his own experiences as a child. He believed that nature bears man in innocence but that society makes him good or bad, and considered that his own generation had fallen too low to be able to solve the problem of its own moral regeneration. "We have seen enough," he says, "of what will happen if mankind as a whole repeats itself in each successive generation as it was in the previous one." That way improvement does not lie. Among the working classes the hardships, financial worries and sordid cares inevitably infect the children and clog their moral and intellectual development. There must be a complete break with existing conditions if the reformation of mankind is to be achieved; education, the most important of all institutions, must be left to chance no longer.

He does not deny that in certain circumstances family education is good, but he asserts that everyone has a right to receive the best possible education and that family education is never the best, because it cannot be conducted with the clearest understanding. Besides, family education varies, because families are so dissimilar; whereas education should be exactly the same for all children.

There was probably nothing in the recollection of his own childhood to deter him from advocating the complete separation of children from their parents as soon as possible. He had left home at a very early age

and the first seven or eight years of his life seem to have left him no fragrant memories of family life and no definite sense of any great educational benefit derived therefrom.

It is not, however, that he would abolish home education for ever. He had no desire to quarrel with Pestalozzi over the hopes that the latter entertained of the mother's influence in education; but he would postpone the question of the part which the home should play in national education until one generation had had the benefit of the new education. Moreover, he urged that compulsion would be required only in the first generation. He probably thought that once the new education had set society on the right track there would be no need to separate children from adults.

The school, therefore, is the supreme, and indeed the only, educational institution. Fichte does not tell us much about the type of school which will be created by his new system of universal national education, except that in the main it will be modelled on those established and conducted by Pestalozzi. The children are to be completely isolated from all adults except their teachers, and live together as separate communities, the organization of which is precisely defined and based on rational principles. These schools will be co-educational. The education of boys and girls in separate institutions would violate several important principles which Fichte laid down for the development of perfect manhood. He regarded the female sex as quite indispensable for teaching boys manners and believed that the best way to make the girl a woman is to develop completely what is truly human in her nature by educating her along with the boy. Besides, he would have boys and girls recognize and learn to love the common humanity in one

another and be friends before their attention is drawn to sex distinctions and they become husbands and wives. Finally, he considered that co-education would foster the ideal relationship between the two sexes, viz., stout-hearted protection in the boys and loving helpfulness in the girls.

At the outset each school will be supplied with a building and an adequate piece of land, and will be suitably equipped. Thereafter it should be very largely, if not entirely, self-supporting. Any help that must be given should be in kind and should consist only of natural objects which the school does not possess. The pupils should not know that their products have been increased in this way ; or, if they do, they should receive the supply as a loan and return it within a definite time-limit, in order that the institution may appear self-supporting, to them at least. In any case, once established, these schools will cost little to maintain. Every child is to realize that he is indebted absolutely to the community and must share its fortunes. Moreover, he must contribute to the independence and self-sufficiency of the school-community with all his strength and without thought of profit for himself by helping to make every tool and article of food and clothing needed in the institution. These experiences will teach him the honourable independence of communities like the family and the State and the relationship of their members to them. They will also enable the pupil to earn his own living and teach him the proper management of his resources, thereby promoting both his economic and moral independence.

It is not clear at what age Fichte intends the child to enter the national school. His demand that from the very beginning the pupil shall be under the influence of

this education is too indefinite to serve as a clue. He will have every pupil remain at school until his education is finished, half an education being no better than none at all, because it does not alter the existing state of affairs. Again, it is not clear how long the child is to remain at school. Fichte certainly says in one passage in the *Addresses* that if his scheme were put into operation at once the better generation described would exist in twenty-five years, but I fear that this statement also is much too vague to serve as the basis of even an approximate estimate of the normal duration of the school course.

The innate intellectual talent displayed in education determines the position of everyone in the realm. It differentiates men into the two distinct classes of scholars and people in the narrower sense. Apparently Fichte bases this analysis on the fundamental distinction of body and mind in the unity of the human being. The scholars are the thinking element, the people the realizing element, in the population. The scholars alone are to order and guide human affairs. The virtues of the others, whom Fichte called sometimes labourers and hodmen, and who are destined to maintain the human race at the stage of culture it has already reached, consist in punctual obedience and careful avoidance of all independent thought and in confiding the direction of their occupations to the scholars.

The supreme aim in their education is of course the culture of the will. The development of the understanding is much less important. Usefulness for the occupation to be followed determines the extent to which mind and body are to be cultivated. The various vocations, other than that of the scholar, demand above all things strength, dexterity and endurance of body ; all men should, there-

fore, be trained in those elementary abilities which are necessary in every occupation. Intellectual culture is here but a means; only sufficient is needed to enable the workers to understand what belongs to the labours of their vocation and to the perfecting of their art. Fichte deplores the fact that, apparently owing to the baleful influence of the scholar's mode of life upon popular opinion, far too high a value has been put on intellectual culture, causing many to desire that all should become scholars. He maintains emphatically that the chief aim of national education is to produce men, not scholars.

Fichte has only some general observations to make on the curriculum which should be the core of instruction for the ordinary pupil, boy or girl, under the new system of national education. Begin, he says, by developing properly and regularly the power of sensation, training the pupil to make his sensations clear to himself and thereby enabling him to discriminate correctly. In this way the child will obtain a knowledge of himself and of what is not self. He will also feel the need for adequate self-expression; this need forms a starting point for training in speech, which in turn compels the further discrimination of sense-experience and the progressive development of self-consciousness. Then follows training in perception, to help the child to make his perceptions clear to himself. This includes training in the relations of number and measure and stimulates the free activity of the mind to the creation of ideal pictures, among which would be the planning of a social order of mankind, pictures which fill the child with joy and pleasure and so incite him to realize them. The child will ultimately come to think and judge for himself.

During this process of what we might call intellectual

education, Fichte emphasizes the importance of treating the child, when reason begins to appear in him, as a reasonable being and of putting him always in the company of people who will converse with him as if he were reasonable, so that ultimately he becomes reasonable. Moreover, Fichte will make the child acquainted with the actual world and in a practical manner, which is the only fruitful way; he is to get to know the surrounding world by its signs and uses and make with things whatever can be made. The child is ready to begin this as soon as he can walk and use a few sounds as symbols for definite objects. During this period he should learn good habits, such as distinct pronunciation, clear expression, proper carriage and deportment.

Counting he will learn while being trained in perception. Reading and writing are to be postponed until the very end of the course, because of the danger of plunging the child into the driest of all symbolic worlds, that of the dead alphabet, before he has become acquainted at first hand with the actual world. At the end of the course the child should be taught reading and writing, as a kind of parting gift, by being led to analyse the language, which he has been master of for a long time, and discover the letters and their use. This will be easy work for him after the training he has had and will prevent him from having his attention distracted and entering a world of shadows and dreams. Some science might be done with the pupil, who might also find useful a preliminary knowledge of mankind, obtained from History, and of the civil constitution of the existing world.

The development of the pupil's bodily powers would proceed simultaneously with his intellectual education, the teachers in both cases taking care to follow the general

principle of keeping pace exactly with the development of the child's powers. Exercises such as striking, carrying, throwing, pushing, pulling, turning, and swinging, would be performed in natural sequence for the purpose of making the hands and feet of the pupil act in harmony and in obedience to his wishes. Moreover, work would be combined with learning, because the pupils would take part, according to their age and strength, in gardening, agriculture, cattle-rearing and other forms of manual work which are necessary in their community. The pupils must understand the principles of what they do and also receive instruction in the knowledge necessary for their various occupations, while the machines and tools required will be invented and made in the school. Knitting, spinning, and similar forms of manual work Fichte regards as inferior; if included at all they should be treated as incidental.

The subjects of instruction are fundamentally the same for both sexes; arrangements for the necessary differences in the manual tasks allotted to boys and girls respectively can easily be made and carried out.

Moral education begins with the suitable stimulation of the instinct for respect which is innate in the child. The organization of the school-community must not only ensure obedience to its laws—this is mere legality—but also encourage voluntary self-sacrifice for the welfare of the community. Moreover, the pupil will be stimulated in his mental training to create voluntarily a picture of the ideal moral order of life after the pattern of the school-community.

The scholar is the teacher and guide of the human race and must work deliberately and with clearness of purpose for its moral development. Now he cannot labour successfully in this task unless he is himself a good

man, for we teach, not by words alone, but also and most impressively by example. The scholar ought, therefore, to be morally the best man of his age. Moreover, he is not a scholar for his own convenience; his vocation is to be not only the real ruler of the community, but also its servant.

As the teacher of the human race his function is to enlighten both himself and the people by mastering and increasing the knowledge of his age and by developing the theoretical insight of the people into their true needs and the right means for their satisfaction. He must, therefore, make a comprehensive survey of the progress of the human race down to his own time and also picture to himself the ultimate goal of human development, freedom and complete inner harmony, and its attainment through the pursuit of truth, beauty and goodness. He must strive to cultivate his own mind by solitary meditation and speculation and by systematic study, and will seek to increase the knowledge of his age by exposing errors or establishing new and correct conclusions; the truth he will pursue for its own sake and at all costs.

He will seek to bring other men to complete manhood by developing and refining in them their innate feeling for what is true, beautiful and good. He will use neither force nor deception in this attempt, but only the methods of true education. The superintendence of the universal national education must be always, therefore, in the hands of the scholars, who alone understand its final purpose. Moreover, the scholars must educate their successors and so provide for the continued performance of their important functions. The scholars who make this work of education their profession are called teachers.

As the guide of the human race the scholar's function

is to lead human society gradually and steadily on from its existing conditions to that final perfection which his vision of the ideal has set before him, so that the actual social relations approximate ever more closely to the ideal. This means actually ruling the community and arranging the occupations of all its members. The scholars who undertake this task form the body of higher government officials.

Permission to become a scholar is to be granted only to the boy who shows a strong inclination for the world of ideas and a dominant impulse to build up such a world in himself. On the other hand, provided these conditions are fulfilled, permission must be granted always and without regard to so-called difference of birth ; for such talents are the precious possession of a nation and must not be lost through remaining unknown. Strong inclination for the world of ideas shows itself in that unselfishness which renders possible legality and especially morality and which, suitably fostered, becomes religiousness. A dominant impulse to build up in oneself a world of ideas expresses itself in dissatisfaction with the external world and the desire to erect thereon an inner and unified world of ideas.

The education of the scholar rests upon the universal national education. Really it has to do nothing but preserve the chosen pupils in their innocence and simplicity. The means thereto are partly suitable instruction for the development of understanding and speech and generally of the inner world, partly separation from contact with evil.

Education must accustom the scholar to solitary reflection and exercise him in mental self-activity without guidance from others. He receives the instruction given

by the national education but is exempted from the manual work which the other pupils undertake, and devotes the hours thus gained to the study of whatever his future profession specifically demands. He is supposed, however, to get the general knowledge of agriculture and other mechanical arts, and their particular methods, which is to be expected of every man. He must learn writing sooner than the ordinary pupil, because it is the means of making solitary thought audible. His sense-organs are to be developed, the eye by perspective drawing, the ear by exercises in singing and, if talent permits, by learning a musical instrument Knowledge of the surrounding world he will gain better from direct experience in life and conversation with others than from study and special lessons. But the chief subject of instruction is the ancient classical languages, Greek first, then Latin, together with ancient history and classical geography. These are the best means of developing mental power. The second main subject of instruction is Mathematics, especially Euclid. Modern languages are to be learnt from life itself, at the instigation of a need that is genuine or created artificially. Any systematic and speculative study of the sciences before the years of adolescence, apart from the learning of Mathematics which has already been described, is harmful.

Although his body is only a means of supporting and maintaining his mind in the sensuous world, the young scholar must on no account be exempted from the physical exercises that are prescribed for the universal national education. He should enjoy fresh air daily and should have his body harmoniously developed by means of such exercises as dancing, wrestling, fencing and riding.

Fichte regards the University as the institution

expressly designed to secure, by handing on the highest culture from generation to generation, the steady uninterrupted progress of the intellectual education of the race, which is the exclusive condition under which the divine manifests itself ever more clearly in the world. In virtue of this function the University is the most important human institution, the visible representation of the unity of the world and the manifestation of God Himself. It is the top of the tree of education, whose stem is the lower school for scholars and whose root the system of universal national education. Philosophy and the philosophical aspects of the various particular sciences as determined by philosophy are the subjects studied in the University. Training in the practical application of such subjects as law, medicine, and theology, however, is carried on in institutions specially established for the purpose.

There are three classes of students in the University :

(1) The *Regulars*—who have satisfied their teachers in written work at the end of the first session, or who have come up from school fully qualified. They form a kind of close corporation, enjoy communal life, wear special academic dress, and are supplied with all necessaries, including pocket-money.

(2) The *Novices*—students coming from school who have not yet qualified for admission as Regulars, but who are candidates for that dignity.

(3) The *Confederates*—other students attending the University but not full members of it like the Regulars.

Candidates for admission to full membership of the

University as Regulars must satisfy the following conditions :—

(*a*) They must have received a suitable education in the lower scholars' school. The candidate must be able to understand thoroughly in a given time a passage from an author which is set before him and which is suited to his capacity, and must prove that he understands it correctly. He must also show that he has a general knowledge of all the necessary scientific material. He must be familiar with the general literary vocabulary of the scientific world, which is the tool by means of which alone he can understand and make himself understood.

(*b*) He must devote his whole life to his purpose and consequently isolate himself completely from all other modes of life. The scholar must regard science, not as a means to some other end, but as itself the end.

(*c*) He must be secured from all anxiety about external matters, by being given suitable maintenance in the present and guaranteed adequate provision for the future.

The principle concerning the payment of fees is that he must pay who can, while for him who cannot pay all, the fees must be reduced proportionately. It is not payment that qualifies for admission, but achievement of another kind. No one, except the parents or guardians and the university administrators, need know which pupils have places that are wholly or partly free.

The Mastership is conferred on those students who are perfect in an art. The thesis for the mastership

should be on a theme set by the teacher of the subject and calculated to show whether the candidate has developed sufficiently to overcome the greatest obstacle in his nature known to the teacher. German, not Latin, is the language in which all theses are to be written. Regulars educated in the University and held worthy of the mastership have first claim, together with the first teachers in the University, upon the chief offices of State. Normally, all the chief citizens should follow this course, which would divide their lives into the three epochs of learning, teaching and practising.

Fichte regards the Universities and lower schools for scholars as interacting closely with one another, improvement in the one leading to improvement in the other, and tries to determine their exact relations. To the lower schools for scholars he assigns the task of developing speech, which is the instrument of all understanding, and of teaching their pupils the outlines and elements of science. They are schools for teaching the scientific use of the understanding as memory or the capacity for comprehension. The function of the University, on the other hand, is to criticize knowledge, separating the true from the false, the useful from the useless, and subordinating the less important to the more important. It is the school for teaching the scientific use of the understanding as the capacity for judgment.

It is not possible to establish a University unless the suitable teacher is first found. He must be versed in the art of philosophising and know how to train his pupils to skill in that art, so that some, after learning elsewhere the particular sciences, become artists in them, while others become so skilful in the art of philosophising itself that they in turn are capable of training others in it.

In this way the transmission of scientific art is assured for ever. The teacher needs complete knowledge of science and love for the art of philosophising. This love is of divine origin and the characteristic of highly gifted natures ; it is not to be expected of everyone, therefore ; nor is it a permanent gift, for the wings of genius are free to turn away.

When the University begins there must be only one teacher in the art of philosophising, so that no one but himself will have any influence on the development of the pupil in this art. This encyclopaedic teacher, as Fichte calls him, sets the written work which tests the students. He is the special teacher of the Regulars and of those who are trying to become Regulars, together with the junior teacher, or extraordinary professor, whom he appoints to teach part of the subject. The extraordinary professor may also teach the Confederates.

As the University develops, Regulars are selected to form seminars for future professors in the various subjects, under the supervision of the ordinary teachers ; from the members of these seminars the University teachers are appointed, in the first instance for one year. If they are found suitable they are appointed junior teachers or sometimes encyclopaedic teachers, if there are vacancies.

After retiring, teachers continue to give help and advice when occasion arises on special items of knowledge and points of technique to their younger colleagues. They constitute an Academy of Science and a Council of Elders in the University. Together with the teachers who are still active they form the Council of practising teachers and the Senate of the University.

Fichte ridiculed as costly and injurious the usual teaching practice in the University, whereby the lecturer

talked continuously, often merely repeating what was already contained in books. He conceived the function of the University to be unique ; it is a school for training in the art of using the understanding scientifically. Everything, therefore, that can appear in a book theoretical and dead, must be made practical and the living possession of the pupil.

The ultimate aim then is not knowledge, but the art of using knowledge. Skill in this art can be developed only when the pupil works according to a definite plan and under the supervision of the teacher. The teacher stimulates the activity of the pupil by providing material, which may be his own lectures or books set for regular and systematic study, a principal part of the art being to learn the use of books. The pupil himself works up the material, while the teacher remains in a position to judge from the result the degree of skill which the pupil has attained and to decide therefrom what fresh material to supply.

The relationship between teacher and pupil is one of continuous conversation ; both express themselves in dialogue, the pupil asking questions and the teacher counter-questioning in the Socratic manner. Besides having these discussions with their teacher the pupils converse among themselves about scientific matters, so that they gain from the views and experiences of one another and form a real community of learners.

In addition to conversing with his pupil, the teacher examines him in the spirit of his art. A question is stupid and injudicious which requires as the answer something heard or read, because the object of study is, not the ability to repeat constantly in examinations what has been learnt, but the power to apply knowledge to life's problems

and to put it into practice. A question, therefore, must assume some knowledge and require as the answer its application in the drawing of some conclusion.

The teacher must also set problems for his pupil to solve in writing. The purpose is the same as in the examination, to require the application and not merely the reproduction of what has been learnt. The progress of the pupil is not to be measured by his ability to repeat what he has learnt ; for he may have learnt it by heart or copied it from his notes or some book. It is to be measured by his power to use freely and independently what he has learnt. Normally the teacher himself will set the problems ; he must, therefore, be skilled in devising exercises which will show infallibly what stage the pupil has reached in his education. The more experienced pupils, however, may also be asked to devise similar problems for themselves and their fellow-pupils. These written compositions will exercise the pupils in the art of expounding scientific matter, and the teacher will judge them partly by the arrangement, clearness and exactness of the exposition.

A thorough, systematic study of science ennobles of itself. Moreover, the arrangement whereby the Regulars and their teachers form a single great household under liberal supervision, and wear academic dress, assists the moral development of the pupils by introducing order unconsciously into their lives and ensures respect for them from the rest of the people. The household will have a family court, consisting of all the ordinary teachers and members appointed by the Regulars and presided over by the elderly and venerable scholar, formerly a teacher in the University, who is the father of the family and the supervisor of the household. Finally, special means will

be adopted for the moral education of the pupil; care will be taken to develop in him, by means of example and precept, love of honour and feeling for the sublime.

Fichte considers it bad policy to have school and University situated near the homes of the pupils and gives three reasons for his view. First of all, he considers it degrading to man to let him grow up and continue to live insensibly in the sphere in which he was born and spent his early life. No one should be refused the right of commencing life again independently; he should be lifted out of all the relationships of family, district and country which hold him as it were in leading strings and placed among strangers who will value him solely for his personal worth. Secondly, the usual practice, according to Fichte, is at variance particularly with the character of the scientific man, who needs freedom of outlook, restricted neither by time nor place, and who is dishonoured when chained to the soil, a mode of existence which is pardonable at most in the case of the manufacturing citizen. Distance attracts the ardent spirit, who faces the unknown with courage because he wishes to gain experience from it. Thirdly, the prevailing custom hinders the organic union of all into one and the same citizen-body, and so causes the separation of individual towns and provinces from the great community, the State.

He holds that if these bad features of the existing arrangement are recognized, it will be found that no real reason can be given for the existence of more than one University in the same State. The expression "provincial university" contains for Fichte a fundamental contradiction; for the University removes what is particular. It is clear, therefore, that a State should have one University only. Fichte applies these principles to his

own country and advocates the abolition of all other Universities in Prussia in favour of the new University of Berlin and the transference of their incomes and endowments to it.

Women are not to attend the higher schools and Universities. Fichte maintains that woman is not inferior to man in intellectual talent, but holds that their minds have naturally quite a different character. Man brings everything to clear conceptions, whereas woman has a natural feeling of discrimination for what is true, good and appropriate; her very femininity makes her pre-eminently practical, but by no means speculative. Women are therefore excluded completely from government offices and may not become teachers, preachers, doctors, or lawyers. All other professions, however, are open to the unmarried woman, though Fichte hopes she will exercise her rights with womanly modesty. Woman need not envy man his monopoly of the higher branches of education, nor complain of her exclusion from them. She will obtain in society all the results of culture, and will lack merely the shell of scientific form which, however, is a very subordinate thing, being only a means, never an end. Women are best fitted to write popular works on education and ethics for their own sex, though on the whole Fichte considers writing by women a most disastrous business.

Fichte indicates a few general characteristics which all teachers should possess. No one, he claims, can be successful as a teacher unless he has been educated to freedom and can, therefore, influence those who are as yet unfree. The right to be an educator lies in control over children. The teacher must know how to behave before children and must have acquired, by continuous

practice, the power of restraining himself, at least while children are watching.

The primary teacher he regards as the intermediary between the scholar and the people. He need not be a scholar himself. It is sufficient if he knows the general outlines of science well enough to make himself understood, and has the ability to learn more by subsequent reading, if necessary. The special characteristic of the primary teacher is a pious heart that loves mankind, especially the people. This is the essential quality to consider when admitting people to the profession; it is far more important than extensive knowledge or other glittering talents.

The teacher in the lower schools for scholars is to be a true scholar; he must have a vision of the ideal; a vision which, if not perfect, nevertheless fills him with ardour. The subjects studied in these schools will lift him who pursues them thoroughly and conscientiously above vulgar modes of thought. The honour and dignity of the teacher's vocation calls for suitable external circumstances and independent status in society.

The qualifications of the good private tutor are first that he loves education for its own sake and, therefore, seeks a post not as means to some other end, but as an end in itself; secondly, that, even if he knows only a little of what he is to teach, he has the mental ability to learn easily what he needs, and also knows or can acquire the most suitable methods of teaching it.

The teacher performs two main functions in school. First of all he influences the child's moral development. He should accustom him imperceptibly to what is high and noble and estrange him from what is low and ignoble. When chosen by the child, he should act as his adviser in

matters of conscience, giving counsel whenever the child finds it difficult to do right, helping him with friendly exhortation, serving as his confidant when the child undertakes voluntary actions and crowning with approval in private the child's good deeds. He should point out the child's faults, not, like a judge, in order to punish, but, as an educator, in order to lead the child to improve.

Secondly, the teacher must train the minds of his pupils to see the ideal and comprehend it by their own efforts. This means teaching children to think, and can only be achieved by bringing order and sequence into their thoughts. To discover how to do this is the most difficult thing in education; but without this knowledge the teacher cannot instruct his pupils. In training the minds of his pupils the teacher will take into account their capacity for training and the extent to which they have already been trained.

Fichte also considered that teachers have important functions to perform in the community; in fact, as his conception of the State and of its relationship to education developed, he rated higher and higher the importance of the teaching profession and finally decided, like Plato, to put the whole guidance of the State into the hands of the teachers. According to the individuality which each shows in education they are to organize themselves into a group and appoint therefrom as ruler either him whose actions have proved him possessed of the highest understanding or a senate elected by vote. They are also to decide for the community its occupations and professions, and assign to everyone his proper place in the community. Recognizing that skilled workmen and husbandmen are of no value unless they are Christians, the teachers will

educate the people to Christianity and give them thorough instruction concerning the State, its aim and its laws.

Indirectly the teacher is a public official, for he educates the people's teachers and the State officials; in so far as he is a public official he may receive a salary from the State and be under its supervision. Of course, the State cannot prescribe what he is to teach—that would be a contradiction of his vocation; but the State can see to it that he does really communicate in the best way what he thinks he knows. The teacher is, therefore, both a public official and a scholar. It is his duty to separate both functions in his conduct; for when he is a public official he is not a scholar, and when he is a scholar he is not a public official.

Fichte makes only a few points concerning the sources of supply for the teaching profession and the training of the teacher. He emphasizes the paramount necessity of securing capable teachers when schools are first established, and recommends that these be obtained from Pestalozzi's Institute. Every school should regard itself as a training college for teachers and, perhaps only as a temporary measure, he would entrust children of more tender age to older children in school. He recommends future scholars to teach during the interval between the completion of their studies in the University and their appointment to public posts.

He will not have the schools for scholars or Universities used for the training of intending primary school teachers, on the ground that these need quite a different kind of education. He recommends the appointment of a committee, consisting of competent theologians and preachers, to frame a definite plan and establish a special institution for the training of elementary school teachers,

who should receive their preliminary education in the lower school. The encyclopaedias produced in the Academy will give them the necessary scientific knowledge and references to the literature on the subject. The philosopher will train them in philosophising, and give them an idea of their vocation and of the means of fulfilling it. A book embodying the fundamentals of true religion and morals contained in the books of the Bible will give them sufficient material for connecting their teaching with the Bible; they need not understand the biblical writers in their true sense. Practising teachers will train them in the art of social intercourse with the people.

Fichte regards the State as an institution established on the basis of a contract voluntarily made by men to secure their freedom of action within certain limits and to protect their property, by force if need be. It aims at the maintenance of internal peace by means of law, and individual freedom must be limited to achieve this purpose. The natural boundaries of States are drawn where the same language is spoken.

Later he adds a second aim, and emphasizes it as the more important. The State must see to it that everyone who works can satisfy thereby his material needs, because morality demands that man shall be able to live by his work and the natural mechanism of industrial life does not necessarily ensure this. It must, therefore, organize work so as to make poverty and idleness alike impossible.

Finally, in the *Addresses* and especially in the *Theory of the State* in 1813, Fichte adds yet another aim and emphasizes it at the expense of the others. The aim of the State is the same as the goal of human development, viz., that man may order all his relations in accordance with the laws of reason. It will do all it can to achieve

this purpose. It will promote the moral welfare of its members and direct the powers of all towards the common purpose. It will allow all men equal access to those sources of culture which will prepare them for their vocation, by establishing the absolute equality of all men in personal and civil freedom, privileges and rights. But there are limits to what it can do ; religion, science and morality are beyond the scope of its activities.

Religion is as old as creation, and, therefore, older than any State. It lives invisibly in the heart and never makes itself apparent in outward actions ; whereas the State can order only the visible actions of men. Religion is love, whereas force is the instrument of the State ; and nothing can be more perverse than the desire to enforce love by outward constraint. The State must never attempt to use religion to further its purposes. The influence of religion on the State is that it summons up deeper sympathies in aid of the purpose which the State is pursuing and impels the State more powerfully towards the attainment of that purpose.

Science, strictly so-called, is raised far above common life and has no direct influence upon it. As the State develops, therefore, it becomes more and more estranged from science.

The State can enforce negative good manners upon its citizens by means of legislation and government, and positive good manners by establishing equal rights for all. Thus it can remove the most powerful obstacles to the development of pure morality. But it cannot force men to morality, the source of which lies in their own free will. The compulsive power of the State assumes the absence of good will or morality and the presence of ill will, the outbreak of which it represses by fear of punishment.

If morality and religion are to develop, the State must allow the individual the greatest possible amount of freedom.

Legal right is superseded when morality develops, because the moral man needs the constraint of no law; the law accords with his will. The State, therefore, is not part of the final purpose of human life, but a means to the formation of a perfect society; like all human institutions which are merely means to an end, it always tends to make itself superfluous. The ultimate aim of government is to make itself superfluous.

It is noteworthy how Fichte's idea of the State gradually develops and how the relative emphasis on the three aims of the State is gradually changed from the actual towards the ideal. The similarity between these aims and those of Plato's ideal State is striking.

Fichte's earlier view of the relationship between the State and education is contained in his *Science of Rights* of 1796. In order that the existing generation may be replaced by new citizens, which is a condition of the possibility of a State, the State has the right to make the education of children a condition of the State-compact. Education thus becomes a legal obligation upon parents, and the State makes it the duty of parents to educate their own children. The State has no right to decide the principles on which children are to be educated; these the parents alone determine. The State has the right to establish public schools, but it is for parents to decide whether they will use them; the State has no right to compel their use. The State has the right to see that the child is educated, and, therefore, also the right to prevent the child being used in any way which would make education impossible. Only the parents can decide

when the child's education is finished ; the State, however, liberates the child indirectly, by giving him a civil office or some civil right or privilege, which sets him free from parental authority.

Later, Fichte modified considerably his view of the relationship between the State and education as the result of the change in emphasis on the various aims of State action. The problem for him now is to make the actual State approximate more and more adequately to the rational State, in which men, being virtuous, would live with one another in justice and peace. The transition can be accomplished only by means of education. The State in accordance with reason cannot be built up by artificial measures from whatever material may be at hand ; on the contrary, the nation must first be trained and educated up to it. Only the nation which has first solved in actual practice the problem of educating perfect men will then solve also the problem of the perfect State.

Fichte regards this as possible because he rejects the assumption that everyone seeks his own welfare and the corollary that the State must compel every man against his will to promote the general well-being. He holds that there is innate a love of good, which can be developed by education into that firm and certain spirit which is the only possible foundation of a well-organized State, because one element of it is love of the community. This spirit is the mainspring that will preserve and regulate the life of society. The genuine art of politics seeks, therefore, to create this spirit by educating all the nation's children.

Since education aims at the improvement of the human race and the State exists for the same purpose, which it cannot attain by coercive institutions, the State should promote education by defraying the cost and

compelling parents who resist to give up their children to its influence. As the supreme administrator of human affairs and the guardian of its citizens the State is responsible only to God and to its own good conscience, and has a perfect right, therefore, even to compel its citizens for their welfare, just as it has the right to compel them to do military service.

Fichte claims that his new system of education will produce the completely and harmoniously developed man, inwardly perfect and master of himself and outwardly fully equipped for all his purposes in time and eternity. It is certain that he will know his particular vocation in life and love to fulfil it, while he will always have the ability to be what his vocation demands. He loves, and lives for, the spiritual world alone and constantly strives, therefore, to make the actual world better. Such a man does not regard the actual world as something to enjoy; and his reason for this view is not that he considers enjoyment a sin, but that he knows it will not bring him true joy. The world is rather a sphere within which it is his duty to act; and in order to extend his sphere of action and make himself a more fitting instrument of duty he exercises all his powers to the full.

The new education ensures, therefore, that the aim of such individual development is not selfishness, but service to the community and the ennoblement of one's fellowmen. It develops in the individual keen sensitivity to the welfare of the community and the ardent desire to remove from it whatever is bad and unworthy. Moreover, it promotes the welfare of the community by educating the good citizen. It trains the individual to love his vocation and devote all his powers to its fulfilment, and so increases the power and wealth of the State by providing it with

trained, intelligent, hard-working, self-supporting citizens and removing in great measure or altogether the need for expenditure on poorhouses, convict prisons, reformatories, and regular armies. By making him love his country and see in the eternal development of his people the hope of his own immortality it develops the true patriot, dutiful in the pursuit of his occupation in time of peace and ready to sacrifice property and life itself in the defence of his country when war threatens.

But nationalism and patriotism are not the final aim of the new education ; it must extend its benefits to the whole human race, so that ultimately mankind becomes through morality a real unity, a single inwardly united Christian State. For this purpose nations must educate their sons in no narrow and exclusive spirit, but in a universal and cosmopolitan spirit. It is true that each nation will aim in the first instance at educating its own citizens to the highest and purest morality, the goal of human development ; but it is equally true that it will desire to extend its achievement to the whole human race by disseminating its own spiritual goods and absorbing those which other nations have to offer. Cosmopolitanism and patriotism are, therefore, interrelated, and he who is the most powerful and active patriot is also the most active citizen of the world.

In this way will be achieved the purposes of the world-plan, for the fulfilment of which the human race exists. By the general diffusion of culture Nature, which exercises an influence upon the existence of the human race as well as upon its actions, will be wholly subdued to the jurisdiction of the understanding as the material condition which enables man to fulfil his moral duties. Finally, the whole human race will attain the highest and

purest morality and God will reign in the world alone and everywhere, as moral Being, through free will and insight.

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The significance of Fichte's observations on the external and internal political situation of his country does not really concern us here. It may be mentioned in passing, however, that his statements are true to fact, even in detail. Very cogent are his remarks on the futility of increasing expenditure on police institutions, convict prisons, reformatories and poorhouses instead of creating a proper system of education. His description in the thirteenth Address of the reaction of men's minds from war and the consequent longing for peace and order is no philosophical argument but a surprisingly accurate interpretation of the state of mind which was beginning to appear in France at the time; while his analysis, in the same Address, of the psychology of the world-conqueror and his attendant soldiers of fortune is only too true of Napoleon and his followers.

Our present problem, however, is rather to estimate the influence of Fichte's ideas on the development of education in Germany. We have already seen that his description of educational conditions corresponds closely to the actual state of education at the time and we shall soon realize that his principles of educational reform agreed with those held by the enlightened statesmen of his day.

Admittedly in Fichte's writings on education there is much verbosity and repetition. His thought and language are often difficult and at times obscure. Some of his ideas are false, others are crude and gross exaggerations, others again are quite fantastical and chimerical.

What was there, then, in his theory which could and did influence the development of education in his own country? There are at least four points which demand close attention here.

In the first place, Fichte's words animated his countrymen with zeal for educational reform and stimulated them to work for its achievement, and that at a time when few people had the courage to demand anything so exalted from their slack and feeble contemporaries. The spirit of his words awakened slumbering sympathies. He made his fellow-countrymen believe in themselves and in their nation. Scarcely anyone, it has been said, "has spoken so greatly, deeply and proudly of the German nation," and his Addresses have been hailed as one of the greatest deeds of the German spirit. The fire of his eloquence, the loftiness of his ideas, the ardour of his patriotism, the rare earnestness of his convictions, all these lend his words a life and grandeur which have made them immortal and help to account for his moral influence on subsequent generations as well as on his contemporaries. He gave noble and permanent expression to the greatest and deepest sentiments of the time; the enthusiastic desire to raise mankind to a higher and better level, the passionate belief that what should be is also possible and the firm conviction that the achievement of a new and higher civilization depends on man's own efforts. It is true, of course, that but for the co-operation of men like Stein and Humboldt many of Fichte's ideas could never have been realized at the time. It is true also that many of his particular suggestions and proposals did not find favour with his contemporaries and were quietly ignored. It is true, finally, that, in spite of occasional stimulating and suggestive remarks like his criticism of the place and

value of memory in the educational process and his able exposition of the true functions of the teacher, he offers few hints which the teacher can apply to his practical work. It may be that he dealt too much in general and abstract terms to be the author of a working plan; he himself certainly claimed only to have planted seed and admitted that he was content to leave its development to others, his own powers and time being devoted to other and quite different pursuits. But such admissions in no way detract from the value of the tremendous stimulus which his writings gave to the movement for educational reform in his country, and it is in this general influence that we must seek first and foremost the significance of his educational theory.

A second great service which Fichte rendered to education in his own country was his passionate advocacy of a national system of education. He stated admirably the case for State control of education, defining the rights of the State, its duties and its powers in relation to education. At the time Stein was attempting to reconstruct the organisation of the State; he began by establishing self-government in towns and cities and by emancipating the peasants, his intention being to found the State altogether on the spontaneous activity of free citizens. At the same time Scharnhorst was creating a new national army, based on universal compulsory military service and embodying the same idea, that the State is founded on the willing force of its free citizens, ready, if need be, to defend its existence with the sword. Fichte's contribution to the movement for the reform of the State was to convince influential men that all such reform must begin with the better education of the next generation. It is true once again that many of Fichte's views on a national

system of education were never actually carried out in Germany. But his insistence on the fact that education is the most important business of the State undoubtedly had a great effect on the framing of the German State system of education and created a firm foundation for the German educational system of the 19th Century. Moreover, he was the first to give utterance to the great idea of a universal education as the basis of a common nationality for the German people, and his contention that the content of popular education in Germany should be typically German, with German language and history as the main core of instruction, helped to give a definite stamp to German education in the 19th Century.

Thirdly, Fichte described the goals at which systems of education in the 19th Century should aim. As the three main tasks of education he gives the development of the individual for the sake of the community into which he is born; the stimulation of the individual to self-activity, resulting in the formation of independent self-reliant men and women; the formation of the good will, the development of moral character. It is interesting to note that when Humboldt reconstructed the educational system in Germany in 1809 and 1810 the main idea of his reform was to cultivate self-reliance through self-help. The re-organisation of the German secondary schools was an attempt to encourage true self-culture by abandoning the old lifeless methods of teaching in favour of a living and spontaneous reception of all that was most worth knowing, while the central idea in the early development of the primary school was to rouse the masses from their passive indolence and make them free personalities, intellectually and morally independent. Of course, it may be urged, with truth, that in the course of the 19th

century, German education departed far from the threefold aim indicated above; but for that Fichte cannot justly be held responsible.

Finally, it was Fichte who introduced Pestalozzi to the German people and helped to make his ideas known and to get them accepted. He was the first to point definitely to Pestalozzi and the first to recognise and state publicly the significance of Pestalozzi's ideas on education for the moral and political regeneration of the State. From the time of the Addresses, Pestalozzi's name was identified in Germany with the idea of national regeneration; his works were read more eagerly than ever and thenceforward his method met with no more opposition but was accepted and reigned supreme in Prussian schools.

Since the influence of Fichte's educational ideas on the development of education in Germany consisted largely in stimulus it is difficult to trace in any detail the course of that influence. In the early years of the 19th Century many of the influential people of Prussia were full of zeal for educational reform and of understanding for Pestalozzi's ideas. Such were Queen Louise herself, statesmen like Stein, Beyme, Humboldt, Altenstein, Schön, and Schrötter; together with their subordinates, men like Nicolovius and Süvern, and the principal directors of normal schools, Harnisch and Diesterweg. How far their zeal for education and sympathy with Pestalozzi's ideas were due to Fichte's influence is almost impossible to determine with any accuracy. It is certain that Stein was influenced by Fichte; and he himself testified to the great influence made by the Addresses on the minds of the educated classes. The educational schemes of his ministry bear witness to the influence. His cabinet order of January 6, 1809, enunciated, as the

fundamental principles of the reorganisation of primary instruction, among other things, that school education and instruction are the affair of the State and that the aim of primary instruction is not to impart knowledge, but to form the judgment, common sense, the moral and religious spirits. Moreover, that part of his political testament which concerns itself with education appears to have been inspired by Fichte's influence.[1] Beyme, too, acknowledges Fichte's influence in a letter written to him in February, 1808: "You know me and can, therefore, yourself judge how strongly and deeply the greatness and truth of your lecture has gripped me. I have read and read again especially the first lecture in MS., and cannot get enough of the precious and strong fare. The confidential communication to your worthy readers has made a similar impression on all." Beyme was and remained one of Fichte's warmest friends. Humboldt was obviously in sympathy with Fichte, for in 1810 he chose him to be Professor of Philosophy in the new University of Berlin. Schön testified with gratitude to Fichte's decisive influence upon him as a young student at Königsberg in 1791 and remained on good terms with him until Fichte's death. Altenstein, who became head of the new ministry for public worship and instruction which was established in 1817, confessed that he had found in Fichte's Addresses the consummation of his own philosophy. It was probably during the winter of 1806 when Fichte was staying in Königsberg that Altenstein learned from him at first hand his plans for future reforms and the part to be played therein by State education. At that time, too, Fichte was in constant touch with Süvern, who had been his pupil at Jena, Nicolovius and Schrötter. It was mainly

1. Seeley: *Life of Stein*, Vol. II, p. 29; cf. p. 292.

owing to the influence of these men that Prussia undertook seriously the organisation of a national system of education. In 1809 that State made itself definitely responsible for the primary school system, and laid down the principle that the first business of the schools is to train the judgment and develop the moral and religious sense, thereby showing its desire to introduce a new spirit into the schools. At the same time it was decided that teachers should be specially trained for their work and the experiment was begun of sending to Pestalozzi at Yverdun a regular succession of teachers who, on their return, were put into positions of responsibility and authority in the educational system of the country. It looked as if Prussia would become one great Pestalozzian school, and there were signs that other German States would follow her example in due course. Unfortunately, the development did not take quite the course expected by Fichte; his own Addresses were suppressed by the Prussian censor in 1824 and Süvern's school-law projects of 1810 and 1811 were never carried out, first of all because of the outbreak of war in 1813 and later because of the period of reaction which set in about 1818 and continued really until 1870.

To the influence exerted on people's minds by Fichte's writings on education we may also justly attribute in large measure the revival of the Universities, which began to pay more attention to their important functions in the social organism and to become essential organs in the national life. Moreover, Fichte was one of the spiritual founders of the new University at Berlin. It is true that his elaborate and minute plan for its foundation was considered unrealizable and was, therefore, not carried out and that the new University was really Wilhelm von

Humboldt's achievement. It is true also that Humboldt modelled it on the Universities that already existed, attempting to distinguish it from them not by any originality of constitution or organization but by the talent and reputation of its teachers and the peculiar authority of its eminent position in relation to the government of the State. Nevertheless, Fichte was one of the first teachers in the University and worked unceasingly to educate the students in the fullest and best sense of the word.

Finally, Fichte influenced a number of other educators, whose names have since become household words, Herbart, Froebel, and von Raumer. In spite of Herbart's final judgment of Fichte, that he offered neither in the framework of his system nor in his Addresses thoughts that were applicable to education, we find many points of similarity between them. Herbart's conception of the aim of education in terms of morality is comparable with Fichte's insistence on the formation of the good will. Fichte's view that instruction should have only a subordinate place in education, the life of the school community being the most important thing, received full recognition first from Herbart and his followers. Again, although Fichte never attained a complete conception of the importance of interest in education, his plea that education should create pleasure in learning and always endeavour to increase that pleasure seems but a foreshadowing of the Herbartian doctrine of interest.

Schmidt[1] says of Froebel that he was incited by Fichte's ideas on national education to take up the work of education and sought to realize what Fichte had recognized as necessary. He transferred to education

1. Geschichte der Pädagogik, 4th edition, Vol. IV, p. 279.

Fichte's fundamental ideas concerning the impulse towards the true and the good innate in man, concerning the progress of mankind towards the goal of perfection and concerning the interaction of the spiritual life of man with the divine life and the recognition of all spiritual life as a link in the eternal manifestation of the divine life.

Von Raumer confesses that Fichte's Addresses had the greatest influence on him when he was studying theology in Paris and that they induced him to visit Pestalozzi at Yverdun. He stayed there long enough to get a thorough understanding of the work of the establishment in all its details and a sincere admiration for Pestalozzi, though he was not blind to the defects of the Institute, as is shown by the criticism which he published later in his " History of Pedagogy."

Moreover it is significant that Fichte's ideas on education are influencing educational thought and practice in Germany to-day. The process of reconstruction which has been going on in Germany since November, 1918, is affecting the educational system of the country and it is in Fichte's writings that the reformers are seeking counsel concerning the aims, methods and organisation of education. Thus the important movement in favour of the Volkshochschule or People's University is an attempt to realise the proposals of Fichte, its spiritual founder. It is the principles of Fichte's educational theory which are being applied in the aims, methods and organisation of these institutions.[1]

Two other modern movements in favour of educational reform in Germany are inspired by principles contained in Fichte's writings—the *Einheitsschule* and the *Arbeitsschule*.

1. For a detailed comparison see my article, " Fichte and Recent Educational Reform in Germany," *Forum of Education*, Vol. II, No. 3.

The *Einheitsschule*, the same type of school for the children of all, rich and poor alike, has at last, since 1921, become a reality, though the idea has not yet been fully carried out.[1] This recalls Fichte vividly to our minds, for he advocated the *Einheitsschule* in the most comprehensive sense of the word. He claimed that his scheme of education must be applied to all the members of the community without exception, so that it is not the education of a single class but the education of the nation; in fact, in this connection, all distinction of classes is to be entirely removed.

The central idea of the *Arbeitsschule* (work-school) is that active constructive work is done by every pupil for the common good. This is entirely in the spirit of Fichte's school-communities, in which learning and work are combined, the children participating in manual work of various kinds according to their strength and age and being taught to understand the principles of what they do because such understanding ennobles their mechanical work and prevents it being done purely mechanically. This work renders the communities self-supporting and makes the pupil conscious of the debt he owes to the community, while at the same time it teaches him moral independence and the proper management of his resources.

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The problem that now remains for us to face is that of attempting to form some estimate of the permanent value of Fichte's educational theory. Now, some of the ideas and opinions expressed by him in his educational writings are obviously false and cannot be accepted. Little further comment need be made on his conception of the

1. cf. M. F. Liddell: "German Education since the Revolution," *Forum of Education*, Vol. I, No. 1.

German language as the sole living language, or on his notion of the part which Germany has played, and must still play, in the process of the salvation of the world. His whole-hearted enthusiasm for things German makes him at times inclined to regard almost everything that is genuinely German as necessarily good and everything that is foreign as necessarily bad. It is obvious what evil results would accrue from the logical development of such a conception, and the plea, legitimate perhaps where he merely exaggerates without stating falsehoods, that he was an orator charged with a peculiarly delicate task in desperate and difficult circumstances, cannot be urged in excuse of these false ideas.

Educationally, however, these two false ideas are not so important as others, prominent among which is his utter misconception of the rôle which the family can and must play in education. His demand that all children shall be separated from the adult world and live in communities of their own is undoubtedly fantastic and ridiculous. It may be urged in defence of his point of view that the efforts of teachers and other educators on behalf of the child are foredoomed to failure if their work is daily undone by contact with home surroundings. The force of this argument is generally recognised, and already under certain conditions we isolate children from home influences that are positively bad. It may even be urged, with some show of justification, that we should also remove all children from home influences that are not positively good, and it is now fairly easy to prove, from the results of educational experiments like the training of boys for various branches of the Army and Navy and Air Force, that these children, like those others, could be educated with very good results in a community of their own where

they would work and play and learn some sort of manual occupation.

But granted even all this, and there are many who would not be willing to concede so much, no adequate case is made out by Fichte for the entire abolition of family education. There is no doubt that he felt driven to this reform as the only possible though desperate remedy for the state of complete and hopeless corruption in which he judged his own generation to be living. How strongly this argument weighed with him can be estimated from the fact that he is willing to dispense with family education even after admitting[1] that in the child the instinct for respect, which is of paramount importance for the development of morality, is directed towards the father, the child naturally loving the father as the mirror from which his own worth or worthlessness is reflected for him, so that the father can easily develop morality in the child through this natural love. He felt that if only the children of the existing generation could be kept from the evil influence of that corrupt society they would grow up to form a new generation as nearly perfect as mankind could possibly be ; in this way he saw society recreated in God's image within the short period of one generation. He probably felt too that Plato's example was a very fine guide to follow in this matter.

These circumstances, however, extenuating though they are, do not justify Fichte's proposal. We may reasonably doubt whether the schemes of Plato and Fichte to abolish family education are practicable and must not be banished to the realm of impossible utopias and dangerous chimeras. They are certainly much more difficult to realize in modern society than in the small

1. Addresses, pp. 172-3.

city-states of the Greeks. Apart from this consideration, however, it seems eminently unwise and undesirable to make the attempt. The family is and should remain one of the fundamental elements of social organization. Family education is really indispensable as part of the process of education and it is certain that nothing can adequately take its place or achieve what it accomplishes as it were unconsciously. The soundness of a community depends to a very large extent upon the proper discharge of the parents' functions in education. The parents are by far the most important educative influence affecting the child, and are peculiarly fitted to perform certain functions in education because of the bond of love and natural sympathy which normally exists between them and their children. This is not to suggest that the family can do everything for the development of the individual—it suffers under limitations too serious to permit of this ; nor that every family does for its members what it ought to do and can do. But it does mean that at all costs we must avoid superseding the family ; that is a remedy we shall apply only if and when all other remedies fail us in our endeavour to strengthen the family and make it perform its valuable educative functions in the most effective way. Our efforts at better housing, better conditions of work and better opportunities for leisure, our attempts to educate parents for their tasks and responsibilities are such remedies which we must try to the utmost We shall regard the school as the complement of the family for most children and we shall allow it to supplant the family only for those few whose home conditions are bad, whilst we never cease our efforts to improve those home conditions. Our idea would be that home and school should jointly exert their influence towards

the attainment of the same aims, thereby harmonizing their efforts.

Again, we cannot agree with Fichte that love of the good is innate in man in the form of pleasure in the right and good for its own sake and that every child wishes to be upright and good and not merely healthy like a young animal. We shall see soon that this false psychological principle involves Fichte in grave inconsistency in other directions. Here we merely mention the fact that Fichte ignores the principle almost as soon as he has stated it. He tells us that during his early years the child cannot distinguish between good and evil and proceeds to ask how this innate love of the good is to survive these years of ignorance. Modern psychology tells us that the child is neither moral nor immoral, but non-moral, and that morality and love of what is right and good is the goal of a long process of education. Similarly, we cannot believe his statement that the child has a natural inclination for clearness and order.

Further, Fichte is often inconsistent with himself. At one moment he stands forth as the apostle of freedom, in education as in other spheres of human activity. The next moment he appears as the advocate of the crassest determinism, recognizing no limits to the influence of education, not even the individuality of the child, and asserting that education must guarantee the result of its influence. He tells us to educate the child in such a way that it becomes impossible for him to leave undone what he knows to be good and to do instead what he knows to be evil, to train him in such a way that he cannot will otherwise than as we wish him to will. If we are to educate to moral stability and independence we cannot hope to achieve this by training the child to do

always what we wish him to do ; such a view is not only a contradiction in terms but a practical impossibility. Besides, Fichte himself says that absent-mindedness is not to be tolerated in the pupil ; yet if he is absent-minded, is he to be compelled to attention ? Fichte answers yes, and evidently in his system of education the spontaneous self-activity of the pupil is to be compatible with blind submission to the will of the educator.

Moreover, the very freedom of the will which Fichte postulates in the individual as the essence of morality makes even the possibility of education questionable. According to him external circumstances do not influence the individual at all, and from the point of view of absolute truth whatever is to be manifested in the thought and deed of man must first be inwardly present in his nature and indeed constitute his nature, being and life ; for that which lies in the essential nature of man must necessarily reveal itself in his outward life, shine forth in all his thoughts, desires and acts, and become his unvarying and unalterable character. Conscience, i.e., the consciousness of our higher nature, teaches us and orders us definitely in every particular situation of our existence what we have to do in this situation,what we have to avoid in ourselves ; and so far as the results of our actions are concerned, we must assume that the eternal will will guide everything for the best. How then are we to reconcile with this theory the efforts which are made by means of education, religion and legislation to train man to goodness ; how can conduct and character be cultivated by rule and precept ; how can there be any influence or even interaction between teacher and pupil, any education of the latter by the former ? Fichte says that it is quite possible thoroughly to resolve this apparent contradiction, that a deeper study of

philosophy will show clearly the possibility of the union of the two points of view, but one feels that he himself never solves the problem adequately and that he is compelled to regard the development of moral character as a wonderful phenomenon and to leave it unexplained.

Even if Fichte could show that, in spite of this conception of human nature, moral education is still possible, we might nevertheless argue that his theories do away altogether with any necessity for education. If the child is already endowed with a moral sense, with a love of what is right and good, moral education seems to be at least superfluous. Yet Fichte urges moral education; in fact it stands as the foremost of his aims in education. Moreover, there is strangely linked to Fichte's doctrine of the absolute freedom of the will a dogmatic fatalism. He assumes that to each individual a particular place has been assigned in the divine world-plan, that already at birth there is in man a natural affinity to the supersensuous world, the kingdom of heaven, that pupils are born noble or ignoble and are therefore predestined to be workers or rulers and scholars, that lack or possession of intellectual talent is God's decree and that education depends on individual talent which we can neither alter nor, if it is bad, change to good nor in any way develop according to our wish. Morality develops of itself in society and from the heart of man. In Fichte's earlier writings the individual does count for something; compared with nature and the existing world he is independent and absolute. In his later writings, however, God alone is absolute and independent; man has only phenomenal existence. No one can meet the demands of higher morality unless the demands are already met without his help. On this assumption there is no longer any need to consider educa-

tion even a necessary business ; one must leave oneself to God's decree or ultimately to fate.

Again, Fichte contradicts himself when he claims that man is innately good but that society is corrupt.

But Fichte brushed aside all psychological and logical difficulties in favour of the maintenance of his ethical principles. He remained personally convinced throughout life that man has to work for the realization of practical aims. In spite of theoretical difficulties and inconsistencies his enthusiastic personality impelled him to take up eagerly and warmly the problems of education and to come to the help of the race with proposals for educational reform.

Besides the false ideas and opinions which are expressed by Fichte in his educational writings and which we must decline to accept there are gross exaggerations and over-statements which can only be accepted after considerable modification. Many of his judgments of historical fact are one-sided. He greatly exaggerates, for instance, the part played by Luther and by Germany in the Reformation movement. His views on some of the good results that will follow from the adoption of his ideas in education are fantastic and over-drawn. He probably exaggerates when he promises that the adoption of his reforms will greatly reduce the number of convict-prisons and reformatories and do away altogether with the necessity for a standing army and for alms-houses, all of which impose such heavy financial burdens on the State.

Also it is hard to believe that he does full justice to the relative claims of the individual and of the community in education, although he is constantly asserting the need for free active men and women, economically, morally and intellectually independent, and claiming that his scheme

will train the whole man completely and fully for manhood and for all his purposes in time and eternity. To Fichte the individual as such is of no value. It is the race, the people, that is important; and over and over again he seems to suggest that the supreme goal of education is "citizenship," citizenship certainly in a very large and comprehensive sense of the term but nevertheless service to the community.

It may be that Fichte saw no real or necessary antagonism between the two aims of education, the perfection of the individual and the good or welfare of the community, and that he really tried, with some success, to do justice to the claims both of the individual and of the community in a scheme of education. He seems to suggest that the progress and development of the community is intimately bound up with the development towards perfection of its individual members. He says that the perfect State cannot be built up by artificial measures from whatever material may be at hand; that, on the contrary, the individual must first be trained and educated thereto, and that only the nation which has first solved in actual practice the problem of educating perfect men will then solve also the problem of the perfect State. He claims that when a generation of individuals has been educated which is impelled solely by its taste for the right and good we shall be very near the ideal of the perfect State or community. Fichte deserves much credit for insisting that an ideal should be set up which the State will ever strive to realize. He feels certain that the important thing is, not whether the ideal is ever realized or can ever be realized, but that there is a gradual approximation to it. Moreover, he wisely recommends that this process of change by which the State ever approaches the

ideal shall be no revolution but a process of gradual evolution. The ideal which he sketches for the State is at once lofty, elevating and suggestive.

Yet at other times Fichte insists on the absolute supremacy of the State, which to him is the divine or moral idea as it exists on earth and as such the supreme administrator of human affairs and the guardian of its citizens who are its wards. The State in this sense is an end in itself and responsible only to God and its own conscience, and the highest duty of the individual is to be a member of the State. The citizen of such a State regards it as eternal and himself as partaking of eternity only in and through the nation, joyfully sacrifices himself for it and is at once its courageous defender and a peaceful and honest citizen. It has a perfect right to compel its citizens for their welfare or for its own sake. The logical outcome of such a conception is the absolute supremacy of the State, which, being the supreme community, is free from all moral restrictions. There are no limits to its authority and power and the individual loses all independence.

Obviously there is confusion of thought here between the ideal State and the actual State and, again, between State and society. The worth and value of the individual is ignored. Yet after all everything depends on him willing the ideal objects, for the State can promote morality indirectly only, by removing obstacles and guaranteeing rights which are merely the conditions of morality. Moreover, this view makes the State as a community the complete expression of man's ideals and purposes, which it can never be, and ignores altogether the claims upon the individual of other, and it may be larger or more important communities like the religious

organisation. Although, therefore, Fichte probably tried to reconcile, and thought he had succeeded in reconciling, the claims of both the individual and the community in his scheme of education, the fact remains that the claims of the former are over-shadowed by those of the latter and that his scheme needs readjustment. It is certain, too, that as his ideas began to bear fruit, it would be the claims of the community, interpreted as the actual State, not as the ideal State, which would be more and more emphasized ; and as we know, this is what happened in the subsequent development of German education during the 19th century.

Again, the isolated self-contained school-communities which he advocated for all children are a fantastic and ridiculous demand. They strike us at once as most artificial and practically impossible to realize. They are too exclusive, in the sense that they are completely shut off from the life of the world, for which, however, they are meant to prepare. How could pupils, on their release from these schools, possibly find points of contact in this world, not only for the purpose of adjusting themselves to it, but also as Fichte suggests, for the purpose of moulding it gradually to their ideals of perfection ? Besides, even Fichte's attempt to secure complete isolation for them breaks down ; he has to admit adults from existing society in the persons of his teachers, although, of course, they are assumed to be nearly perfect themselves. He is also constrained to grant that outside help will probably be necessary, certainly at first, while no doubt the establishment, organisation and maintenance of the schools would require adult thought and supervision. In this matter too, therefore, as in others, Fichte has exaggerated to such an extent as to become impossibly extreme.

His views on the reform of University education, though suggestive and stimulating as a whole and admirable on many points, suffer from the same defect. The fact that his scheme was not adopted when the new University of Berlin was founded points to the fact that his contemporaries considered it impracticable as a whole. We have letters from Johannes von Müller, the historian, and one of Fichte's friends, written at the very time of the " Deduced Scheme," which, allowing for the tone of friendship and respect in which they are written, contain just and adequate criticism of Fichte's suggestions for the new University. He praises the plan as new and incomparable and says he has read it with the greatest pleasure and with much approval. He thinks a standard University in Fichte's style would be epoch-making and would be the first step in the transformation of Germany. He realizes, however, that it would require good organisation and sound management and that it would necessitate a general change of the educational system and especially of college life if a teacher is to attend to the individual development of his pupils. He regards as great ideas the communal life of students and security for their future, while the examinations, discussions, essays and chronicles he calls models, worthy of the wisdom of the ancients and calculated to reform the State better than any revolution. He regards the establishment of a seminar for future professors as a happy and indispensable feature, and considers that Fichte has overcome all financial objections to the whole scheme. But although he considers the plan excellent, he does not approve of its adoption for the establishment of a big University. It seems to him better suited for an Institute of National education or for little literary communities

within the University, like the colleges at Oxford. A small number of students is the logical outcome of insistence on communal life and the State could not be expected to guarantee permanent security and maintenance to foreigners or even to any large number of natives. The institute would therefore, of necessity, be small, the number of students would be limited and Müller sees no reason why it should not exist, in close relation to the State, within the University itself. It certainly could not itself become the University *at once*, because there are few suitable teachers available and also because there are few pupils adequately prepared for the kind of tuition and teaching suggested. He sees clearly that the new demands upon the teacher involve a revolution in the system and instances the difficulty in the normal existing conditions of treating adequately the whole history of the Universe in a teaching year of from 200 to 250 hours. He suggests two alternatives, either that each teacher gives two courses of lectures, one a general survey and the other a discussion thereon with his pupils, or that the Academy becomes a separate institution from the University, visited afterwards by the pupil, in which the pupil has one teacher as was the custom among the Greeks. He seems to favour the second proposal and suggests that there would be no better way for the pupil to learn philosophy. He hopes that Fichte would not insist on *all* the teachers being young, because he regards maturity and experience as valuable additional qualifications. He seems to doubt the efficacy of the uniform for students, when he expresses the hope that it will impress for a long time.

There is no doubt that much of Müller's criticism is justified. It is hard to reconcile Fichte's constant demand

for freedom—freedom of action, freedom of teaching and learning in academic life, freedom for science to develop—with the system of monastic life to be lived by the Regulars in the University and the number of coercive measures and regulations which he considers it necessary to make for the discipline of the students. We may reasonably doubt whether in an atmosphere of such confinement and restriction it would be possible for freedom to live and develop.

Fichte's idea of allowing teachers to act as " advisers " to the pupils " in matters of conscience " is no new one and would probably find acceptance in many quarters. In the moral training of the young, precepts are apt to yield disappointing results, the reasons being that they are generalizations and that, therefore, they often fail to give specific guidance when the call to action comes, especially at critical moments. One way of dealing with the problem which is thus created is to try, as Fichte suggests, to set up a " keeper of conscience " who will endeavour to anticipate the kinds of difficulty which children are apt to fall into and who will form solutions to these difficulties. It is interesting to note that this device for moral training is usually advocated and adopted by those who elevate the principle of authority in education. Unfortunately the application of the idea tends to lead the young to lean entirely on their authoritative superiors, with the result that, when the support is removed, they are unable to cope successfully themselves with the difficult situations which then confront them. A much better alternative plan is to try to develop in the child sound enlightened moral judgment, which will enable him to choose with discretion among the various conceptions of conduct or moral ideals on the ground of his sensitivity

to what is right and wrong, good and better. Such choice will give him ideals for life and a system of values and we may then leave him to grapple with his own difficulties as far as possible and gradually more and more, in the firm conviction that all will be well with him. It is rather surprising that this better alternative did not suggest itself to Fichte as the solution to the problem he raised, for he is constantly insisting on the need for developing moral stability and independence in the pupil.

Fichte exaggerates tremendously the importance of the teaching profession to the community and assigns to it a position which is nothing short of autocratic, and which would give it absolutely arbitrary powers. For instance, since it is the business of the teachers to assign each individual to his particular profession and class, it follows that the recruiting for their own profession is entirely within their own discretionary power as a body. Such a union of teachers into a close corporation can only be regarded with a great deal of misgiving. But even for Fichte the solution to the problem is not quite so simple as this. Elsewhere he tells us that man is predestined to a particular and definite place in the divine world-plan. It would seem therefore that, unless people are to be recruited for the teaching profession who have not the necessary qualities and equipment, the State must just trust to God for the supply of teachers it needs, as for every other profession and class. There is inconsistency here which Fichte does not seem to have overcome.

In his consideration of the curriculum, too, we must note that reaction from Pestalozzi on one or two points makes him inclined to go to the opposite extreme. He asserts with considerable truth that Pestalozzi over-estimated the value of reading and writing as subjects and gave them far too

prominent a place in the process of education. He himself, on the other hand, gravely underestimates their value and gives them no place at all in national education. It is difficult to see what particular value they would have as a parting gift to the pupil, while it is certain that they are instruments of considerable value in that process of education which we call schooling.

We should grant in part, therefore, Herbart's contention that it is impossible to work in education according to Fichte's system. The fact remains, however, that these false and exaggerated ideas are small blemishes in his writings; they are easily explained, if not justified, when we consider the desperate state of the times, the exalted aim of the lecturer, the peculiar difficulty of his task, his enthusiastic personality and the fact that most of his pronouncements on education are those of an orator charged with the self-appointed task of persuading his indifferent and sometimes even hostile fellow-countrymen to undertake a laborious, difficult and therefore unpleasant enterprise.

In trying to assess the value of Fichte's writings on education we should put first their stimulating, inspiring and elevating effect upon the minds and souls of their readers. As we study them we feel compelled to admire and wonder at Fichte. Herbart, in his criticism of Fichte, will have it that "idealism is useless for education." Such a pronouncement falls strangely from the pen of the educator who advocated morality as the supreme purpose of the educational process. But our best answer to Herbart is to be found in Fichte's own words:[1] "That the Ideal cannot be manifested in the actual world, we

1. Fichte's preface to *The Vocation of the Scholar*, Jena, 1794; see Smith I, p. 173.

know as well as they (*sc.* those who hold such speculations as mine to be at best useless) do,—perhaps better. All we maintain is, that the Actual must be judged by the Ideal, and modified in accordance with it by those who feel themselves capable of such a task." Nor can we agree with Herbart when he calls the Addresses " a mass of educational nonsense." Certainly Fichte was no educationist in the ordinary sense of the word, and this may be the reason why he has not been given, and does not occupy in the history of education, the place that really belongs to him. Unlike Pestalozzi and Froebel and Herbart, he left no school ; but his educational ideas are a mine for every student of educational problems and a source of inspiration. He who lets Fichte's ideas work on him without prejudice will thankfully exclaim, " I have felt a breath of your spirit."

Nor shall we agree with Herbart that Fichte's scheme of national education is intended to create a unity (" we ") but will actually create only different " I's " and " we's." He states the case for a national system of education with clearness, emphasis and accuracy. Education is to be democratic in nature and universal and compulsory in application. He will have nothing to do with a system that is incomplete, which leaves off when the pupil is but half-educated. In the light of his intense national enthusiasm, he sees clearly that education is the very life-blood of the State, that without it the State cannot attain its true aim, and that the future of the nation absolutely depends upon it. He emphasizes, therefore, the necessity of looking at education from the point of view of its value for the nation. It is only now that we are beginning to realize this ; hitherto we have been in the habit of regarding education mainly, if not exclusively, from the

personal point of view, considering it as a matter of importance possibly to the individual and as aiming at individual development. Such a conception of education is hopelessly one-sided and inadequate. The individual is not only an individual ; he is at the same time a member of a community and as such must be educated to take his place in it ; otherwise the future of that community is doomed. The application of this idea of nationality to educational matters is revolutionary in its effects ; it completely alters our conception of the aim and process of education, gives a different status altogether to the school, the child and the teacher, and profoundly modifies the whole school curriculum.

Yet it is no one-sided narrow nationalism which Fichte preaches as the aim of education. In view of the subsequent development of education in Germany and the ruthlessness with which the purely national aim was pursued, this point cannot be over-emphasized in justice to him. Rather do we find in his writings an ideal of humanity which he calls cosmopolitan but which we should probably prefer to call international, recognizing, as we are beginning to do, that cosmopolitanism aims at making all nations alike as far as possible, while internationalism implies frank recognition and full reconciliation of the great differences between nations. Fichte believed in a people preserving its own characteristics and wishing to have them respected by others ; but at the same time he held strongly the view that a people should recognize the special characteristics of other peoples and permit and encourage their retention.

A system of education which considered only the claims of the community would, however, be equally as one-sided and as inadequate as the purely personal

conception which we have just considered. Fichte tries, though not with complete success as we have already seen, to do justice also to the claims of the individual in a scheme of education. He will not have merely civic education, aiming at the production of the good and useful citizen, but he will have full and complete training for manhood. The aim which he sets before the educator is to inspire the individual with an ideal of conduct which will guide his life, to develop self-activity in the service of what is right and good. Fichte rightly assigns to moral education first place in the whole educational scheme and is sufficiently wise to refuse to separate knowing and willing.

Education is to be the deliberate and sure art of producing in the pupil a stable and infallible good will. All else, the development of his body, the training of his mind and the knowledge that will result therefrom, is subordinate to this. He will have the educator go right down to the roots and springs of action in life, i.e., to the instincts and impulses, and try to mould these as they gradually develop. The place he thus assigns to moral education in the whole system and his ideas on it are well worth considering.

It has already been indicated that Fichte's views on the reform of University education are suggestive and stimulating as a whole and admirable on many points. His is an altogether new conception of the University and the postulating of a new aim. The chief feature of value in the conception is the perfect unity of purpose, the complete subordination of every branch of instruction to the one great object of all teaching—not the inculcation of opinion, but the spiritual culture and elevation of the student. The institution sketched is an organic whole, an assemblage of men animated by a common

purpose and steadily pursuing one recognized object. Spiritual independence, intellectual strength, moral dignity — these are the great ends to the attainment of which everything else, positive knowledge included, is but the instrument.

Fichte sees clearly that in any reorganisation of existing Universities or in the foundation of new ones, a decision must be made between two possible functions of a University; that which makes it an institution for training future public officials, suiting its spirit to the prevalent wishes and views of the government and using its powerful influence on the spiritual movements of the time for certain definitely prescribed purposes; and that which makes it a nursery of scientific thought, really and completely free, and initiating every development that takes place in the thought and actions of the community. He has no hesitation in championing the latter view, which embodies the highest and finest idea of the function of the University.

Again he advocates a new and necessary reform when he demands that neither class nor any other accidental difference between individuals shall have any influence in opening or closing the University and the highest offices in the State to the members of the community.

We have Fichte to thank also for the idea of the *Einheitsschule*, an idea which, if fully carried out, would work great changes in the social, educational and economic worlds.

Again in Fichte's writings we find the philosophical foundation for what we should call to-day the "school-community." The demand that education shall awaken self-activity is a reforming idea and Fichte is right in regarding self-activity as the essential foundation of

independent character and of an independent moral will. Kerschensteiner, who has done so much to realize the ideal of the school-community, rightly points out[1] that Fichte's suggestions are quite in the spirit of John Dewey's efforts to realize "embryonic community life" in the school. He feels that the institutions described by Fichte can be realized only on a very small scale, if at all, mainly because of the cost, which was the reason for the closing of Dewey's experimental school in the University of Chicago. Kerschensteiner suggests that "care for others," which is one of the main ideas recognized in Fichte's small self-contained educational institutions, is one means of solving the demand for a "fuller life" for our children which should bear wonderful fruit. He instances some of the experiments along these lines which have been made, e.g., in Thuringia, at Toynbee Hall, and in the George Junior Republic in New York. He himself suggests a gradual approximation towards the final goal, by exchanging the bookish atmosphere of our schools for one of practical work, by making our schools work-communities and by substituting for virtues acquired by habit virtues acquired through insight into the meaning of the phrase "citizen of the State."

It is in this connection that another of Fichte's ideas is likely to prove fruitful, his conception of the *Arbeitsschule* or work-school. He sees clearly the intimate and close relationship between work, economic independence and morality. Rightly, therefore, he insists on the need of bodily training for all, assigning it an important place in the whole plan, on the vital importance and proper function of manual work of various kinds, and on the necessity, which we are only now realizing, of the individual

1. *The Schools and the Nation*, pp. 16-22; cf. pp. 77-8.

understanding the principles of the manual work which he undertakes. In this, as in so many other respects, the whole tone, outlook and content of Fichte's writings on education are modern and we are only now beginning to put into practice many of the principles and ideas which are expressed in them.

Fichte's attitude to book-learning and mental training is noteworthy and gives us a reminder which we are greatly in need of to-day. He fought hard against the bookishness of education and against intellectualism, believing it to be a dangerous enemy of civic education and an evil already rooted too deeply in the educational system. His industrial communities are a protest against this book-learning, and although they cannot be put into practice we may learn much from the ideals which they exemplify. He wisely assigns to mental training a place subsidiary to moral education, the purposes of which it is to subserve. No longer is a certain amount of knowledge to be the aim of education. Knowledge and the mental activity which results in knowledge are but means to an end; they but promote the purposes of moral education. This reminder is very necessary in these days when the tendency seems to be more and more towards a purely intellectual system of education. It is not that one wishes to decry intellectual training; on the contrary, this becomes more and more necessary, in the interests both of the nation and of the individual, as competition increases and as the organization of society becomes more complex and more highly specialized. Yet there is the constant danger of forgetting that the corner-stone of individual and of national life is moral character, and that all else is necessarily subordinate thereto.

His views on training in citizenship are sound. He is

little concerned with instructing children in the duties and rights of citizenship. He believes rather in letting them absorb the right spirit towards their country by getting them to grow up in a little community which exemplifies the best traditions of service on behalf of others. He feels that then this spirit of service will animate the pupil's later relations to other and larger communities than the school. Life in the school-community will bear in upon them by its own organisation and arrangement a picture of the ideal social order of mankind; its methods will create in them a love for this community, its organisation and order. Thus real love of fatherland will be established in the hearts of all. They will be good honest citizens in time of peace, and in time of danger will be willing to sacrifice themselves for their country. They will be able and inclined to help themselves and will form an army without equal. All this they will do with clear understanding; for ultimately Fichte hopes, as a result of this training, to transform, like Kerschensteiner, the virtues of custom into the virtues of understanding.

Fichte will give the same education to both sexes and will have them educated together. He therefore appears as an advocate of co-education on quite modern lines.

Herbart accuses Fichte of ignorance in psychological matters but we cannot agree with him, except in so far as he was no more advanced in his knowledge of psychology than were his contemporaries, which happens to every educational reformer. Rather does Fichte occasionally show considerable psychological insight. He emphasizes, for instance, the prominent part played by the instinct of respect in the process of moral education and traces its development. This is worthy of note because we are

only beginning to realize the great importance of respect and self-respect in the growth of what is now called the self-regarding sentiment, which is such a decisive factor in the making of character.

Fichte's belief that punishment cannot be dispensed with altogether as an instrument in moral training comes as a timely warning to us. He advises us, however, to be quite clear as to the sphere within which punishment is justified. He finds no place for it in the sphere of morality proper and restricts it to offences against mere legality, as he calls it. Thus he advises censure and even punishment for those who transgress the laws which have been drawn up for the regulation of the community.

He is equally decided in his views concerning the relationship of the Church to education. He has much to say concerning the history of this relationship and is quite sure that it is better for education to be beyond the authority of the church. This does not mean that he finds no place in his scheme for religious education. Far from it. He believes that the process of moral education which he describes and which results in the formation of a stable and infallible good will in the individual is also religious education, in that it leads the pupil to the knowledge of the indwelling of our life in God. For him, therefore, religious education is not instruction in a particular dogma or creed or form of worship. Such instruction he would leave to the ministers and priests of the various denominations, to whom he would grant, at certain regular times, right of access to his schools for the purpose of teaching their particular doctrine to pupils of their own persuasion. Religious education for him is rather the development of the proper sentiments of love, reverence and awe for a supreme

Being. It is true that Fichte uses the word religion in another sense as equivalent to that supreme knowledge which makes man quite intelligible to himself and so brings perfect clearness into his understanding. But religion in this sense is not intended for everyone; it is the possession of the scholar only.

Finally, we may grant Herbart's further contention that Fichte leaves unanswered the man who asks particular educational questions. He demands that the teacher shall stimulate the child to self-activity, but he does not tell him how to stimulate and develop this self-activity. He gives as good as no answer to the question of the particular course which education must take in order that the mental activity of each individual may develop and the whole personality be neither lost nor corrupted. The theory is, therefore, too empty and indefinite for the actual needs of practice; and it seems to those, who long to act according to special and psychologically grounded principles, like a licence which allows the teacher to do what he likes. But we make these admissions with the disarming proviso that really Fichte never sets out and never pretends to answer questions of method. What is certain is that he belongs to the class of creative spirits, and that many of his educational principles are still perfectly sound. These principles are of value now as they were in 1808, and are applicable not to one country alone but to any nation. In these days, therefore, when education is the subject of so much discussion and criticism, such views as are set forth by Fichte merit close scrutiny and careful consideration.

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TRANSLATIONS

I. EARLY WRITINGS ON EDUCATION

(a) Plan for arranging Exercises in Speaking.

[Fichte drew up this plan for the establishment of a school of oratory at Zurich, in 1789[1], probably at the request of his friends and certainly because of his own fondness for oratory. The plan came to nothing, but it is interesting both as being one of the many unsuccessful projects of his youth and for its educational significance. Recently it has been claimed[2] that the Plan is to be regarded as the germ of the modern German People's University. The translation is from the text published in "Fichtes Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel," Vol. II, pp. 3-10.]

The political constitution of the people of Zurich alone makes it necessary to speak in public. Some young students from the best families have attended lectures on German rhetoric in foreign Academies, presumably with this intention.

But apart from these *particular* causes, exercises of this kind are of the greatest use to everyone, whether we consider the *improvement* in *style* which is due to the composition of addresses or the *ease* which accrues to the whole *discourse* of man from their recital.

I pass over the advantages which the actual scholar and the business man almost equally obtain from the ability to communicate their thoughts without difficulty, clearly, in an orderly way and appropriately. I pass over the fact that this ability influences even the most unimportant business letter, and that he who does what is more difficult with ease, will do what is easier all the

1. Fichte's son gives the date as 1787, but Medicus (p. 21) shows that this cannot be correct.

2. Engelhardt: "Fichte's Erziehungsgedanken und die deutsche Volkshochschule," Hamburg, 1919; cf. my article on "Fichte and Recent Educational Reform in Germany," *Forum of Education*, Vol. II, No. 3, Nov., 1924.

better ; but I must not overlook the fact that he who has been instructed early in explaining his thoughts to *others* will think them *himself* more clearly and connectedly. We believe we understand a great deal, merely because the words in which it is explained to us have become familiar to us. We have to explain it to others : it is difficult for us to make ourselves intelligible to them, and soon we discover without difficulty the reason why it is difficult, viz., because hitherto we have not understood ourselves.

A man of good ability has clear moments in which a true and great thought breaks loose, as it were, he himself knows not from what connection, and in which he hits upon a truth unexpectedly ; but *consecutive thought, that follows its course in a definite direction step by step,* is achieved only by practice. Attention to the exposition of a teacher who pursues this course leaves one spirit too little occupied and wearies another. What teacher could speak so that every one of his pupils would follow him with equal ease ? They have so much cause and find it so easy to interrupt this attention ; and once it is interrupted, the teacher must not speak very connectedly if they are to be able to pick up the threads again whenever they want to. Apart from the learning of pure Mathematics, which, however, exercises the imagination less, the best and only way to exercise oneself in this connected thought is to *make one's own compositions.* It is the best and surest exercise in independent thought, in attention, in connected reasoning, the most useful and only practical learning of logic.

Many people who love science without having actually devoted themselves to it know no pleasanter way of spending the hours that remain after business than in reading and reflection. Always to *read,* always to follow the course of another person's ideas, to make one's head the receptacle for nothing but thoughts that are not one's own and not always very similar, is very tiring ; it exhausts the soul and cradles it into a certain kind of indolence. The resulting stagnation in the human mind is prevented by nothing more successfully than by working up one's own thoughts. Nothing gives the mind a pleasanter and stronger feeling and consciousness of itself

than gradually leading one's thoughts from one sphere of clearness to another, uniting them and moulding them arbitrarily and autocratically to one's purpose, and seeing the actual determination of oneself represented as it were automatically in a successful picture. There is certainly no greater mental pleasure for those who are capable of it than that which one enjoys during and because of writing and which, quite independent of the pleasure of the friend to whom one submits one's written work in confidence or of the praise of the public to whom one submits it in print, would remain even in a world in which no one could read or hear what was read. Then with mind whetted one goes back to reading, enters with more certainty and finer feeling into the spirit of the author, understands him more correctly and judges him more profoundly and is no longer impressed by the man, whose halo vanishes from his head and who becomes like oneself. It is certain that no one can quite understand an author and sympathize with him who is not one himself to a certain extent. Even to him, therefore, who seeks but pleasure in science skill in the art of writing guarantees the highest that science can give.

Pleasure and profit are increased by *practice in speaking one's compositions aloud.* The facility of the man of the world in saying just what he ought at the right moment is thereby, if not acquired, at least promoted in great measure. Already in several districts people have felt the need of training young people to this facility and have attempted to promote it by exercises in the drama—with little additional profit and with infinitely greater harm.

Thinking aloud gives our ideas a new degree of clearness and definiteness. It brings the senses and the understanding into closer connection, makes the most abstract ideas of the latter more realistic and the pictures of the former simpler and more organised. It gives our feeling sensibility and sensitivity to all works of taste. What leaves us cold when read silently and merely with the understanding, without letting the words sound, will shake or move us, make our nerves shudder or make us melt into tears, as soon as we read it aloud in accordance with the rules of correct declamation, be it only in imagina-

tion. Finally it gives our own art of writing the fullness and finish which spread over every piece of writing that has them, the charm which one feels without seeing and lack of which causes the difficulty and reluctance with which we read so many writings without being able to say why.

These considerations have given a young man who has been living here for some time, and who believes he has developed by exercises some talent for this skill, the idea of proposing *the establishment of such exercises in speaking and style* to those who have somewhat similar feelings on the matter.

Like every other art, this must be based on definite laws of the human soul ; but historical knowledge of these laws alone does not give the ability to practise them, and one might very well know all the rules of rhetoric without thereby having become even a moderate speaker. The most useful learning of all rules comes from practice and no rule does one understand better and impress more deeply on his memory than those which one learns by his mistakes against them. This instruction in the art of speaking, therefore, would consist not so much in *systematic lectures* concerning it as in its *practice*.

No one can learn to *speak* who has not previously learnt to *think*, who has not some ideas at least collected and in his power. For a person quite uneducated the art of speaking is the miserable art of chattering. Only *such persons*, therefore, can take part in these exercises *as have already got beyond the rudiments*.

Concerning the *choice of subjects* the unskilled, who, however, would understand at least Latin and French and write German correctly, might translate into German passages or whole speeches, e.g., from Cicero. For the more skilled the teacher, or they themselves with his approval, would choose subjects for treatment. In this choice special attention would be paid to awakening and fostering the patriotic and republican spirit, which the author of this proposal feels and honours although he is a foreigner, to recapitulation of the country's history by speeches on its illustrious events and to pure, noble and manly morality.

In regard to *treatment* the first requisite will be *truth ;*

for the writer considers the art of convincing one's hearers of whatever one will a very foul abuse of rhetoric and believes that nothing is aesthetically beautiful that is not morally true. One would have to fear from him, therefore, anything but that he should teach, under the noble name of rhetoric, the very ignoble art of sophisticating.

One would be equally particular concerning *order* and *correct sequence of thought,* and would seek to whet the judgment of the pupils to find with certainty the heads of classification peculiar and natural to each subject, firmly convinced that he can never speak without order who has acquired this skill. From what has been said already it is clear that these exercises could and should be at the same time exercises in independent thought and in definite reasoning.

In regard to *style* the first consideration would be definiteness and clearness as well as purity of language ; one would warn, however, against nothing more urgently than against that affected, florid and sentimental language which here and there people have begun to consider synonymous with beautiful speech.

As for *oral discourse* itself, the writer is convinced that every mode of treatment has only one kind of declamation and action suitable to it, and that it is just as ridiculous to give the declamation of enthusiasm to a quiet or merely warm speech as it is contradictory to recite something, which the hearer is to assume at least that we believe ourselves, in a monotone or with a humdrum air and as if it had nothing at all to do with us. It follows that bodily eloquence of course is a necessary object of the exercises but that it will never degenerate into affectation.

Every subject set should either be worked up by the teacher himself or taken from an orator who is recognised as classical, in order to compare the work of the pupils with this and to develop the reasons for the superiority of one work to another.

The most perfect examples of style still seem to be the ancients, and study of these does not seem to have become superfluous yet owing to the masterpieces which modern languages contain. True exercises in style are

closely connected with this reading. If there are some, therefore, who should wish to educate their taste on these better models, and others who, even without taking part in the actual exercises in speaking, should promise themselves profit from an occupation of this kind, one would try to meet these wishes too by means of *lectures on Latin authors* in accordance with this ultimate object. It is clear from the matter itself that one assumes in those who wish to take part in this sufficient knowledge of the Latin language to follow the author's meaning and to distinguish his mode of expressing his thoughts. The manner in which one would treat the authors is equally clear from the final aim which is thereby intended: explanation of the meaning, of the intention of the author; the reason why he mentions *this* particular circumstance, why he mentions it in *this* particular way; in what other way he might have said it; why that would not have been equally suitable; the sequence of his ideas; the way in which the various parts hang together; why they were connected thus and not otherwise. This is for the exercise of thought and reason in general. But since the aim would be, specially to practise this art in the German language, this would have to be done always with particular regard to that language. One would take translations of the piece to be read, give as good a German translation as possible in the lecture, show where the German does and does not equal the Latin, how beauties lost in the German can be replaced by others, etc. Generally one would seek to guide the audience to all the advantages of which one becomes aware almost solely through translation from foreign languages, to the influence of words that are almost synonymous, to the structure, the arrangement of the words, etc.

These exercises are certainly exercises in style. If there are some, however, who do not wish to take part in them, considered as exercises in *speaking*, or cannot do so because of their more limited progress in science, but want advice on style alone, a separate plan could be arranged for them. For them one would read, criticize and develop the beauties of selected passages from classical German writers, and also bring forward and criticize compositions of all sorts. One would criticize

the style of these compositions in accordance with those principles which have already been mentioned and, as in the case of the exercises in speaking, either work up the problem oneself or take it from some good author.

For those who are younger still another suitable exercise is proposed: *practice in correct reading as a preparation for declamation.* In accordance with the needs and powers of the young people, one would read aloud oneself and let them read aloud from the simplest narrative to the highest kind of poetry. For those who were more advanced instruction in German prosody could be connected with this.

These are the author's first ideas, as yet little worked out. Naturally, although what is essential will be retained, this sketch will have to be modified in accordance with individual demands and needs and will have to be more definitely determined in regard to the details of the treatment and the fixing of hours, if it is found acceptable by some.

All four schemes could be combined more or less closely, in accordance with the nature of the people participating.

The marking of the exercises, more detailed instruction to individuals on general matters that arise in the public lessons, etc., would have to take place outside the public hours. The writer would therefore promise, provided he finds a reasonable livelihood in this work, to set aside for this purpose some special periods, whilst he would give all his time to these exercises.

Eight, at most ten pupils could be admitted to each scheme.

It is fair that those who might let their relatives take part in this enterprise should know the man who undertakes it and his ability in the proposed matters, in order to be able to judge for themselves what they have to expect from him and what not. He proposes, therefore, with this purpose to give an address to them in some public place, say in some society, without anyone committing himself to anything by his mere presence. On the other hand, if the proposal is accepted, he promises himself that in their fairness and intelligence they will not judge too prematurely the value of efforts,

the fruits of which cannot of course be immediately visible.

(*b*) The System of Ethics according to the Principles of Philosophy.

[This work was published at Jena, in 1798. Only a small part of it concerns us here; in Chapter III Fichte discusses the duties of man according to his natural state, and after treating the relationship of husband and wife, goes on to deal with the relationship of parents and children and the duties of both that arise from that relationship. In this connection the question of education is raised and discussed in the following words which are translated from the Works, Vol. IV, pp. 333-343. A translation of the whole work has been published by A. E. Kroeger, under the title of *The Science of Ethics*, London, 1907; but I have preferred to translate direct from the German text, although I have had this translation before me.]

The System of Ethics according to the Principles of Philosophy, 1798.

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Chapter III. The theory of duties proper.

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Survey of the universal and particular conditioned duties.

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Survey of the universal conditioned duties.

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Survey of the particular duties.

26.—Concerning the relationship of the particular to the universal duties; and classification of the particular duties.

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27.—Concerning the duties of man according to his particular natural state.

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A.—Of the relationship of husband and wife.

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B.—Of the relationship of parents and children and the mutual duties that arise from this relationship.

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I

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II

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This is the first conception of education or *bringing-up*, as this part of it might specially be called. It is the parents' duty to maintain their child ; it is their duty to care for and foster his freedom; it is their duty, in so far as the latter might injure the former, to subordinate the use of freedom to their highest purpose with the child, i.e., bringing-up is a duty.

Soon there appears the duty of a higher education, of education to morality, and for this reason.

The parents have discovered the child's freedom—for the present only the formal freedom ; but every free being, and therefore the child too, is capable of morality and ought to be educated thereto. Now they must have the child with them for the sake of his physical maintenance, which is their task exclusively ; consequently it is they alone who can educate him to morality also.

This duty of moral education includes the following. First of all, the duty of training the child's powers suitably, so that he may be a good instrument for the promotion of the purpose of reason, i.e., the duty of developing *skill* in him. It is—we say this in passing, for it cannot be our intention here to exhaust the theory of education—it is also the real aim of education, in so far as it depends on art and rules, to develop and train the independent

powers of the pupil. Then there is the duty of giving a moral direction to the trained freedom of the pupil, which can be done in no other way than that already mentioned, by promoting morality outside ourselves.

III.

Now what is the mutual relationship of parents and children in education ?

It is often the duty of parents to limit the freedom of their children, partly for the sake of their maintenance—they cannot allow a use of freedom which would be detrimental to this—partly for the sake of their training in skill. In the latter connection they must urge their children to do what will achieve this purpose and abstain from doing what is consistent neither with the first aim of maintenance nor with the second aim of training, because such actions are unnecessary and only a waste of time and energy. For the sake of morality they must not limit their children's freedom ; for morality consists in the freedom to do or to leave undone.

A question can hardly arise concerning the right of parents to limit the freedom of their children. I must respect the formal freedom of every man because I must regard him as a morally developed being and his freedom as a means for the promotion of the purpose of reason. I cannot be his judge, for he is my equal. But I regard my child, not as a morally developed being, but as one still to be trained ; and it is given to me just through the duty to educate it. I must, therefore, limit the freedom of my child for the same purpose for which I must respect that of those who are my equals.

It is the duty of parents to limit the freedom of children in so far as its use might be detrimental to the aim of education ; but only so far. Every other limitation is contrary to duty, for it is unsuited to the end in view ; *their* freedom is to be trained ; they must, therefore, have freedom for possible training. Parents ought not to forbid their children anything from mere caprice and in order, as they say, to break their will. It is only the will that runs counter to the aim of education that ought to be broken. Will in general, however, they

ought to have ; we are educating free beings, not will-less machines for the use of the first-comer who takes possession of them. Yet in this matter the parents alone are their own judges and have to settle this with their own conscience.

If no means, other than compulsion, can be found to subject children to the aim of education, parents have the right of compulsion ; it is then their duty to compel their children, since the proper aim is to be achieved in this way only.

If the child is compelled, it is and remains merely the object of its parents' action. It has freedom only within the sphere in which compulsion ceases, and this freedom is to be regarded as the result of the parents' actions. The children's actions are not, therefore, in the least moral, because they are enforced.

But morality is to be developed in the child ; something must, therefore, remain as the result of his own freedom and this is the child's *voluntary obedience.* This voluntary obedience consists in the children doing voluntarily, without compulsion and without fear of compulsion, what the parents command, and abstaining voluntarily from what they forbid, *because* they have forbidden or commanded it. For if the children themselves are convinced of the goodness and appropriateness of what is commanded, and so convinced that their own inclination already prompts them thereto, then this is not obedience but insight. Obedience is based, not on special insight into the goodness of what has been commanded, but on childlike trust in the higher wisdom and goodness of parents generally.

Just as one cannot say that the love or sympathy of the wife is a duty, so one cannot say that this childlike obedience is a duty. It springs, however, from the tendency to morality and dutiful disposition in general, and is found wherever children are properly treated ; for it can be based only on respect for and submission to superiority of mind and morality, not comprehended but dimly felt, together with love of this and the desire to share in it too. This is the source of obedience ; and if anything proves that there is good in human nature, it is this obedience.

Once obedience exists, it can be strengthened and elevated by freedom; the child may give himself up specially to those reflections and sensations which elevate it, and in this way and only then does obedience become the *duty of children*. It is the only duty of children; it develops before other moral feelings, for it is the root of all morality. Even later, when morality becomes possible within the sphere left free by the parents, it ever remains the highest duty. Beyond this sphere the child ought not to wish to be free.

(Obedience in the child is a copy of the whole moral attitude; it is, therefore, supremely important. As the educated man conducts himself in relation to the moral law in general and to its executor, God, so the child conducts himself in relation to the command of his parents and to them. We ought to do simply what duty commands, without quibbling about the consequences; but in order to be able to do so we must necessarily assume that the consequences will turn out well in God's hands. Similarly the child in regard to the commands of his parents. In Chrisitanity God is represented in the image of the Father. This is excellent. But let us not be content with speaking always and ceaselessly of His goodness; let us think also of our dutiful obedience to Him and of childlike submission to His will without sophistry and cavilling. This submission means not mere sentimentality and self-consolation, but especially brave performance of our duty, no matter what consequences our short-sightedness thinks it discovers therein. The development of this obedience is the only means whereby parents can directly produce a moral disposition in the child; it is their special duty, therefore, to urge them to obedience. It is a very false maxim which, like many other evils, we owe to the eudaemonism which formerly prevailed, that we should compel the child to everything by means of arguments founded on reason and on their own insight. Besides other reasons for rejecting it, it is nonsensical; for it attributes to children a great deal more reason than we attribute to ourselves; because even grown-ups act mostly from inclination and not on reasonable grounds.)

We have still to answer the question: How far should

unconditioned obedience on the part of the children, and the demand therefor on the part of the parents, extend? (All obedience is *unconditioned* and also blind; for otherwise it would not be obedience. It is blind especially to the particular. Blind obedience in general is not possible; it is necessarily based upon our conviction of the higher wisdom and goodness of the person whom we obey.)

The question raised may mean two different things. We may ask for the extension, for the sphere of action within which the child is to obey his parents, and *how far* he is to obey. Or we may ask for the protension; *how long* he is to obey, whether there is not a time for setting him free and when it is.

If the question is applied in the first meaning, it is raised either by the child or by the parents. It ought not to be raised by the child, and therein lies the answer: the child ought to obey, and his obedience consists in not wishing to be more free than the parents let him be. Only the parents can be the judges of the necessary limit of this obedience—the child not at all, for he submits obediently to them. To say the child ought to obey in all matters that are reasonable—as we sometimes hear—is completely contradictory. He who obeys only in reasonable matters, obeys not at all. For then he must have a judgment of what is reasonable or not. If he does only what is reasonable, as such, he does it from conviction, not from obedience. Whether obedience is demanded reasonably or not, the parents must answer according to their own conscience; they cannot let themselves be brought before the judgment-seat of the child. "But what if the parents demand something immoral of the child," you may say. I reply: The immorality of the demand either appears only after careful investigation or is immediately obvious. The first case cannot occur; for the obedient child does not assume that his parents could demand anything bad of him. If the second case occurs, the reason for obedience, trust in the higher morality of the parents, falls away at once and further obedience would be contrary to duty. Similarly where the existing immorality and the disgraceful mode of life of the parents becomes immediately clear

to the children. In this case obedience by the children and education by the parents is impossible.

If, as is more reasonable, it is the parents who raise the above question, then this is the answer: Give no commands of which you are not convinced in your own conscience that they aim, according to your best conviction, at the purpose of education. You have no inner moral right to demand further obedience.

If the question is: How long does the duty of obedience last? the answer is as follows.

First of all: obedience is demanded for the sake of education; but education is the means to an end; and the means falls away when the end is achieved. The aim of education was to make the child's powers useful for the promotion of the aim of reason in some subject and in some way. Whether it is achieved the child himself cannot judge; for he admits the higher insight of his parents. Either, therefore, the parents themselves decide that the aim is achieved and set the child free of their own free will and judgment.

Or—the second case—the result itself decides that the aim of education, usefulness, is achieved. In this matter the State is a competent external judge. If, therefore, the State confers an office on the son, it decides that his education is ended; the State's judgment, however, is legally binding on the parents—they must submit to it without appeal; it is binding morally, they must submit to it for the sake of duty.

Finally, the third case: education is no longer possible; this happens after marriage. The daughter submits wholly to the man and is subject to his will; she can, therefore, no longer be subject to the will of others, that of her parents. The son undertakes to look after his wife's fate, wholly in accordance with her wishes; he cannot, therefore, any longer let himself be determined by other wishes, those of his parents.

IV.

Even after the children are set free there continues a special moral relationship between them and their parents.

If, as we assume, the parents were also the educators,

they know the inner self of the children, their whole character ; for they have seen it grow and have developed it. They remain, therefore, their best advisers and it remains the duty of parents pre-eminently and before all others—this is the point, for otherwise we should have no *special* relationship but the *universal* one, according to which it is a duty to give good advice to all men—it continues to be, I say, the special duty of parents to advise their children, because upon them their advice can be brought to bear most appropriately. It is the duty of children to pay more attention to the advice of their parents than to any other advice and to consider it more carefully. Obedience is, of course, no longer their duty ; they are released therefrom and can act only according to their own conviction ; but this attentive listening and consideration is their duty. The parents retain the duty of *caring for* their children, the children the duty of childlike *reverence*. (Reverence consists in assuming higher wisdom in another and endeavouring to find everything that he advises wise and good. It is lack of reverence when what another says is rejected without further consideration.)

Finally there remains between parents and children the *special* duty of helping and supporting each other. The children maintain in their parents their best guides and counsellors ; the parents maintain in their children their own work, which they have developed for the world, in order to fulfil their duties thereto even after their death.

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(*c*) Foundation of Natural Right According to Principles of Philosophy.

[Only the fourth chapter of the first appendix to this work, which appeared at Jena in 1796, concerns us. The first appendix discusses the rights of the family, and Chapter IV the legal relationship between parents and children. Some of the paragraphs (e.g., 43, 44 and 45) cover the same ground as parts of the System of Ethics which have been translated, and deal with the first conception of education, the conception of higher education and

the right of parents to be the sole judges in this business of education. They have, therefore, been omitted, and only those parts have been translated which throw additional light on Fichte's early conceptions of family education; they occur on pp. 360-364 of Volume III of the Works. A translation of this work has also been published by A. E. Kroeger (*The Science of Rights*, London, 1889), but again I have preferred to make my own translation, although I have had Kroeger's version before me.]

Foundation of Natural Right according to Principles of Philosophy, 1796.

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First Appendix to natural right.
Outlines of Family right.

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CHAPTER IV.—Concerning the legal relationship between parents and children.

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[Paras. 43, 44 and 45 contain the same points as in the translation from the System of Ethics, 1798, viz., first conception of education—parents to restrict child's freedom for sake of its preservation; conception of higher education—parents to develop morality in the child by developing his powers and awakening his morality; parents alone to be judges of what is necessary in this education.]

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46.

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Every citizen promises in the civil compact to promote with all his might all the conditions of the possibility of the State. . . . . This he can best do by educating children to skill and usefulness for all sorts of reasonable purposes. The State has the right to make this education of children

a condition of the State-compact; thus education becomes an *external* compulsory duty owed directly not to the child but to the State. It is the State which acquires in the civil compact the right to require education.

I spoke of the education of *children in general;* for thereby the aim of the State is achieved. But it cannot be left to the caprice of the citizen which particular child he wishes to educate, because owing to the clashing of wishes insoluble legal disputes would arise. An arrangement must therefore be made concerning the children whom each is to educate. The most appropriate arrangement is for the State to follow the lead of nature and reason—apart from the fact that it has no right to order anything contrary thereto—and require parents to educate *their own* children.

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49.

In consequence of the condition of the civil compact already mentioned the State has the right to see that children are kept alive, fed and clothed and live among men, as the exclusive condition of their education to manhood and citizenship. We shall soon see that this right does not extend to the means chosen for education.

50.

The State makes it the duty of parents to educate their children. It therefore necessarily guarantees to them the conditions of the possibility of this education. There is first of all this condition, that no other person may take possession of their children to educate them. Therefore, *the State necessarily guarantees to the parents against other citizens the exclusive right of keeping their children to themselves.* If a legal dispute arises concerning this, the law must decide in favour of the true parents.

Education involves a continuous plan and uniform principles for the treatment of children. The plan would be disturbed if a stranger wished to interfere with education and to exercise influence over the children. Complaint

would be made of such interference and the State would always have to decide in favour of the true parents.

51.

If the parents think morally, the education of their children is a matter of conscience. They want to educate them as morally as possible ; but each necessarily considers his own principles the best and most correct ; otherwise he would be unprincipled, if he retained them. But the State cannot interfere in matters of conscience. It cannot, therefore, interfere in education.

It has the right to set up public educational institutions ; but it depends on the parents whether they will use them or not. The State has no right to compel their use.

52.

Neither the State, nor any other citizen, nor the child—because he is the object of education—is the judge of the principles of education ; the parents are, therefore, their own judges in this matter. No legal dispute can arise between children who are still being educated and their parents. The parents are in this matter the final court of appeal and supreme. The State can no more make laws concerning this relationship than concerning that between man and wife.

53.

The authority of parents over their children is based solely on the parents' duty to educate them. This duty of education is instituted by nature and guaranteed by the State. To consider children the property of the parents and to regard the rights of the latter over the former as rights of ownership is unfounded opinion.

54.

According to the above the State has the right to see that the child is educated ; consequently it has the right to prevent any use of the child which obviously puts an

end to education. It cannot, therefore, allow the child to be treated as property, e.g., a son to be sold.

. . . . . .

[Then follow passages similar to those in the "System of Ethics," 1798, dealing with the completion of education and the child becoming wholly free either because he is sufficiently educated or is given an office by the State or marries.]

(*d*) Diary of the Most Noticeable Mistakes in Education which have come to my knowledge.

[Fichte was employed from 1788 to 1790 by Mr. and Mrs. Ott, of Zurich, as tutor to their son and daughter, Kaspar (born in 1780) and Susette (born in 1781), whom he calls at times Käper or Cäper and Sette, respectively. He held very different views on education from his employers and thought it his duty to point out their mistakes, with the result that there was continual friction between both parties. In order to impress upon Mr. and Mrs. Ott their mistakes and his own views on education he began this diary on Wednesday, August 5th, 1789; in his own diary he calls it a "Diary of the most noticeable mistakes in education which my dear employers commit." Because they throw further light on the whole question of Fichte's educational views at this time I have added translations of "Another diary for Mrs. Ott" and of parts of Fichte's own copy of the diary, which cover the same period. The German text is contained in Schulz, J. G. Fichte Briefwechsel I, pp. 28-45.]

Diary of the Most Noticeable Mistakes in Education which have come to my knowledge.[1]

Begun on Wednesday, August 5th, 1789.

I.

In order to say something clear, definite and

1. In his own Diary (Schultz, p. 9) he calls it a "Diary of the most noticeable mistakes in education which my dear employers commit."

convincing concerning Susette's[1] education, it is necessary first of all to describe her present character exactly ; and I believe that such a description may be useful in other respects too.

In order that I may not again expose myself to the danger of being misunderstood in this matter too, I must make some preliminary remarks.

1. When I blame a child and point out its faults, I never mean by this that it *should be without faults, or, in other words, that a child should not be a child.* You know that from the beginning I have asked for nothing more than that children should be treated as children—and if I had not known the difference between children and grown-up people I should never have dreamt of undertaking the business of education.

2. Any man who is but moderately kind and half reasonable points out the faults of a child, not as judge, in order to see them punished ; but as educator, in order to lead to means for their improvement.

3. Whether I—to express myself quite mildly—am prejudiced against Susette, the mild measures which I have often recommended, and the intercessions which I have often made for her quite ingenuously, might have decided ; and perhaps the following considerations may still do so. Only the most depraved heart can bear any ill will towards a child, especially one who is most attractive, *in and for itself*—to transfer a certain irritation from the actual object to an innocent one is certainly in itself not so unusual ; but it points at least to a very weak character, and I have reason to believe from old and new experiences that I am free from such wretched paltriness.

Susette has all the good qualities and all the faults of thoughtlessness. First of all the good points ! One of the main characteristics of thoughtlessness is *the desire to be always pleased, and to see none but cheerful faces around one. Hence her susceptibility to all dissatisfaction with her, and to all disapproval of her actions ;* her frequent requests to be only good and merry and gay, and still more striking events of this kind. This affords an easy and natural means of influencing her, if only it is not used too

1. The seven-year-old daughter of his employers, Mr. and Mrs. Ott, of Zurich.

often, as is now the case, and thereby rendered useless.

The impression of the *immediate* moment influences thoughtlessness; the *past* is forgotten at once. This is clearly the case with Sette. She is, therefore, incapable of lasting anger and of real obstinacy. Certain events, which seem to prove the contrary, I shall explain later. If, immediately after the severest punishment, I could and would jump about in the room with her, without further reference to the unfortunate matter, I am sure that she would be as heartily pleased with me as ever. I have often experienced this on a small scale.

Her faults spring also from the same thoughtlessness and from many defects in her treatment hitherto.

Thoughtlessness, which is a sign of natural liveliness, wants to be *occupied ceaselessly and freely in its own way*, and, if the mind has still too little power, this desire affects the body. As you know, Sette can never stand or sit still and upright, if she is standing or sitting; and if she is compelled to do so, she must make movements at least with the remaining movable part of her body, her face and hands. That this description is not exaggerated, you can verify at any moment by watching her. The *particular form of many* of these movements of face and hands proceeds, however, from another source, from which proceed a number of other things of this kind, e.g., the stories of foolish servants, silly murder tales, vulgar riddles, etc. I have already hinted at this once; but it seems that you will not allow me to think anything about it. Yet I avail myself of my well-established right to protest that nothing that comes from that source be ascribed to *my* negligence.

This instability must influence the mind as well as the body. The most difficult thing of all in education is to discover the children's succession of ideas, their mode of linking thoughts to one another and of passing from one to another—a thing, of course, whose name is never dreamt of by him who has everything new committed to memory—and yet without this knowledge instruction is not possible at all. To bring order, arrangement, regularity into this succession of thoughts, that is briefly the aim of education or of the effort to make children reasonable, to teach them

to *think*. A mind like Susette's is, however, always far more confused, that is, it combines its images in a much more unusual way. It is wonderful how she confuses and misunderstands many things, how disinclined for all spontaneous thought she is, how difficult it is for her to explain clearly even once what she means. Add to this her hastiness in speech, her constant promises, the obscurity of her conversation in general; which proceeds from the instability of her mind and in turn increases it.

Her *waywardness* is very apparent. In cases of disobedience by children one ought always to differentiate between *that which shows itself in one long continuous action*, and which must always therefore be premeditated and arbitrary, and that which shows itself *in some small matter that is over in a moment* and occurs mostly without deliberation and almost without consciousness. Susette has never been guilty of the former, which does not seem to be in her character, at least *up to now*. She falls into the latter continually. Many things have combined to produce this waywardness in her. Out of thoughtlessness she immediately forgets what one has forbidden her; often, indeed, she is too absent-minded even to hear it. All the punishments with which one can threaten her *are remote;* the pleasure is *immediate*. Does the future affect her thoughtlessness like the present? She has always too much ground for the hope that she will escape punishment. And how often does not this hope succeed? Finally, and this is the chief thing, according to the existing arrangement one has had perpetually to command and forbid her, now—to sit upright, now—not to make faces, now—to attend, etc.—to some extent things which it is almost impossible for her to do. (I need not quote the reasons why I had to do this too, although I saw quite well the harm of it. You know that I have never been allowed to act according to my conviction.) Now this treatment, however prevalent it usually is, is the surest and most potent means of making a child disobedient. *Everything* cannot be noticed, censured, punished; one is not equally attentive at all times to such trifles, one cannot always be the same; disobedience is so frequent that one must often overlook the smaller cases in favour of the greater—the child becomes

accustomed, therefore, to regard important and unimportant commands as equivalent, to obey only when it pleases, and to be disobedient and yet remain unpunished.

This child has also been suspected again and again of obstinacy and stubbornness. This has happened when she did not want to apologize. I must make a more general remark on this. Nothing is more important for the formation of character than to accustom children to acknowledge and regret their faults and to confess them openly ; this is the only *real apology*. It comes of *reflection* and *feeling*, and *cannot be dictated*, just as no feeling can be dictated. Any other kind of apology is mere ceremony and consists in saying : I beg your pardon ; I won't do it again— ; it is, therefore, merely an external action, which can be dictated. People insist almost universally on this latter kind of formal apology in the case of children : with much harm, I believe. Either the child apologizes easily, quickly, willingly—in which case we accustom it early to invent a feeling which it does not have ; or the child apologizes unwillingly and is therefore forced to it—in which case we ourselves make it stubborn and incite it to anger. Sette has been compelled to apologize to me now and then : it would be no wonder if merely because of this she had taken the dislike to me which has been ascribed to her but which fortunately she has not taken. Her aversion to the *ceremony* of apology is due to the fact that she regards it as punishment and because it seems to have been imposed on her as a punishment. She will not give herself a punishment which is bitter to her. I quote an example to explain myself. She was once disobedient to me ; I pointed it out to you ; she was punished. At 11 o'clock she left me ; at 12 o'clock she came back to me to apologize at your bidding. She talked of all sorts of things, caressed me, jumped up at me, etc. That was undoubtedly the *essence* of apology ; she could have no grudge against me—but I saw your intention, and asked her " whether she had anything else to say to me, as I must go to dinner," and prepared to go ; then came the *formal* apology very slowly, with much constraint, and with a very bad grace. When I am compelled to reprimand Käper he sometimes defends himself ; I say a few convincing words and am silent ;

he begins to say something else ; I reply and continue to converse with him, rather coldly and drily for my part, of course, but without any mention of *his fault.* In quarter or half an hour he comes weeping bitterly and begs my pardon. This is true apology from feeling, which the heart and no external order demands.

That is a pretty fair description of Susette's character in general. In particular I must say a few more words concerning one circumstance.

If I really found that Susette did not like me, I could admit it very frankly, without prejudice to myself, because the blame might not really be mine but might be due to other circumstances too, and because I have shown in your house that I know quite well how to win the love of a child ; it would certainly be very silly to argue away this dislike now. But actually it is not so.[1] It is in Susette's character to become attached to everyone whom she is often with and who can contribute anything to her pleasure, because she likes to be pleased and to see pleasure around her. She likes to be with me. But she takes much pleasure in a woman's work, sewing, etc., which will undoubtedly please you ; she has often wanted, even at meals, to sew for her doll ; therefore, of course, she prefers to be where such work is done. She prefers to go to Miss Huberinn rather than to me for the twofold reason, that a woman's work is carried on there, that she finds her friends there, and that a freedom rules there which cannot of course be permitted in my lessons.

II.

Thus is the object constituted that is to be trained. This is the good ! These are the faults ! This is the individual character she possesses. And what then are the aims that we wish to achieve with her ?

1. The first and most important thing is undoubtedly *religiousness.* I confess that it surprises me, since you and I—I truly not with less enthusiasm—desire the

1. In his Briefwechsel, I, p. 33, Schulz adds this note : " The daughter absolutely hated Fichte's manner, and it is quite certain that neither she nor her brother got any permanent stimulation from Fichte." Zurich Memorandum, 1890, p. 16.

same purpose, that we have nevertheless been unable to agree thereon. Is it perhaps because we have not the same ideas concerning the nature of religiousness? I must, therefore, explain what I understand by religiousness and I shall speak more definitely on this point than on any other, partly because I ought to know something about it, partly because I do not want to be misunderstood any longer.

Religiousness is the *habit of thinking and acting virtuously which proceeds from a heart that is easily affected by the truths of religion.* This idea comprises two things; first of all, *a heart that is susceptible to the teachings of religion and easily affected by them.* Nothing affects us which we do not understand, whose connection with us and whose influence on us for good or ill we do not perceive. No one can be religious who does not understand at least as much of religion as is necessary to achieve this purpose with him. *What principles alone* belong to a child's religion;—what must be omitted therefrom for a long time;—by what method this religious instruction of children is to be treated; on these points I have already told you my thoughts several times, and even to-day I am not ashamed of having told them, because I have on my side not only obviously sound reason but also the example of Jesus who, when first instructing his disciples, did not discuss mysteries, but always said only as much as his hearers could bear, and clothed what he said in parables drawn from nature. But since you ordered me to follow exactly the opposite method, I have done so, although against my conviction, and have sought thereby to do as much good as possible, as my conscience testifies. I have followed your catechism, with the contents of which I quite agree; but as a theologian and teacher I have considered it, and will always consider it, my duty to contradict dangerous principles (e.g., that there is always time to turn over a new leaf) or absurd statements (e.g., that the devils in those possessed were driven out of their mouths visibly, that there are three heavens, etc.) which are not in your catechism, wherever I find them. If one understands the teachings of religion and if one remembers them often in relation to himself or is reminded of them, it is impossible not to be affected by them, not to

be moved at the thought, e.g., of the omniscience and omnipresence of God, of His goodness to man.

To religiousness there belongs secondly *the habit of thinking and of acting virtuously.* Habit comes from practice. By means of the efforts by which we try to keep children away from vanity, conceit, and harsh unkind judgment, and to make them obedient, grateful, patient, etc., we make them good Christians too. It is all one. On this point I ask you to read again the introduction to Salzmann's Primer,[1] which expresses my thoughts perfectly on this point and to which, therefore, I refer instead of to what I ought to say here myself.

" But the Holy Ghost produces sanctification in the hearts of children in a supernatural mystical way incomprehensible to us,"—this is the only objection you can make to me. Yes ! but if this must happen *entirely without our assistance,* we need do nothing at all and might leave the work entirely to the Holy Ghost. But if we too must do something in the matter, we can never, since these workings of the Holy Ghost are invisible, know where they begin ; and we act, therefore, most wisely when we do everything that is possible by *natural* means without waiting for *supernatural.*

Hitherto I have not intentionally shown the children the difference between religiousness and the means thereto, the devotional exercises, although I may have mentioned this matter in passing ; I find, however, that it is ever becoming more necessary to do so ; chiefly in order to avoid misunderstanding : for it is not sufficient to tell them[2] that man must do both but also to tell them the relationship in which both stand to each other. *Devotional exercises are not religiousness at all but are the most powerful and effective means of attaining thereto.* Religiousness and devotional exercises are related to each other as end and means. In this I am far from saying anything paradoxical ; it is rather the true fundamental and characteristic doctrine of the whole evangelical church ; and the opposite leads to that mode of thought which Jesus condemned most openly and decidedly during his earthly life.

1. p. XXIII *seqq.* (Note by Fichte).
2. The text has " Ihnen " ; but this must be a mistake.

You have noticed the children's indifference to the truths of religion and devotional exercises. Unfortunately, I am quite in agreement with you on the matter; indeed, I can know still better, for very obvious reasons, how deep it goes. (Please do not be frightened at these statements of mine until you have read the whole account through!) I have had to do with children who had nothing like the tender susceptible hearts of yours, and who had enjoyed nothing like the loving affectionate treatment which yours enjoy: I have treated religion with them according to my method: very often, when I was but a little earnest—one must not be so too often—they melted into tears: a reminder of God's presence worked more strongly upon them in their greatest boisterousness than fear of punishment. I have never been able, in discussing religion, to move your children to tears, although more than once I have been moved thereto myself—yet both weep very bitterly when they but think they have offended me; their hearts therefore are certainly not hard. It is equally true that at prayers they are not always attentive, speak very quickly, also often play and laugh during them. In this matter I have complained less of you because I considered it all very natural, perceived the causes, and believed that I had means to combat it in my own, though very limited, power; but you will remember that I have said all this *before*. I quite agree with you, therefore, concerning the fact but not concerning the cause; for you believe that I am to blame for it. *First of all, facts! When I came, they were far more absent-minded and thoughtless at prayers than now.* I have the diary no longer by me; but if I remember rightly, Mr. Hurter also complains several times about this. Was I to blame then? *Now they pray, usually at least, with external propriety: when I came, they never did. They now begin to feel something* when religion is taught (this I shall have to show in greater detail later); *when I came there was no trace of this.*

All this did not surprise me, and could not surprise me. Whether it did not pain me is another matter. Ought, can men generally—can *children* be moved by something of which they understand absolutely nothing, and concerning which they think nothing at all, or something

false? Just as little as you or I could be touched by the reading of the most stirring poem in the Turkish language. That this is the case with your children in regard to the chief point I can give you clear proof, as soon as you like, from its parts, which I have not yet reached in my explanation. Must not anything, which one has had to learn by heart with the same indifference as any other lesson, without preparation, without being reminded of respect, and must not the monotonous tune to which it is generally set, produce the greatest indifference? Even if the recollection of the funny additions which one's school-fellows made, on the one hand, or the remembrance of the bitter tears which one shed, of the sarcastic reproaches which one received, or even of the blows one got, on the other hand did not convert this indifference into more vigorous feeling?[1]

In regard to prayer, can children with true devotion and feeling say prayers, which were generally the feelings of a man, not of a child; which they learned perhaps in years when they were scarcely capable of childish feelings; which they have said daily for years? I may appeal in this matter to the experience of the most mature man. Does the usual common prayer, however excellent it is in itself, move you to such an extent as when Mr. Lavater, or someone else, earnestly says a prayer that you have never heard before? Not me, I admit. (I do not fear that you will understand me here as if I found fault with this arrangement of the liturgy in itself, whose sufficient grounds I know quite well: because I have taken therefrom what seems to me a suitable analogy.)

1. Here I must speak very freely of things which may not seem so obvious and important to you as to me. But remember that you have to stick solely to the *grounds on which my statements are founded*, if you want to convince me of error—that the reason, that it has been introduced here in this way for a long time, does not satisfy me—in the mother-country too, in the whole Christian world, so far as I know, it is introduced in this way in all the *lower public* schools; but in the whole Christian world many wrong things are introduced which every reasonable person condemns and yet must imitate, and so many people have always condemned *this* abuse, and it is now condemned so openly on all sides that its end seems near—that you have put the matter in such a way that I must give this proof to *save my own honour*: that I would willingly have been excused from further dispute on this point:—that one ought to point out the disease when one promises to cure it.

Finally, I have spoken of *both children* in considering this point, because in this matter the treatment and faults of both are the same.

2. The second thing we must see to with Susette is *good habits, in so far as they are physical and conventional :* for Christian modesty belongs to religiousness, as I said before. Naturally, I cannot go into detail here ; because the education of the two sexes in this respect must be very different and because the gentler, more reserved, more modest female character, as compared with the more determined, more spirited, more independent male character, can be formed only by a good loving mother ;—because the customs of different countries differ very much in regard to what is conventional :—because much of what is physical is a matter for the dancing master, etc. But the point wherein it is obvious that the teacher must co-operate is proper deportment and manner, clear pronunciation and precise expression.

3. Finally, the aim is to give her some instruction. I can and may speak only very briefly and diffidently about what a woman should know, for the obvious reason that I may easily be wrong. To wish to make a woman really *learned* can scarcely occur to any reasonable person. Yet there is much knowledge which pertains really not to being *learned* but to being *sensible, more useful in one's sphere* and *more happy ;* this, I believe, we should seek to give to everyone in that measure of completeness which is possible in the circumstances and without interfering with higher purposes. I do not include *writing* and *reading* in this knowledge ; they are indispensable. Whether French is in a similar category because of the locality—*in itself* it is not—I cannot decide. *Independent thought, independent judgment* is the prerogative of man as man, not of sex, and is the highest source of his happiness. It is no special science, however, but must be learnt and exercised in everything that is taught. For this purpose alone it is necessary to do some science with a woman—even if one regards it as but a *means* to the development and exercise of the understanding, and as material on which the mind exercises itself in its work. But these means may also yield much real true profit. It is very fitting for a woman to have some idea of the

objects in nature which surround her and of their influence for good or ill upon us, in order to learn to guard against prevailing prejudices, ungrounded fear and superstition. It might be very useful for her to get—perhaps by means of History—some introductory knowledge of mankind, in order to learn to consider more precisely those with whom she must some day live, to handle them more skilfully, to judge them more correctly, more mildly and more lovingly. It might not harm her to have some knowledge of the civil organisation of the present world, in order to be able to take part in the conversation of men, without fear of committing herself, and to occupy any free time more pleasantly with useful reading.

III.

And now concerning the means of achieving these aims with this character.[1]

ANOTHER DIARY FOR MRS. OTT RUNS THUS.

August 5TH.

My project cannot offend you in any way, because I undertake it neither with the intention of censuring you, a censure to which you might be quite indifferent ; nor with the intention of giving you instructions, because I know very well that you will never follow them nor alter what is censured ; but merely with the intention of being able to defend myself when occasion arises ; a precaution which is very necessary for me, as you yourself will be good enough to admit. I have already been blamed several times for the results of mistakes which you have made ; I have availed myself of the right of self-protection, and have made known to you candidly the true sources of the bad manners that have appeared in the children ; you must have seen what is so obvious, because I have not been refuted yet, and indirectly you have admitted it yourself. When we wanted to part, and afterwards, when we agreed to remain together, I hoped that the most important things would be changed. The change,

1. This diary is not continued further.

however, is not very noticeable, and fresh mistakes are made daily against the principles of the good education of children. The results of this on the moral behaviour of the children have already become visible; they will *become more apparent from day to day.* It is very probable that you will make me feel your impatience at this once more; especially since I am becoming more clearly convinced that prudence and duty require me to remind you no more without cause of these things and you might therefore easily begin to believe that none were being committed by you; in order to be ever ready to defend myself and to have my defence always at hand, I am thinking of it in good time. At the same time, however, I have a higher and far more extensive purpose in this matter.

According to my previous conceptions the education of children was the art *of making the pupils as good as possible;* now, after the most serious consideration, I see that in your house, with the host of prejudices and abuses that are ineradicable, it consists only in *preventing as much evil as possible;* I see that I shall achieve a bad or at most a mediocre education and I feel that I am capable of achieving a *good* one. I am accountable, therefore, to myself, to you and to all reasonable people for the fact *that in these circumstances I can do no better.* This is the reason why I am making for myself a copy of the most important part of this diary.

You will receive this copy *as soon as you compel me thereto by unfounded accusations* or *when I leave you.* The use of *mine* depends upon the *way in which I leave you* and *on the position into which I may come because of the obviously bad education which I foresee.* I shall endeavour to write in the truest and simplest manner, without any trace of bad temper, which I shall likewise suppress entirely after this undertaking, because it is vain to resist things that are unchangeable and because I may hope to save my honour at least.

Susette said to me this morning when I spoke of her very bad conduct yesterday: "O! Mamma is very good; it does not matter to her; although I did not deserve it and had behaved very badly, she gave me a piece of meat yesterday." I hope I need not point out the results of a

kindness, on which the *child may rely with certainty* and *does actually rely with such certainty.*

Cäper comes in the afternoon and asks me to play with him. At once I understood this completely and asked whether his mamma had sent him to me and if he is to repeat to her what I say. After much stammering and begging me to take no notice of it, because mamma *had forbidden him* to repeat it to me, he admits to me that you asked him *what I was doing,* that you ordered him to ask me to play and to *tell her* if *I refused ;* that *then he would be allowed* to shoot with powder which he had asked your permission to do ;—after making *some very cunning subterfuges concerning the game to be chosen,* he asked me to refuse so that he might be allowed to shoot. In order to prevent greater evil, and not to play with him against his will, I let what he wanted happen.

There are many faults which must have been strengthened and nourished by this statement. *Deceit* and *falsehood,* by the prohibition to tell *his teacher* something that *his mamma* had said—*distrust* of both simultaneously, by this very prohibition—*disobedience,* because he found he had to be disobedient either *to me* (who asked him the truth) or *to you* (who had forbidden him to tell it)—gossip, by asking what I was doing, and by the order to repeat to you what I should say—*cunning* and *intrigue* and *hypocrisy,* by the necessity of *appearing* to want something (namely, that I should play with him) that he *did not want,* as you well knew, because of a greater pleasure which awaited him in the event of a refusal. Some of the authority of *one* of us must be lost, either *yours* or *mine,* and it is not good for parents if the teacher's authority is lost, nor for the teacher if the parents' is lost. As I did not fall into the trap but guessed everything at once, I probably saved *my* authority ; but I would not like a *particle* of *yours* to be lost. This manœuvre was the more surprising to me, because he had received this commission some days before and I had let it be noticed that I had reasons for disapproving of it, and because it was *his customary and main* faults which were thereby encouraged and strengthened. Meanwhile I see, of course, the reasons for this behaviour. *You wanted to allow him the pleasure he asked for, but you feared the remarks I*

might make concerning it, and wanted to deprive me of the right of doing so by making it appear the fault of my own refusal to bother with him. But why not be frank and open? Such things must be the natural consequence, if parents and teacher do not agree.

I add a remark of another kind which may cause you some reflection. Susette behaved yesterday towards you both with the utmost impropriety, and whilst she was not afraid of *behaving thus to her parents*, it occurred to her in her greatest rage *to be afraid that I might hear her screams.* Whence have I this authority over a child whom I neither punish by depriving her of her freedom nor beat? Undoubtedly because of my coldness, dryness and firmness.[1]

Diary of the Most Noticeable Mistakes in Education. My Copy.

[Friday] August 14th.

Käper comes to tell me, mamma has said "*She wishes she had power to have the maid properly whipped.*" I need not point out here the influence which such a sentiment on the part of his mother must have in the heart of this boy, who is inclined to harshness without this. And it soon appeared too. A few days afterwards, because he had drunk some water from a mineral spring, Käper was not to eat before 10 o'clock. Mamma had forbidden it; but he wanted to do it behind her back—the maid had carried down the rolls, and *thereby prevented him from acting against her order.* He threatened, however, to tell his mamma to have her *right well scolded* (these were his expressions) and himself expressed in his own name the very hearty desire to be allowed to whip her.

[Sunday] 23rd.

Both children ridicule the maid in their mamma's presence. Mamma laughs, and is pleased at this, and says: "It is right; why does she play the fool so much." It

1. This diary ends here.

is not a question of *whether the maid deserves to be ridiculed ;* or *whether it is unjust for children even to ridicule her ;* but, *what results such indulgence must have on the moral character of the children.* Shall I tell you?

[Tuesday] 25th.

Early this morning I heard Käper argue very violently with the maid—order her rudely, say several times to her : but *you must.* He did it again the other morning—when I reminded him of it he said : his mother had told him to.

[Friday] 28th.

To-day he tells me my walk does not please his grandmother and mother. I walk very *pathetically,* they had said. Mamma once asked him what kind of *pathetic* steps I take when I walk with him. That this is very silly and means really nothing, is not the point. Käper does not understand it at all, yet he believes that it may be some sarcasm about me, and despises either you or me. Which of the two did you intend ?

September [Wednesday] 2nd.

Because of bad behaviour Käper is put in the black book immediately after lessons, and treated coldly and unsympathetically by me at play-time ; after his mother had already made him expect that I would pardon him. Against my will, however, I have to take part, in order to prevent damage, in one of his games which I had not allowed but also, on account of my principles, not forbidden—he was making a little powder-man—— ; and I tell him to get matches instead of a light to kindle it. Mamma says to him : *See, Mr. Fichte is becoming good again ; already he is a little better,* etc. Since I did not write down my views thereon until this evening in the diary, I cannot say that this was contrary to principles of education proved and mentioned. But it was certainly obvious that the previous comments on my anger, and especially the reference to this conclusion, which he would never have made without it or which would not at least

have been so strong, were exactly contrary to the purpose I wished to achieve by means of the black book. The inevitable result soon followed. After the diary had been written he came to me again and begged an evening kiss, which I had already refused, whereupon he had comforted himself, "Mamma had given him three." When I again refused he whispered to himself, "Mr. Fichte is then the worst."

Further remarks are not necessary here.

[Thursday] 3rd.

I learn from him—he once complained to papa that "I no longer love him." In what connection I may have said this, *if I did say it*—what I wanted to effect by means of whatever he drew this *conclusion* from—what his intention was if he simply *invented* it himself, was certainly not doubtful. Suffice it that he told more. Papa answered "it matters not, even if he does love him (Käper)." Should I say anything to this?

[Monday] 14th.

Käper was very spiteful to the maid—quarrelled with her on a matter which had nothing to do with him; and when I reprimanded him for it, he said: "Mamma had told him, when a servant did anything wrong, to tell her so—he need not put up with every thing that the maid did to him," etc.

[Sunday] 20th.

For more than a week Käper has been used to convey personal remarks to me, e.g., "I look as if I would eat someone." "I don't understand this and that." Everything that I have told him is contradicted on the most foolish pleas: e.g., no true man can eat plums in any other way but unwiped—my table rules are as affected as if we were educating counts or barons—they are free Swiss, and more of such nonsense. Naturally I answer as is fitting; I *must* do so. One of us loses, or rather we both lose, and you most, I believe.

II. APHORISMS ON EDUCATION, 1804.

[Fichte's son, Immanuel Hermann Fichte, the editor of his Works, informs us (in a footnote to page 353, Vol. VIII) that this account was written by Fichte when he was planning to take into his house the sons of some of his friends and educate them together with his own son who was born in 1796. The translation is from the Works, Vol. VIII, pp. 353-360.]

Aphorisms on Education,[1] 1804.

1.

To educate a man means to give him the chance of becoming completely master and lord of *all* his power. Of *all* his power, I say; for the power of man is a unity and a coherent whole. It would be merely superfluous, therefore, if it were not fatal, to aim in education at some particular use of this power—to educate the youth for his class, as it has been well called. This restricts that power and makes it the slave of the educated class instead of the master which it ought to be. We may leave that power, when fully and harmoniously developed, to decide from what side to approach the world and work therein; conversely, in all classes the important thing is, not what one has been *educated* for and what one has *learned*, but what one *is*. He who truly *is*, the rational and ever spontaneous being, will always easily *make* himself what in his position he should be. But he who has substituted some external drill (Training) for the animal instinct that unfortunately is lacking, remains within these limits, which encompass him like a second impenetrable nature; education, or instruction, has restricted him and killed him, instead of freeing him and making him capable of living self-development.

1. An account written when he was planning to take into his house the sons of some of his friends for education along with his own son. (Editor's Note.)

2.

For the development of mental power in this most general sense we have to-day nothing more suitable than the learning of the ancient classical languages. The question is not whether these languages will ever be needed for life; indeed we may not consider whether it is more useful for the developing mind to breathe in the choking air of the modern mode of thought or in the clear breeze of the writers of antiquity. But this question we cannot escape: how the pupil is to arrive at a living perception of the thing itself through the mist of words which he does not create and therefore does not understand—a mist which permits in him the rise, not of his own mind, but only of that mind which, unknown to him, flickers in the language, and which holds captive for life the majority of so-called educated people.

I hold that this can take place only through the study of *those* languages whose entire *mode of conception* differs completely from ours and definitely compels everyone who is to achieve *real understanding* here to rise above all symbols to something higher than the language sign, to the comprehension of the matter; such understanding is certainly more than is aimed at and usually achieved by the usual instruction in the ancient languages which is satisfied with an approximate interpretation of the sense. For that very reason this study of the classics is not to be replaced by the learning of any modern language; because in the latter exchange can be, and is carried on between phrases which are not understood and others which are equivalent and merely sound differently but are likewise not understood, i.e., in the latter there is never any advance from expression and image to conception. Hence the misty world of notions, half-understood and never thoroughly investigated, in which lives the usual consciousness, even that of so-called educated people, and which are its truth. These notions depend on the accidental form of the genius of the language that surrounds these people and on the equally accidental smattering picked up from their more particular environments, in which consciousness has to do, never with the real and the true, but with their phantoms.

3.

It is obvious that the *form* of the instruction and of the exercises must be compatible with the purpose described : with that form I believe I am well acquainted from former practice in instruction. A secondary consideration here will be to devote the greater part of the time and of the labour which in the traditional system of instruction has been devoted to Latin, a very inferior daughter of Greek, to the mother itself, to begin with Greek as far as possible, to consider it as of most importance and to practise in it exercises in style and even in speaking. The reason is that fluency in Greek, which apart from this is easily attained by Germans because of the very close relationship between it and their mother-tongue, results in a notion of language in general and is also a preparation for Latin which is much more remote from us. The opposite procedure would not achieve this result so surely.

4.

Of course, during this learning of the ancient languages and of the views of the ancient world, of ancient history, geography, etc., knowledge of the surrounding world will not be forgotten. Because this concerns the environment, however, it is to be promoted more by means of life and as much perception as can be arranged, than by useless study and the handing-on of tradition, more by means of direct experience and conversation thereon than by special lessons. An active boy, accustomed to unity and order by his daily work, will not fail to rise from what he perceives to what he does not perceive, and to enquire about the latter as well as about the connection between both. He will be satisfied when those about him know and also understand how to answer in such a way that the pupil gets, not some useless phrase that merely repeats, but a living perception.

5.

The inner spirit and character of this intellectual education, without which no kind of external skill and knowledge has any value, is that the pupil himself shall

really work always, shall acquire everything by his own mental power, and shall learn nothing purely mechanically. The method which makes teaching and learning easy or a matter of play cannot, therefore, enter into a reasonable system of education, in which the important point is, not *what* is learnt, but the intellectual ability of the pupil, and how it has been developed by the subject-matter of instruction.

For this reason the study of Mathematics, preferably according to Euclid or by his method, will be the second important part of the instruction proper.

6.

On the other hand modern languages are to be learned in real life, at the prompting of a need which presents itself spontaneously or is artificially produced. If no useless excellence in mere speaking is aimed at, these languages are very easily learnt, particularly among the daughters of Latin, by the boy who has already acquired a knowledge of language in general from the ancient languages and exercised his ear and tongue therein, and who understands Latin in addition.

7.

Apart from the instruction in the rudiments of Geometry and Arithmetic which is based on perception, any really systematic and speculative study of science before the years of dawning adolescence is harmful. Before then, a greater amount of the subject-matter of knowledge should alone be offered, the imagination should be strengthened and made free and independent, the understanding *accustomed* by exercise to the legitimate course, as if there could not be any other. Once he is established in the correct mental attitude, he may fly to investigation and to clear consciousness of its laws, which he followed formerly like some dim instinct. In a word: Transcendentalism of any kind, even in its slightest indications, does not belong to the subjects of education.

8.

The body is as good an expression of the *whole* human power as the mind. Now, quite contrary to the usual

opinion that diligence and serious study are unhealthy, early mental training, if it is not merely a brooding of the memory over useless, unintelligible phrases but a living and moving of the imagination, is already of itself the most effective balm of life for the body too. Apart from this fact, however, it remains the more particular aim of education to make the pupil master also of his body, so that he possesses it, but is in no sense possessed by it, or by bodily moods and excitements.

In the first place this involves the development and fixing of the senses ; of the eye by drawing, perspective, not mechanical ; of the ear by practice in harmonious song for one voice and for many voices, and also, so far as there is any talent, in learning some musical instrument ; of common sense by habituation to uninterrupted attention and absolute intolerance of distraction. (This point is more important than it seems, and I venture to assert that one would cure the human race of all its other defects at one stroke if one were to cure everyone of distraction and persuade him always to give his whole undivided attention to what he is doing.)

Daily enjoyment of fresh air, harmonious development of the body by gymnastic exercises, like dancing, wrestling, fencing, riding, all aimed at bringing the body under the control of the mind and at making it at the same time the strong durable tool of the latter,—these are understood in the whole of this system of education.

9.

There is no *positive* moral education, i.e., one which sets itself, and expressly proclaims, the aim of training the pupil to virtue ; rather would such a procedure kill the inner moral sense and form heartless hypocrites and double-dealers. In the modest calm of one's own heart, without idle talk and self-reflection, morality must spring up of itself and gradually grow and spread, as external relations increase and become clearer to the child. It must be so, and will result in this everywhere of itself without any deliberate assistance, *so far as none but good examples surround the pupil and everything evil, vulgar and base is kept far from his sight.*

Apart from such protecting care the educator has only this to do : to make a few positive rules, quite clear in themselves and easy to observe, and insist on their observance firmly and without any exception. Then some time he should solemnly proclaim the moral law : not to lie at all, not to speak or to act wittingly and deliberately against one's conviction. According to all experience this law grips the boy with wonderful power, lifts him, gives him inner composure, and becomes for him the ineradicable source of inward honesty, which is the mother of all virtues and lets no one who possesses it fall beyond help.

10.

Inner religiousness of heart, i.e., a sacred presentiment of One who is raised above all sensuousness, and affection for Him, appears quite spontaneously with the inward honesty of heart and suitable mental training, that has just been described. To attempt to teach it systematically, however, would kill the inner sense for it and make a hypocrite. The clergy of his persuasion (our education is quite indifferent to what this is) will look after the instruction in the positive religion of the country, when the pupil is old enough to share its mysteries, and our system of education will abstain with strict conscientiousness from any positive or negative interference and any influence in this matter.

11.

This will be the external means for attaining the specified aim. One private tutor will be kept, or two if there is a larger number of pupils. These are the exclusive conditions which will guide us in choosing these teachers : first and foremost, that education is the work of their mind and heart for its own sake and that therefore they seek such a post not as the means to some other end but as the primary end in itself ; secondly, that, even if they do not know all they ought to teach or even only a little, they have the intellectual freedom and training always to learn it with ease, as they need it, and also possess, or can acquire, the most suitable method of teaching it. These men will teach alternately with me and keep the pupils

under *continuous* supervision ; we shall confer daily and exchange reports.

12.

Even if there were no higher motives, prudence and affection for our own child alone would compel us to regard and treat other people's children exactly like our own in every way, because the opposite kind of treatment would have the most disastrous consequences for him.

III. PATRIOTISM AND ITS OPPOSITE.

[Of these two patriotic dialogues, which belong to the year 1807, only the second is here translated, and that not completely, from Volume III of the posthumous works, pp. 248 to 274. B. is obviously the exponent of Fichte's own views, while C. merely acts as a foil. We know that Fichte studied Pestalozzi's writings, especially "How Gertrude teaches her children," during his absence from Berlin in Königsberg and other places in the winter of 1806-7 and that he found in them the true remedy for the ills of mankind and of the German nation in particular as well as the only means of making people understand his own *Wissenschaftslehre.*]

Patriotism and its opposite. Patriotic dialogues of 1807.

Second Dialogue.

. . . . . .

B. . . . . The aim of science is to put into the free possession of men the fundamental source of truth and reality, in their absolute point of unity,—from which point of unity all particular truth and reality is derived in accordance with definite and immediately recognizable laws as a further definition of the former.

. . . . . .

B. The reason why it is impossible for this generation to attain to science consists in this, that it neither shares nor is susceptible to the perception of immediate life. . . . . .

B. . . . . Our generation, however, is not directly susceptible to the perception of life because, from the moment of its first development onwards, all perception is snatched away from it, and it is driven thence with considered art into shadows and mist. Our education consists in doing this skilfully. The child's voice is scarcely developed to the first lisp, and thereby offers a weak spot to our art that is already in waiting, when it receives words instead of things and figures of speech instead of sensations. Soon spoken words, a pattern that is still too close to perception, are changed for children to dead letters, until through familiarity these, too, lose their definite forms; the children swim in a sea of unformed letter elements as their real world, and thereby education has already achieved one of its first aims. The highest art of this education is not to let the pupil stay for a moment at a shadow of lower power—for this is loss of time for the aim of education, and idleness and stupidity in the pupil—but to drive him on quickly to the shadow of the shadow and again to the shadow of this and so on, the genius of the pupil consisting precisely in rushing into this skill. In this way only a world of mist and shadow, without any core of perception to support it, has remained as truth and reality for the generation. Its higher scientific efforts, however, consist in further refining, purifying and thereby raising to ever higher power, the shadows of highest power thus produced, and then in pairing these results with one another in order that there may be created from them a world of mist quite free, if possible, from all truth and reality. This work, of course, can be continued *ad infinitum;* yet the aim intended, to obtain a world of mist quite free from truth, is never quite attained. There are in Germany honest but ill-informed men who consider the science of knowledge a great mistress for purifying mist and who are, therefore, cordially averse to it, because of a dim feeling that it should not be so. I honour and love the source of this aversion!

Now is it a wonder, or can there be any result other than that those who have never, since they came to consciousness, been in a state of perception in any sphere of knowledge, cannot enter the highest perception of all and the source of all other perceptions, but remain in the shadow and mist in which they have grown up and in which they have lived? How could such people, who have never perhaps during the whole of their lives conceived a leg of a chair correctly and as it really is, notice and conceive correctly the very fine and deeply hidden operations of the spiritual life by which, e.g., Being is produced and the insight of which is required for the destruction of Being? They know absolutely nothing and have been allowed to remain nowhere until they knew, but have always been driven on to some other provisional memorizing; how could they ever know of knowledge itself? Such a generation and science live in elements that are completely opposed; the latter does not expect of the former development, reconstruction or such things; it expects it to be born again, and that is a pure impossibility. On the other hand, if you give it men who know something correctly and exactly because they have grasped it in living perception and made it their independent possession, it is already in a common element with them. They have only to increase a power which they already really possess, and which remains ever the same, and to raise it to the last stage which it can attain; and this raising of a fundamental power that already exists is not even very difficult.

C. In the education of our generation, then, in accordance with which it is driven with considered art from the truth and immediacy of perception to the mere representative shadow and is always driven further on in this world of shadow, you find the reason for its insensibility to the doctrine of truth, to science!

. . . . . .

C. . . . . According to you, in the education of the generation lies the cause of all its ills, and in particular the cause of its insensibility to the clear science of reason; and particularly in this arrangement of education, that it does not let the pupil remain and take

root in perception, but drives him thence to shadows of words and to shadows of abstract ideas ever more remote and further from reality. The remedy would, therefore, be to abolish completely this kind of intellectual education ; perhaps you mean that if intellectual education is ever to exist and to mean anything, it must take the opposite direction and lead its pupil to perception and let him establish himself well and take root therein. In this way truth will once more reach the race for possible instinctive development, as well as the skill to govern freely for scientific development with the instrument of truth, perception.

B. I mean that.

C. I am afraid you have got into another circle. If the whole existing generation is spoilt for living perception, how will you find in this generation teachers who can instruct the rising generation in this art of perception ?

B. What is infinitely sublime, great and victorious in this thought is precisely that this art does not need to be taught, just as it cannot be taught ; but that guidance only is necessary, and that anyone, who may himself lack the art, can give this guidance and understand its rules easily. The nature of the human race has not yet failed and has not yet been rooted out. Fortunately our children are still born, as all the children of men have been born from the beginning, with ability and desire for perception. They themselves do not desire the world of shadow ; it is only our fatal art that drives them into it against their will. This art must be suppressed, and another shall appear to guide them suitably in perception, so that their hold on reality is strengthened and their freedom to manage perception properly developed. Consequently nothing is needed but first and foremost the conviction that things are as stated ; secondly, that we should learn the rules of the art of guiding perception aright and according to the natural order, which is not difficult.

. . . . . .

B. . . . . I say that this art of guiding the perception of the pupils has already been put before the public in outline fairly completely and is industriously practised somewhere.

C. Surely you do not mean the theory of *Pestalozzi*, who lets children learn by heart words and phrases that are not understood, who is trying, it is said, to introduce an intolerable mechanism, and whom I considered censured in your earlier words, that the child who can scarcely lisp is given a word instead of the thing. This man himself admits his complete ignorance and impotence in everything, his miserable egoism and his absolute incompetence in philosophy, and is not even modest in this acknowledgment, the literal truth of which is clear in his writings. He seems to be not very favourable to philosophy but to belong to those who consider it the art of purifying mist to the greatest fineness. A philosopher, who is the author of the science of knowledge, recommends this man as the ultimate saviour and deliverer of mankind !

B. *Pestalozzi*, too, one must learn to know from himself, not from the statements of his critics. Necessity, —you can read the confession of this in his writings—forces upon him that learning by heart of words not understood, which is not to be recommended and does not belong at all to the nature of the method but rather contradicts its spirit and starting-point ; moreover, it has not in this connection the disadvantage which it brings with it in every other.

Pestalozzi's thought is infinitely more and infinitely greater than Pestalozzi himself ; this is the relation of every really ingenious thought to its apparent author. It is not he who has thought or made this thought ; it is the eternal reason that has thought it, and the thought has made the man and will continue to make him. From the story of the disclosure of this thought, as it appears in Pestalozzi's writings with a truth that is its own witness and with childlike pure simplicity, one could show in sensuous distinctness what we said above, that a truth which has once seized a man continues to grow in him without his knowledge or assistance and bursts forth finally to light and clearness in spite of the most powerful obstacles. The soul of Pestalozzi's life was love for the poor neglected people ; his love was so blessed that he found more than he sought, the sole means of salvation for all mankind. That he discovered at the same time the sole means of educating a generation capable of

understanding the science of reason will seem marvellous to him when he learns that I have said so; unless he begins to understand from this the real aim of the science of knowledge.

In order then to understand him correctly and to value him fully, one must first and foremost grasp Pestalozzi's thoughts in this sense, not as the intellectual education only of the poor oppressed people, but as the absolutely indispensable elementary education of the whole future generation and of all generations from henceforth. In describing the realization, although this higher view is not unfamiliar to him and is often expressed by him, the author nevertheless always returns to that limited view as the important one. This is partly because he himself started therefrom, and organized his practice thereon; partly because he seems tacitly to assume that this oppression and poverty of the majority will always remain and does not dare to see that, wherever his education grows into national education, this oppression will soon and necessarily cease; finally because, in spite of all his aversion to letters, he nevertheless assigns to them far too high a value for the people, of course as a weapon against oppression. It is simply from this predominant regard for the exclusive needs of the people that there have arisen all these additional features; which belong so little to the fundamental conception that they rather contradict it and which have meanwhile roused most opposition and even put the existing education in a position to affect superiority towards the new education.

Secondly it is necessary for one to follow the fundamental thought itself to its source, and so give the practice the foundation which at present it lacks.

C. The practice, the principle of which you recommend, lacks foundation?

B. It does good service too, and generous nature helps, as it does to what is still more inferior. But if the system is to appear in its full worth and as what it is, the elementary education of the whole human race, this foundation of its practice must be given to it.

C. Make your meaning clear.

B. Naturally Pestalozzi and his followers and collaborators, too, know only that Being is what is

ultimate, absolute and the truth and that Being cannot be transcended; they commence the development of perception, therefore, with objective things that are scattered in space. They ought to know that all reflection and all education to freedom of perception proceeds from the subject.

C. Pestalozzi says very definitely just what you have said and emphasises it expressly; and in this connection his first elementary means of development, the book for mothers, is concerned with the child himself and gives him knowledge of his body.

B. He says so, and certainly sees because of his feeling for truth that it must be so; but he does not understand what he sees, and when he explains himself and practises it he says and does the opposite. Is the child's body the child himself? Pestalozzi certainly does not believe this. Thereby the child is made his own object and that far too early, because according to the regular course of development, to which Pestalozzi elsewhere sticks so earnestly and quite rightly, the child must first learn to use his body before he has to separate it objectively from himself and learn to know it. If Pestalozzi had found some other application of his assumption, which is right in itself, that education must proceed from the subject, he would certainly have discovered that to begin in this way with the knowledge of the body contradicts his own fundamental principle.

There is in Pestalozzi's theory another principle equally correct but equally wrongly understood and applied by the author, the better understanding of which would have cleared up for him at the same time the point already criticized. According to Pestalozzi, of the three means of helping man from dim to clear ideas (we may leave him his mode of expression; we should say instead, helping him to independent and clear perception) the chief is *sound*, as the medium of words and of language, the latter of which he really means.

Looked at more closely, this is absolutely untrue in the sphere of development assigned by Pestalozzi. The form of an object in space has become clear, i.e., it has entered the clear freedom of perception, when it can be reconstructed exactly in all its parts and revived at will;

consequently clearness is complete and entire and no element whatever can be added to it. When we get a name and a word for it, we merely get the power of making ourselves intelligible to others concerning the object; by our being referred in this way to an entirely different sphere, perception itself is not increased. This is the case with language generally in reference to the whole objective world, from the shape of the simplest line to the most complex operation of reason; it is only the means of coming to an understanding with others and the element of unanimity in a spiritual world that consists of many individuals; the sole means of understanding oneself in this objective world, however, is free construction in perception. On the other hand, the use of language, which Pestalozzi recommends, as a framework already existing for the arrangement of perceptions is really the means to the neglect of perception and to the early loquacity which Pestalozzi's theory, when carried out consistently, quite rightly opposes. This use of language, in opposition to the theory, is forced on its author by the above-mentioned temporary anxiety for the people. Pestalozzi's principle is true and contains a very deep truth; it is true, however, in another sphere. Not language, but speech itself, i.e., the fact that there must be speech and that man must express himself, is the very first means for the development of self-consciousness. The child lies in a vague chaos of all the feelings which blend with one another continually. How does he ever lift from this stream any single separate thing and in the process himself emerge from the stream and be born to individuality? What makes him need this lifting and stimulates him to it and to this creation of self? Obviously, in his absolute helplessness, the necessity of *expressing* what most urgently and immediately promotes or threatens his preservation to the human beings who are ready to help him and who are connected to him by no other medium than that of language. In all higher spheres language is only the principle of the further education of the whole race by the more favoured individual; here alone it is the absolute creative principle of a spiritual world in general. In this clarifying of feeling too, just as in the perception of some object in

space, what is unique in the feeling is separated from all the rest of its immensity and freely understood and reconstructed. Consequently reflection and the ego already exist in his whole being. The difference from real perception is just this, that this reconstruction of the feeling depends on simultaneous existence with the actual feeling, whereas the reconstruction of the actual perception rules for ever unrestrained. We cannot, therefore, produce arbitrarily in ourselves the taste, e.g., of sugar, but we can recall at any moment the perception of its shape. For this reason also it is feeling alone which truly binds to reality, or better to truth and law ; whereas the perception of spatial limits, cultivated by Pestalozzi as the very first thing, is only a second shadow, the shadow of a shadow.

The guidance of reflection to these feelings in accordance with a definite rule and in a sequence that develops reflection should, therefore, be the very first business in education ; and this would be the foundation which Pestalozzi's theory lacks. The A.B.C. of perception, which is always free, must be preceded by an A.B.C. of reflection upon non-freedom, the recollection of which is, therefore, the absolute beginning of all freedom ; this A.B.C. would form the real mothers' book. The child would first of all have to be made capable of indicating definitely whether he is hungry or sleepy, whether he tastes or smells, etc., whether he smells roses or pinks, hears the sound of a violin or flute, etc. ; because these characteristics are what is truly and finally objective and real in the first world of appearance, whereas space and especially the patterns of yet higher abstractions are merely general forms of such objectivity.

C. You admit, therefore, against the categorical claim of your former dialogue that even since Kant,—for you have surely excepted him tacitly, and have begun to count from him,—someone, stimulated by the instinct of reason, has discovered something really new that never existed before ?

B. I might seem dogmatic if I were to insist that Pestalozzi, a contemporary of Kant, cannot be considered in any way his follower or influenced by him, because Pestalozzi was certainly seized and carried away by his

spirit long before Kant's spirit was revealed in any clearness, and that, after all that has been said, Kant had no influence at all on Pestalozzi's development. I do not wish to appear dogmatic ; regard, therefore, as admitted everything that you demand.

C. Your meaning then is that if every individual in a State received this elementary education, as you conceive Pestalozzi's suggestion, i.e., if this education were national education—do you mean this ?

B. Certainly. Much was said of national education before there was an art of education. We have this art now ; give it to the citizens and you will get a nation at the same time, and this education will have proved itself national education in the highest sense of the word.

C. If this were to happen, men would be cured first of all of their foolishness and of all the vices that proceed therefrom, and, moreover, some of them would be capable of entering into possession of the science and art of reason as the sure guarantees of the regular and uninterrupted progress of mankind to its destiny ?

B. I mean that.

C. And you hope to convince those who are at the head of the nation, that they too should grasp only the thought of an education for their nation or that they should resolve actually to spend what is necessary for such an education ?

B. As I have already explained, I cannot make up my mind concerning what is to be hoped for and what is not ; and of all the dark places there may be in my knowledge, this at least is the only one that I tolerate after mature reflection, and into which I will not have clearness brought.

But I do know this and can raise it to the evidence of an ordinary example in arithmetic. Suppose a State, which has had peace for fifteen years, and during this peace has spent on the maintenance of its army everything it could make out of its land and spare from other indispensable expenditures during those years, loses, as can happen, this army completely in the first battle after the outbreak of war ; suppose that instead it had discharged half its army and spent what the maintenance of this

half would cost on a national education, as Pestalozzi and I conceive it; I will prove that at the outbreak of war this State could discharge the other half of its army too, and would have a nation to put in arms, which simply could not be defeated by any mortal power.

C. You may be right; and as you are so boldly resolved to hope thus, I will disturb you no longer in your sweet cosmopolitan dreams.

IV. UNIVERSITY EDUCATION.

(*a*) Deduced Scheme for an Academy to be Established in Berlin.

[In 1807, when the project for creating a University at Berlin was being seriously considered, Fichte was invited by his friend Beyme, then Minister of Instruction, to submit his ideas. He sent in this elaborate and minute scheme for the new University. Acting upon Beyme's express permission not to be bound by tradition in this matter, but to consider the needs of scholars as well as of students and to provide for the freest possible investigation in all directions, Fichte produced this well-considered scheme, in which he discloses the faults of the traditional University education and proposes an altogether different system. Beyme was pleased with the scheme, but unfortunately the political situation did not allow the immediate establishment of the new University, and when, in 1809, the project was finally realized, it was no longer in Beyme's hands, and William von Humboldt, who carried it out, adopted a scheme which was much more in accordance with established usage. Fichte was in no way hurt at the rejection of his scheme and was one of the first Professors appointed in 1810, while in 1811 he was made Rector. The translation is from the Works, Vol. VIII, pp. 97-204.]

Deduced Scheme for an Academy to be established in Berlin.
Written in 1807 by Johann Gottlieb Fichte.

Deduced scheme for an academy, to be established in Berlin, in proper relation to an Academy of Science.

First Chapter.

General idea of an academy demanded by the needs of the time.

1.

When Universities first began, the scientific system of the modern world had still for the most part to be established. Of books there were not many; the few there were were scarce and difficult to obtain; and it was he who had anything new to impart who was tempted chiefly to do it by the more difficult method of writing. *Oral communication*, therefore, was generally the most useful means of establishing, maintaining and enriching the scientific system, and universities were the substitute for the books that were scarce or non-existent.

2.

Yet, even when books have become very common owing to the invention of printing and the spread of bookselling has made it far easier for anyone to communicate his thoughts by books than by lectures, when there is no longer any branch of science in which a superabundance of books does not exist, it is still considered a duty to *set* all this literature *once more* in the world by means of universities and to have professors *repeat* the very things that already lie *printed* before all. Since the same thing exists, therefore, in two different forms, laziness does not fail to ignore *oral* instruction, because it can learn it some time from a book, and also to neglect instruction through *books*, because it can *listen* to it. The result is that, with a few exceptions, nothing is

learnt but what happens to stick to us in one of these two ways; in consequence usually nothing but disconnected fragments. The final result is that science has become deeply despised by the mass of half-educated people who have arisen in this way, as something to be acquired at will and ever in the easiest way. Now of the two specified modes of instruction the private study of books is the better, because the book stands fast for attention when voluntarily directed and what attention has been distracted from can be *read* again, while what is not immediately understood can be pondered until understanding comes; reading too can be voluntarily continued when we feel strong, or discontinued when our strength fails. On the other hand the professor usually continues his discourse for the whole hour without considering whether anyone is following him, breaks off when the hour chimes and does not begin again until once more the hour strikes. The position of the pupil makes it impossible for him to interrupt in any way the course of his teacher's discourse and to stop him when necessary; therefore, passive resignation is established as the rule, the impulse of his own activity is destroyed and the pupil is thus robbed even of the possibility of the second mode of instruction, using books with spontaneous attention. Thus, to say nothing of the cost of this arrangement to the community and to the individual and of the depravity of morals that is caused thereby, we are spoiled even for the use of the *true* and *better method* by continuing the *emergency method* long after the emergency has ceased.

3.

In order not to be unjust and at the same time superficial, however, we must add that the modern universities have, *more or less*, had another nobler element besides this mere *repetition* of the contents of existing books, namely, the principle of improving the contents of these books. There were spontaneous spirits who were dissatisfied with the contents of the books known to them in some subject without having immediately at hand, however, what would satisfy and without being able to set it down in a new and better book than the

existing ones. Provisionally they communicated orally their struggle for something more perfect, in order either by this interaction with others to become clear in themselves concerning the proposed book, or, in case their own mental power or life failed them in this effort, to leave behind representatives who would set down the proposed book or in its place and on those premises a still better one. Even in regard to this element, however, it cannot be denied that it has always been much the smaller in all universities, that no government has had in its hands a means of guaranteeing to itself the possession of such an element or even of knowing definitely whether it had it or not, and that this small element, if luckily it has existed anywhere, has seldom worked and governed with any clear knowledge of its efforts and of the principles on which it has to proceed.

4.

Now there should be no such repetition of what exists far better in some other form, repetition which is first of all superfluous and then injurious in its consequences ; if the Universities cannot be anything else, therefore, they must be abolished immediately and those who need instruction referred to the study of the existing writings. It cannot even be any defence for these institutes to plead on their behalf the more noble element that has just been mentioned, because in no particular case (in no given university) can this more noble element answer for itself or prove its existence or guarantee its continuance ; besides, even if this were not so, the worse element, the mere repetition of the literature, must always be rejected. Just as everything that claims the right of existence must *be* and *achieve* what *nothing* but it can be and achieve, guaranteeing at the same time its persistence in this its nature and its immortal continuance, so must the University or the *Academy*, as we shall say provisionally in the old sense of the word ; otherwise it must perish.

5.

What, in the sense of this higher claim on its existence, the Academy can be and, if it is to be, must be, appears

at once, as soon as one considers the relationship of science to actual life.

One does not study in order to be ever ready during life for examination and to repeat in words what has been learnt, but in order to apply it to the occasions that arise in life and so to transform it into *deeds ;* not merely to repeat it but to make something else out of it and with it. Here too, therefore, the final aim is not knowledge, but rather the art of using knowledge. Now this art of applying science in life presupposes other elements which are foreign to the Academy, namely, knowledge of life and practice in the power of judging occasions for application ; it is not therefore in the first instance a question of this art. Yet there does belong here the question of the way in which one receives science itself as a free possession and instrument to be fashioned in endless ways so as to make possible its ready application to the life which, of course, one gets to know in another way.

Clearly this happens only when one receives that science from the very beginning with clear and free consciousness. Let us be understood in this way. Much takes place in our mind of its own accord and clings to it as it were according to a mechanism which is blind and remains hidden from us. What originates in this way is not penetrated by clear free consciousness ; it is also not our sure possession, ever to be recalled ; but it recurs or vanishes according to the laws of that hidden mechanism, in accordance with which it first clung to us. On the other hand, what we grasp with the consciousness *that* we are learning it actively and with the consciousness of the *rules* of this learning activity becomes, in consequence of this our activity and of the consciousness of its rules, a specific element of our personality and of our life which is to be developed freely and as we wish.

The free activity of comprehension is called understanding. In that mechanical learning which was mentioned first the understanding is not employed at all, but blind nature alone rules. If that activity of the understanding and the particular ways in which it behaves in order to grasp something are *in turn raised to clear*

consciousness, there will arise in this way a deliberate art of the use of the understanding in learning. A skilful development of that consciousness of the method of learning—in learning something given—would therefore, without prejudice to the learning now abandoned, aim in the first instance not at learning, but at training the ability to learn. Without prejudice to the learning now abandoned, I said; rather to its great advantage, for one knows thoroughly and unforgettably only that, of which one knows how he attained thereto. Again, since not only what was given at first is learnt but at the same time the art of learning in general is learnt and exercised thereon, the *skill* is developed of learning everything else *ad infinitum* easily and surely; and there arise *artists* in learning. Finally thereby everything learnt or to be learnt becomes the sure possession of man, with which he can deal as he wishes, and the first and exclusive condition of the practical artistic use of science in life is produced and fulfilled. An institution, in which the consciousness mentioned develops with clearness and according to rules and the art which is thereby aimed at is exercised, would be what the following title expresses: *a school of the art of using the understanding scientifically.*

Notwithstanding that by chance in the existing universities gifted men have sometimes appeared who trained pupils in a particular subject of knowledge in the spirit of the above conception, much has been lacking for the realization of this conception in general with certainty, steadiness and according to infallible laws to be even definitely thought of and proposed, much less carried out anywhere. Thereby, however, the maintenance and development of scientific training in the human race has been given over to good luck and blind chance, out of whose hands it could have been brought under the supervision of clear consciousness solely by the realization of the conception mentioned. It is therefore the carrying-out of this conception which, in regard to the scientific system in the course of time, is now the order of the day, and the Academy whose very existence is now attacked would do well to undertake to carry it out, since what the Academy has hitherto been has no longer any right to exist.

6.

But for the sole and exclusive possession of this claim something else, namely the lower grammar school, will contend with the Academy. This school, which may have become clear on this occasion, perhaps for the first time, concerning its true nature, will allege that up to the time of the modern superficial education it was a far better and superior academy for the scientific use of the understanding than any university. First of all, therefore, the Academy must settle with this grammar school their respective limits.

This settling of limits will be accomplished undoubtedly to the satisfaction of both parties in the following way. There will devolve upon the lower school the artistic exercise of that universal instrument of all understanding, language, and the general outlines and structure of the material that exists in the scientific system, without criticism. On the other hand, the higher school shall obtain as its exclusive possession the art of criticism, of sifting the true from the false, the useful from the useless, and the subordination of the less important to the important. The former would, therefore, be the school for the scientific use of the understanding as mere power of comprehension or memory; the latter the school for the use of the understanding as power of judgment.

7.

Artistic skill can be formed only by the pupil working under the teacher's eye according to some definite plan adopted by the latter and practising the art, of which he is to become a master, in its different stages from the beginning onwards to mastery, progressing regularly and without omitting anything. According to our statement it is the art of using the understanding scientifically which is to be practised. The teacher provides only the material and stimulates activity; the pupil himself works up this material. But the teacher must remain in a position to be able to watch whether and how the pupil works up this material, in order that thereby he may estimate what

degree of skill the pupil has, and thus be able to decide what new material to provide.

Not only the teacher but also the pupil must continually express himself and communicate his thoughts, so that their mutual relationship in learning is a continuous conversation, in which each speech by the teacher is the answer to some question asked by the pupil concerning what immediately preceded and the putting of some new question by the teacher, which the pupil answers in his next statement. Thus the teacher directs his conversation not to someone quite unknown to him but to one who reveals himself to him continually until he sees completely into his mind. He perceives his pupil's immediate need, stops to express himself in other and yet other forms when the pupil has not understood him, and proceeds immediately to the next point when the latter has understood him. Thereby scientific instruction is changed from one continuous discourse, which is the form it has in literature too, to dialogue, and there is established a real Academy in the sense of the Socratic school, in memory of which we wished to use that very word.

8.

The teacher, we said, must keep in mind some definite particular subject who always remains known to him. Now if this subject, as is to be expected, consists not of one individual but of several, these individuals must combine into a mental unity and a definite organic body of pupils, for the teacher's subject must be single and definite. They must therefore remain also in continual communication and scientific relations with one another, in which each shows to all his individual view of science, the nimbler mind lending some of its quickness to the slower, the latter some of its calm gravity to the former.

9.

To make our fundamental conception still clearer by further explanation :—The material which the master supplies to the pupil of his art is in part his own lectures, in part printed books, which he sets for systematic and

correct study. In regard to the latter it is certainly a principal part of the scientific art to be able to instruct oneself through the use of books, so that there must be some training in this art too ; besides, in such an Academy by far the greatest part of the scientific material will have to be learned from books, as will appear in due course.

These are the methods, however, by which the master reveals himself to his pupil :—

Examinations, not however in the spirit of knowledge but in that of art. In this latter spirit every question by the examiner which demands as answer the repetition of what the pupil has heard or read is clumsy and unsuitable. Rather must the question assume that something has been learnt and demand as answer the application of it in some argument.

Conversations, in which the pupil asks questions and the master cross-questions, so that a special Socratic dialogue takes place within the invisible and continuous dialogue of the whole academic life.

Problems to be solved by the pupil in written compositions, always in the spirit of art, and such that what has been learnt must not be repeated, but something else made therewith and therefrom, so that it is clear whether and how far the pupil has made it his possession and his tool for every kind of use. The usual inventor of such problems is, of course, the master ; but the more skilful pupil should also be invited to think some out and propose them for himself and others. By means of these written compositions the art of expressing scientific material in writing is practised at the same time ; in reviewing them the master, therefore, should express his opinion also concerning the arrangement, definiteness and concrete clearness of the exposition.[1]

1. Perhaps it is not superfluous to add once more expressly to the mention of such problems a remark concerning the possibility, not only in the *a priori* part of science, but also in quite empirical sciences, of problems which probe the self-activity of comprehension. It is, of course, well known that philology, theology, etc., provide an almost unlimited field for one's power of combination and for conjectural criticism, whereby, even though the gain may be of no importance, the spontaneous activity of the mind is exercised and proved. But the teacher of universal history could also, in my opinion, imagine an event that had not really taken place and set his audience to show its most probable results in this or that condition of the world of which

10.

Concerning the pupil of such an institution.

The following are the external conditions, under which he comes into this position and remains in it.

(1) *Suitable preparation for the higher school in the lower.*

We have seen already (para. 6) the results in the training of the mind for science which are to be expected of the lower school. Now if the higher school is to proceed with certain step the lower school must do its work, not as formerly, as good luck and chance permit, but according to some definite plan and so that one always knows what has succeeded and what has not. The improvement of the higher educational institutions necessarily presupposes, therefore, that of the lower; just as on the other hand a thorough improvement of the latter is possible only through the improvement of the former and because in these the teachers of the lower school learn the art of teaching which most of them now lack. It is clear already, then, that we cannot all at once establish what is perfect, but must approach it gradually and by various stages.

I add here what follows to shed greater clearness on our fundamental conception. It is immediately evident that the youth who is destined for a scientific life must first of all be entrusted with the universal vocabulary of the scientific world as the instrument by means of which alone he can both understand and make himself understood. This positive knowledge of language, however, indispensable though it is, appears a trifling extra when we consider that, especially by learning the languages

they have learnt; or the teacher of Roman law could invent some case and ask his audience to suggest for it any law that follows from, and fits organically into, the whole of the Roman legislation. The attempts to solve these problems would undoubtedly show clearly first of all whether his hearers really knew History or Roman law, and secondly, whether and how far they had mastered these sciences, or merely mechanically learned them by heart.

of another world which fashions characteristics into language concepts in quite a different way, the youth is carried imperceptibly beyond the mechanism wherewith the native modern language fetters him, as if it could not be otherwise, and is trained in easy play to freedom in forming conceptions. Further, when interpreting the authors, he learns from the material that is easiest and already set down for him to change his view arbitrarily, to direct it hither and thither for some known purpose and not to desist from this work until the purpose is achieved. Now for the sake of this relationship of the *lower* to the *higher* art of using the understanding scientifically the school will have to proceed in its language instruction in such a way as to achieve surely, universally and convincingly, not only the first aim—historical language knowledge—but also the second—the training of the understanding; e.g., so that at each stage of the instruction the pupil learns to understand completely and perfectly what he has to understand, learns to know *whether* he has so understood, and learns to prove this; by no means, however, as has hitherto so often happened, so that he depends in this matter on good luck and gropes in the dark, for very often his teacher himself has no proper conception of understanding at all and does not know all the questions that must be answered if we are to say that we have understood, e.g., a passage in some author.

By the following application I make myself clearer concerning the second part of the necessary preparation which falls within the province of the school, the main structure of the existing scientific material. In order to avoid the demands of such a mental training as has been described in this essay people have remarked: such a considered development of mental power was certainly possible for the ancient classical peoples, because the very limited field of positive knowledge, which they had to learn, left them sufficient time; but all our time and powers are absorbed in the immeasurable domain of what must be learnt and none remains for any other purpose. As if the skilful development of power were not the more necessary, because we have to achieve much more with it, and as if we must not take skill and cleverness in learning

all the more into consideration since we have so great a task in learning before us. As a matter of fact this alarm at the immensity of our scientific material is due to our tackling that material without an arranging mind and without a deliberately practised art of memory, whose chief medium is that arranging mind. Rather do we plunge blindly into the chaos and without a guide into the maze, and so lose time in wandering at every step. The few who, saved from sinking, still swim in this enormous ocean, looking back at their course, are alarmed at their own work and the luck they have had and, discovering the gaps that still exist in their knowledge, believe they have lacked nothing but *time ;* whereas the art of arrangement which they know not, because it takes no step in vain, multiplies time infinitely and extends the short span of human life to an eternity. Once the first school for the beginner no longer considers the nimble memory of one boy a lucky accident and the slower memory of another an inevitable natural misfortune, but learns to develop and train correctly the memory in general as well as in those particular abilities that are suitable for particular spheres ; once it gives this memory, and stamps ineradicably upon the inner perception, first of all a picture of the whole of some particular scientific material, in miniature but convincing and clear (e.g., in History a general picture of the changes in the human race due to the chief adventures of the ruling peoples, together with a picture of the general shape of the earth's surface as the scene of those changes) ; once it recalls these pictures day after day and enlarges them gradually but in all their parts proportionately, in accordance with some sure principle of the necessary succession of the *points of view* and in such a way that one does not increase unduly to the detriment of the rest ; then that alarm at the immensity will completely vanish and the minds that are trained in this way will easily and certainly put all the things they come across into their places on those fundamental pictures that have grown up with their personality, not scattered on an unknown ocean but filling the well-known rooms in their ancestral abode with treasures, which these minds can remove again according to their needs whither they had put them before.

Consequently the preparation which the pupil in a higher school must receive in the lower school, the account which he has to give of his ability before admission and the degree of perfection to which the lower school must be improved coincide in these two points. First of all the candidate must learn to understand thoroughly in a given time a passage in some author set before him and suited to his capacity, and be able to prove that he understands it properly in that it cannot be understood in any other way. Secondly he must show that he has in his power and in his possession for every kind of use a general picture of all the scientific material, raised and enlarged in point of view to the level at which the higher school begins its instruction.

(2) *The merging of his whole life in his purpose, therefore his separation from all other modes of life and complete isolation.*

The son of a citizen, who pursues some civil occupation, perhaps attends also, for several hours a day, a good middle-class school, where various things are taught which the grammar school likewise offers. Yet the school is not the centre of his real true life, and he is not at home there ; his true life is his family life and the help he gives his parents in their occupation ; the school however is of secondary importance and a mere means for the better progress of the civil occupation, which is the real aim. But for the scholar science must not be the means to some end but must be an end in itself ; some day, as a perfect scholar, in whatever way he applies his scientific training in life, he will have the root of his life in the idea alone and see reality only from it. He will shape and direct reality in accordance with it and will not admit that the idea should accommodate itself to reality. He cannot, therefore, become accustomed to this, his proper element, and get away from the disagreeable element too soon.

It is a well-known observation that hitherto in universities which were set up in smaller towns a general scientific spirit and atmosphere has been produced very easily among the students and that this has seldom or never happened in larger towns. If we had to give the reason for this, we should say that it is because in the first case

the students are limited to intercourse with one another and to the material which this can supply; on the other hand in the second case they mix continually with the general crowd of citizens and are so distracted by all the material which these supply that study never becomes their real life, than which they can have no other, but is at best their professional duty. The well-known objection to large university towns, that the students have to go a long way from one lecture-room to another, may not, therefore, be the greatest that could be brought forward. It might be set aside more quickly than the greater evil of mixing the student element in the community with the general crowd of citizens who pursue occupations or enjoy themselves stupidly; because, quite apart from the fact that little or nothing is learnt from such study that is carried on merely incidentally, everyone would thus be made a townsman, and a view of reality which transcends reality, and in which alone mankind can find salvation from all its evils, would be destroyed in the human race. More than ever would this have to be taken into consideration in a generation of people who are strongly suspected of having become almost entirely townsmen.

(3) *Security from all anxiety about externals, by means of suitable maintenance for the present and a guarantee of proper provision in the future.*

The details of petty anxieties about life's daily needs do not agree with study; food worries depress the mind; extra work for a living dissipates our efforts and makes science seem the earning of a living; to be slighted by the rich because of our poverty, or to humble ourselves in order to avoid these slights, is degrading to the character. All these things are pretty generally granted, if not everywhere sufficiently considered; but one can take an even deeper view of the matter. It will very soon appear clearly necessary that there should be quite firmly rooted in the State, and especially in its higher officials, the disposition, not to serve the community in order to be able to live, but to live solely in order to be able to serve the community. This disposition does not move us, out

of pity for one's own or another's pleasure in life, to do, advise, or permit, where we can prevent it, what is not otherwise quite right in itself. It can take root only in a mind which has been ennobled by life in science. The way for this ennoblement and for independence of the consideration mentioned will be greatly prepared if future scholars, from whose ranks the offices of State are to be filled, are accustomed from early youth onwards to consider life's needs not as the motive for any kind of activity, but as something which goes its own way, because those needs are assured to them, apart altogether from their immediate appropriate diligence, which must proceed from love of the subject.

II.

How must the teacher in such an institution be constituted and equipped?

First of all, of course, since no one can teach what he does not know, he must have science and be, as described above, a free artist in it, so that he can use it for any particular purpose and change it into every possible form. But even this skill must not guide him as it were mechanically and be in him merely a natural talent and gift; he must also have penetrated it again with clear consciousness until he has got knowledge in general as well as in the special particular modifications which it assumes in individuals, because he is to be able to observe, judge and guide every student of this art.

Even this clear consciousness and this comprehension of the scientific art as an organic whole, however, does not suffice for him; for even it, like all mere knowledge, can be dead, or at best developed so far as to be set down historically in a book. For actual application he needs in addition the skill to call up at any moment the principle which is applicable, and the art of discovering means for its immediate application. To such a high degree of freedom and clearness must scientific art have been developed in him. His nature is the art of training the scientific artist; this art presupposes a science of the scientific art at its first stage, and the possibility of this

science in turn presupposes that he himself possesses this art at the first stage. In this combination and result, therefore, consists the nature of a teacher in a school for the scientific use of the understanding.

Love of the art is the principle whereby scientific art rises to that height.

It is this love, too, which must ever re-animate the existing art of educating the artist, and in each particular case stimulate it and guide it aright. Like all love it is of divine origin and of the nature of genius, and creates itself freely from itself. For it the remaining scientific training is a product to be estimated with certainty; but the art of this training itself is not to be expected of everyone, and does not let itself be kept where it was, if its free wing of genius turns away.

Yet this love spreads invisibly and stimulates the environment mysteriously. Nothing gives greater pleasure than a feeling of freedom, of suitable activity of mind and of the growth of this freedom; hence arises the pupil's most loving and joyful life in these exercises and in their material.

This love for the art is respectful of others and, starting from the individual with this respect, extends from the teacher, as the real focus, to those others who pursue this art with him, and attracts each to all the others. Hence arises that inter-communication of all demanded in para. 8 and the combination of the individuals, the possibility of which had still to be explained, into a learning organic whole, such as can be formed only from these learning individuals. (A common mental life promotes *first of all* quicker, more fruitful and very complicated mental development, and *later* in civil life helps in the formation of a body of business people, in which the real scholar who is supposed by the business man to be an odd foolish fellow does not, as hitherto, call him in turn, usually correctly, a dull fellow and an empirical bungler. Rather have they learned betimes to know and esteem each other thoroughly and they begin all their deliberations on ground which is equally well known to all and not disputed among them.)

12.

If this art of educating the artist scientifically is to come to clear consciousness in any age and be practised to any extent, its continuance and its development to greater perfection must not be left to blind chance. A definite arrangement must be made, most appropriately in the school that already exists, to maintain it deliberately and according to some definite principle and to mould it to greater perfection ; thereby this school, like everything else that has real life, would ensure its eternal continuance.

As has been already said, it is itself the highest degree of scientific art, requiring the greatest love and the greatest skill and mental ability. It is clear, therefore, that it cannot be expected of all, just as we need but few to practise it ; but it must be offered to all, and the experiment made with them, in order that we may be sure that this rare talent is never unused through being unknown.

For this purpose, therefore, the pupil should be urged, but without any sudden transition and after he has obtained sufficient skill in the lower grades of the art, to practise all the above-mentioned duties of the teacher, under supervision and criticism from the real teacher, as well as from the other pupils who are at the same stage. Treading thus, under the guidance of a teacher already skilled, a path which the teacher himself had to go without help and with much groping in the dark, and made familiar with his knacks, the pupil will undoubtedly become much more skilful and clear in the art than his teacher and some day leave behind in accordance with the same law a generation even more skilful and clear.

(It follows that at its height such a nursery of scientific artists in general, according to the different degrees of this art, would be a seminary for professors and would be so called. Practice in preaching has been given for training in the art of speaking to the people and there have been colleges for training the teachers of the lower school to speak ; but so far as I know no one has thought of special practice or examination in the art of academic lecturing, as if it were a matter of course for us to be able to say what we know. This is a striking proof that the university

aims with clear consciousness, so far as this has penetrated there, at nothing more than setting alongside printed literature another kind, spoken literature. Thus our discourse comes back again to its starting point, proving that it has run its course.)

13. Corollary.

The view which has been developed hitherto, itself considered in a scientific whole, provides the summit which the art of education or forming men has hitherto lacked. In our generation another has discovered the root of this education which has also been lacking hitherto. That summit renders possible the highest and final school of scientific art ; this root makes possible the first universal school for the people, meaning by this word not a mob but the nation. The middle stem of education is the lower grammar school.

But the top rests firm only on the stem, and this draws its life-sap only from the root ; all have life and assured continuance only by, in and through one another. Similarly with the higher and lower grammar school, and the elementary school. We who are considering the first continue, as well as we can in these circumstances, from our particular and isolated middle point, taking the necessary notice only of the lower grammar school, with which we are closely connected and without whose assistance we could not well make even a beginning. Similarly, universal education proceeds as well as it can, dispensing with help and guiding light from us, who are first and foremost pursuing only our own lives. But if each of us does but continue to work honestly at his purpose we shall come together in time, and become interdependent ; for every part that is right in itself is part of a larger eternal whole, which appears only in the union of the separate parts. But when we come together, help and salvation will be available for poor mankind which is now in complete helplessness ; for this salvation depends entirely on man's education in general coming out of the hands of blind chance under the shining eye of a deliberate art.

May this view and the consciousness that a great

moment is given us, which will hardly recur if it passes unused, bring holy earnestness and reverence into our deliberations.

Note.

As one often unexpectedly finds this highest principle of our whole life and activity misunderstood, it is perhaps not superfluous to add a few more words concerning it.

Blind fate guided the affairs of man fairly well and brought about, though slowly, some improvement in his whole condition, so long as the principles of good and evil in mankind were both enveloped in this darkness and intertwined. This state of affairs has changed and owing to this change there have arisen an entirely new generation, against whose recognition people still struggle so frequently, and completely new problems for the age. The principle of evil has come to light out of that combination ; it has become perfectly clear to itself and advances freely, deliberately and without fear or shame. Clearness always conquers darkness ; the principle of evil will therefore undoubtedly remain the victor until the principle of good also rises to clearness and deliberate art.

In all human relationships, but especially in the education of man, what is old and traditional is a realm of darkness which we refrain from penetrating with clear conception and from treating with deliberate art, and from which we expect God's blessing without our own co-operation. It is mere inconsistency if in that system of belief we set alongside this divine blessing any mortal guidance and superintendence. What is old is, of course, known to everybody, and must be followed ; there are, therefore, no plans to be made ; success comes from above and no mortal cleverness can accomplish anything in that respect ; there is therefore nothing to guide, and superintendence is quite superfluous. Only if assertions like ours were expressed by free and deliberate art and demanded some influence would superintendence obtain any function, which would be to oppose the innovation strongly and hold fast to the old traditional darkness.

We must not listen when the safety of this old worn

road is praised and, on the other hand, the uncertainty and risk of all innovations is feared. If we stick to what is old, the result will be bad—we can depend on that; for, once the world is what it is, nothing but evil can proceed from darkness. Do we hope perchance thereby to secure that we can say to ourselves we at least have not caused the evil by our own action; it has just come of itself, and we should have had no objection if good had come instead? We must be easily consoled if we are content with that. Why then should it be an enterprise of such great daring to proceed according to some clear and definite conception? We shall take risks in only two cases, either when we have not mastered our conception or when we have not already decided beforehand to stake our all on carrying it out. But nothing compels us to be in either of those cases.

Least of all should we admit as the fundamental conception of a university that it is not an educational institution whose infallible success we must secure as far as possible, but an educational institution which is really superfluous and to be regarded solely as a free gift for everyone, who is in the position to do so, to use freely as he wishes. Such institutions, if there are any, like perhaps the Werkmeistersche Museum, etc., can be only for wise men and citizens who have already satisfied the State concerning their personal vocation and their fixed occupation, but not for young people who are still seeking a vocation. Besides, of course,—and this also is something old and well-established, and no doubt the matter ought to end there—the State has hitherto relied on the Universities as a necessary and hitherto irreplaceable educational institution for a class of considerable consequence to it. We might expect what would happen if for but three consecutive years it should please the freedom of every student not to use the university in the right way. Or are we to presuppose that in our educated States there is still a crowd of people whose natural privilege it is that no one has any claim on their powers and on the training of these powers, and who must be free to wish to be good for something or for nothing because in any case they have to live? Is it for these perchance that this free educational institution which relies on

nothing at all is to be established, in order that here if they wish they may gain the means of spending their future life of idleness with less boredom? Granted all this, at all events these classes themselves might see to the satisfaction of this their need; the cost of such an institution should not be laid upon the State.

Second Chapter.

How the proposed idea can be realized in the given circumstances of time and place.

14.

If our educational institution is not to be a self-contained world but is to influence the actually existing world, and especially if it is to reform the system of scholarly education in this world, it must link up with that system as it is and as it finds it. Its first point of view must be that the latter is the material which it must assimilate and organize, while it is itself the spiritual leaven of that material. It must be created and developed within an ordinary University, because we cannot avoid this, until the latter is merged in the former and vanishes completely; but we must not begin with the idea that we want to make just an ordinary university and nothing more.

15.

Apart from this necessary continuity of progress in time, however, we cannot proceed otherwise in carrying out this plan, for the free *art of the particular science in general as well as in its special subjects* does not yet exist in such a way that it can be preserved and transmitted with certainty and according to a rule. This free art of the *particular* science must first be raised to clear consciousness and to practised skill in the academy that already exists; thus the academy must create one of its essential parts. If the beginning at least of this art could not exist somewhere and at some time in science generally and independent of the existence of the school there would

never be such an academy or even the thought and problem of it.

16.

These are the facts concerning this beginning of scientific art. Art is created (para. 4) by understanding clearly *what* one does and *how* one does it. The particular science in all its special subjects is a particular action and procedure with mental power; and this has always been recognised when mention has been made, e.g., of historical genius, feeling and sense, or of power of observation, etc., as special talents having their peculiar characteristics. Such talent is always a natural gift and, since it is a particular talent, its possessor is a particular nature who is limited to this point of view and cannot rise again above it, contemplate it freely, penetrate it in conception and so make a free art out of the mere natural gift. The particular science therefore, can either not be carried on because talent is lacking or, if it is carried on, can never come to deliberate art because talent, and talent only, belongs to it. So it is in reality. The spirit of every particular science is a limited and limiting spirit, which indeed lives and acts in itself and bears precious fruit, but which cannot understand either itself or other spirits outside itself. If there is ever to be such an art in the particular science, it must be understood independently of its practice and before it is carried on, i.e., the kind and mode of mental activity required for it must be known; the general *conception* of its art, therefore, must precede the practice of that art. Now it is Philosophy which grasps scientifically the whole mental activity and consequently all its particular and more definite expressions; it is from philosophical training, therefore, that the particular sciences must be given their art, and what has hitherto been in them mere natural gift dependent on good luck must be raised to deliberate knowledge and action. The spirit of Philosophy is that which understands first itself and then in itself all other spirits; the artist in a particular science must be above all a philosophical artist, and his particular art is merely a further determination and special application of his general philosophical art.

(Feeling this dimly man has believed, at least until recent quite confused and superficial times, that all higher scientific education must proceed from Philosophy and that in Universities the philosophical lectures must be attended by all and at the very beginning. Moreover, mention has been made in the particular sciences, e.g., of philosophical lawyers or historians or doctors, and it will be found that of these, who understood themselves, those were always so named who knew how to apply their science in many directions with the greatest skill and dexterity, and who were therefore *artists* in the science. Those who dreamed *a priori* when the thing to do was to produce facts, and likewise those who appealed to the actual nature of things when the *a priori* ideal should have been shown, were looked upon by the experts with the appropriate scorn.)

17.

The first and exclusive condition of the possibility of establishing a scientific academy, therefore, would be to find a teacher capable of studying philosophy as an art and able to bring a number of his pupils to considerable skill in this art, with which some of them might in turn penetrate the positive material of the particular sciences, to be given them elsewhere, and make themselves artists in these too. Some of the latter, who had achieved such a degree of clearness in this art that they could themselves train artists, would transmit their art. When this had become possible over the whole range of the sciences to such an extent that the transmission of the whole scientific art to the end of time could be relied on with certainty, the scientific academy aimed at would be established and would exist.

18.

When the institution begins, this philosophical artist must be a single person and no one else will have any influence on the pupil's development in philosophising. He who might object to this that, in order to guard youths from partiality and blind faith in one teacher, there must be a variety of views and systems and therefore of teachers in an institution for higher education, would thereby show

that he has no idea either of philosophy in general, or of philosophising as an art. For although, if there is certainty and it is attainable by man (he who is still in doubt on this point is not equipped to deliberate with us concerning the establishment of a *scientific* institution), the teacher whom we seek must know his subject thoroughly and have a system, because otherwise he would not have finished philosophising, would never have practised the whole art of philosophising and would therefore be quite incapable of penetrating with consciousness this art in all its extent and of communicating it to others, and we should have made a mistake in our choice of person—although, I say, this is so, yet in his effort to train self-active artists who will produce certainty in themselves and discover the system themselves he will not *set out* from his system nor from any positive assertion at all. He will but stimulate their systematic thought, of course on the very natural assumption that at the end of it they will arrive at the same result as himself and that, if they arrive at some other, they will have made a mistake somewhere in practising the art. Another, to contradict him, would have to *assert* something; if he were misguided enough to contradict the contradiction, he too would have to assert something, and controversy would be the result. But where there is controversy, there is thesis; and where there is thesis, there is no more active philosophising but only historical narration of the result of, please God, previously practised active philosophising; controversy quite destroys the nature of a philosophical academy and must therefore be denied all entrance thereto.

(This other remark would reveal the same ignorance of the nature of philosophy; in such an institution all the so-called philosophical sciences must be considered, and since this cannot really be expected of one person it will necessitate a number of teachers of philosophy. Now, if the philosophical spirit and the art of philosophising is really developed, it will spread of itself over the whole sphere of philosophising and take possession of it; while if some kind of philosophical catechism, to be learned historically, like the science of Rights, Morals, etc., is necessary for others, with whom the attempt at initiation into this art fails, but whom we nevertheless, for want of

better persons, must place and use in civil occupations, it is sure to exist somewhere in printed books, to the private study of which such persons may be recommended in this as in the other subjects by the teacher of philosophy, and examined thereon if necessary.)

19.

In the Academy *all scientific material must be comprehended in its organic unity and interpreted* in the philosophical spirit thus developed, as the pure form of knowledge, so that one knows exactly what belongs to it and what not, and the boundary-line between science and non-science is strictly drawn. Thereby, too, one understands the organic interaction of the parts of this material and all their mutual relations, and can estimate therefrom whether the material is treated fully in the Academy or not, in what *order* or *simultaneousness* the separate parts are most profitably treated, to what level the *lower* school has to carry this material and where the *higher* school has really to take it over, and, further, to what level in the latter school *all* who wish to claim the title of scientific artist have to develop it, and how much on the other hand belongs to *special* development as a *definite practical* subject and must be reserved for that. This would provide a philosophical encyclopaedia of science as a permanent regulation for the treatment of all particular sciences.

(Even if philosophy is already able to supply some information for such an encyclopaedic view of science in its organic unity, the rest of the scientific world is much too disinclined to yield to philosophy the authority which it thereby claims, or to understand its assertions even as necessary, for any success to be expected therefrom. Since this is a question, not of the theoretical assertion of some principles, but of the introduction of an art, a considerable number of men must first be trained, who are able not only to understand such an encyclopaedia and to find it true, but also to treat the particular subjects of science in real accordance with its principles. It will be best, therefore, to say nothing about this just now, but let the encyclopaedia gradually grow of itself by the

interaction of philosophy and the philosophically correct treatment of the particular subjects of science that now exist ; the Academy must create within itself this element which is so very essential to it.)

20.

At first, and until this happens, we must be satisfied with grasping merely historically the existing subjects without organic unity, rejecting only what we can prove in the present stage of general scientific education either directly contradicts the scientific use of the understanding or does not belong to it, taking up the rest and letting it stay in its place and dignity until there is a better general understanding. Further, we must be satisfied with obtaining in these subjects those among contemporary teachers who proceed therein most philosophically, i.e., with the greatest freedom, skill and independence. Finally, we must urge these teachers to the most philosophical communication of their subject, i.e., to that which develops independence and clearness most surely, and pledge them to this.

21.

The first point, the rejection, we shall explain soon when we consider the existing scientific subjects. Concerning the second I make the general remark here that we already have the advantage of calling ours those who are generally recognised as the freest and most spontaneous in some of the chief subjects, and that, unless some consider themselves too grand to condescend to live in interaction with their pupils, which this plan expects them to do, we may hope to win them for our purpose. In other subjects, in which we cannot make this boast with the same confidence, the difference between contemporaries in this respect is not very great, and we may therefore hope without great difficulty to fill the necessary posts as well as they can be filled in the present circumstances. It is an essential condition, however, that, before being called and appointed, they be informed and be in genuine agreement with us, not only concerning our scheme

but also concerning the third point, the mode of exposition to be chosen. Finally, concerning this third point we decide, as a result of all that has been said already, that—apart from the above-mentioned examinations, discussions and problems, which are the first characteristic peculiar to our method, and the application of which to the particular case will be described more fully in the proper place,—all oral instruction in a particular subject must begin with the *encyclopaedia* of that subject, which must be the first lecture of every teacher appointed by us and which must first be attended by every pupil. The separate encyclopaedias of the particular subjects, raised to the highest clearness, especially if they are all known to the teachers and pupils of the institution, are the element that influences above all the general encyclopaedia (end of para. 19) that is to proceed from philosophy ; they prepare greatly for it, and will make it quite intelligible when it appears, whilst in turn they will receive from it new strength and clearness. Again, unity and a single view of the matter is characteristic of the philosophy and free skill for which we strive ; on the other hand, unconnected diversity and complete separateness are characteristic of the non-philosophy, confusion and helplessness which we want to root out altogether and must not, therefore, admit within ourselves. Finally, even if all this were not so we cannot, on account of the imperfection of the lower school, reckon at first on our pupils being already completely equipped with all the scientific material that has been described and must make good this deficiency by our special encyclopaedias. The following are the chief points concerning such an encyclopaedia intended for a scientific Academy ; *first of all that it describes*, with all the clearness that is peculiar to the teacher himself, *and demonstrates the characteristic difference peculiar to the use of the understanding* in this subject and its particular forms of skill or precautionary measures (and so penetrates in conception, e.g., *historical talent* or *gift for observation*) ; that it displays the parts of the science completely and comprehensively and shows the order and the particular way in which each must be studied ; finally, that it provides the knowledge of the literature on the subject necessary for the pupil's purpose, and advises him *what* and in *what order* and

possibly with what precautions he has to read. In the latter respect especially the teacher owes the pupil a general catalogue and survey of *all the literature* on the subject, so far as it is necessary for the pupil; the latter himself has to read the literature in accordance with the guidance given him, but is not to expect the teacher to repeat it once more to him. Further, if, as we hope, the teacher belongs to the above-mentioned nobler element in the existing universities and is therefore not satisfied with all the literature on his subject but is capable of improving it here and there, let him point out in his Encyclopaedia the faulty parts of the big book and set out his plan for improving them in special lectures and the order in which these special lectures, which rest as a whole on the firm basis of his encyclopaedia and are arranged in accordance with it, are to be heard. If there is so much that he cannot manage it alone, let him choose an assistant pledged to work according to his plan. Let him not say, however, what is in a book but only what is in no book. (For example: it is self-evident and has already been pointed out that the pupil of the lower school must be given very early a summary of universal history; but I confess I cannot understand why there should be a course on universal history in the University, except to show how we must *understand* the whole history of man, which would be done most appropriately by the philosopher. On the other hand I should consider it very appropriate and meritorious if a Professor of History were to announce a lecture on particular facts of world history, *which no one before him* knew so *correctly as he*, and were to carry out his promise.)

To prevent possible misunderstanding we make the following additions to our remarks concerning these encyclopaedias which are so much opposed by many. With the same complete conviction with which we admit that the attempt to stop at such general surveys and results betrays shallowness, laziness and a desire for cheap splendour, and promotes these evils, we see at the same time that reluctance to *begin with them* plunges the pupil into the wild ocean without helm and compass. Although some boast that they have escaped without drowning, we have no right on that account to expose

everyone to that risk ; even those who were saved would have been healthier if they had never been exposed to it. The sources of this reluctance proceed not from better understanding but for the most part from inability to give such an encyclopaedic account of their own subject because, great only in details, they have never risen to the view of a whole. He who cannot or will not give such an encyclopaedia of his subject is not only useless to us but even destructive, because his influence destroys the spirit of our institution at the very beginning.

22.

We pass on to consider historically the material in the existing universities and make two preliminary general remarks. A school for the scientific use of the understanding assumes that what it deals with can be understood and reduced to its ultimate elements ; consequently whatever did not allow of the use of the understanding and set itself up from the very beginning as an incomprehensible secret would be excluded from it by its very nature. A school for the use of the understanding could not concern itself with theology if the latter were still to insist that there is a God who wills something without any reason, that no one of himself understands the contents of that will but God must communicate it to him directly by special ambassador, that such communication has taken place and its result is in certain holy books, written, however, in very obscure language, on the correct understanding of which the salvation of man depends. It must give up this claim to sole knowledge of secrets and charms, candidly explaining and openly acknowledging that the will of God can be known without any particular revelation and that those books are not *sources of knowledge* but only *a vehicle of popular instruction* which, quite independently of what the authors may really have said, must be explained in actual practice as the authors ought to have said it, which must therefore be known from another source before the explanation. It is only on this condition that the material which theology has hitherto possessed can be admitted to our institution and treated in accordance with that assumption. More-

over, several subjects hitherto treated in Universities (like Theology, which has just been mentioned, jurisprudence, medicine) have a part which belongs not to scientific art but to the very different practical art of application in life. It is on the one hand to the advantage of this practical art, which is learnt best by immediate and assiduous practice under an experienced master, and on the other hand to the advantage of the scientific art itself, which has to separate itself as completely as possible and to concentrate upon itself, that this part should be separated from our Academy and other self-contained institutions set up for it. We shall show what must be observed in this connection by the scientific Academy when we mention particular cases.

23.

Next to Philosophy, philology rightly makes most claim to universality as a general means of understanding. Whether *all students* in the higher school need philological instruction or should have finished it already in the lower school, whether the institutions particularly suitable for those *who are destined to become school teachers* and who need, of course, a wider training would not be more appropriately combined with the lower schools :—the answer to these questions we can leave just now to *that* generation in which the general encyclopaedia will be an established fact and the lower school what it ought to be, and we may *provisionally* leave things as they are.

24.

In our opinion the pure part of *Mathematics* should have been quite finished up to a certain stage in the lower school ; and this should be added to what has already been said about the curriculum of that school. As this is not to be expected at first, a provisional scheme of mathematical study based on the present condition of the lower school should be sketched.

In any case my proposal is that a *committee* of our ablest mathematicians be appointed and our scheme as a whole laid before them ; and that they be ordered to

estimate the relations of their science to this scheme, and then by general agreement to nominate *one* of themselves, or propose a stranger for nomination, to whom the encyclopaedia and the planning and directing of the whole study will be entrusted.

25.

History as a whole is divided into the History of *passing* and the History of *lasting* phenomena. The former is History, properly so called, with its subsidiary sciences; the latter is Natural History, which has a theoretical part, Natural Science.

In the former the senior encyclopaedic teacher appointed must be acquainted with our main scheme and must be in provisional agreement with us concerning it.

For the big subject of *natural science*, which must be treated altogether as an organic whole, I can only propose, as in the case of Mathematics, a *committee* which will choose from its members, or by nominating a stranger, the encyclopaedist, to frame the programme of work and direct the whole study, and which will, if necessary, *share* the lectures in it according to his plan, here again always remembering not to communicate orally what can be learnt as well or better from a book. The chief requirement of such a plan is the completeness and organic entireness of the encyclopaedia. At the same time the Academy has to settle with the lower school the limits of its subjects and assign to the latter as its future task the ability which it is to produce; this applies to the subjects already mentioned as well as those considered later, and is mentioned here once for all. Philosophy alone does not permit of direct preparation in the lower school and is an art for the higher school exclusively.

26.

The three so-called higher Faculties would have done well previously if they had clearly recognised their true place in the whole context of knowledge, had not, presuming on their practical indispensability and their influence with the multitude, set themselves up as separate and more distinguished, but had rather subordinated

themselves to that context and acknowledged their dependence with due humility. As they despised, so they were despised; and students of other subjects took no notice of what these Faculties desired to possess exclusively, with the result that the study of those Faculties as well as science in general was very much harmed. We shall come across proofs of this statement. A scientific Academy expects this modesty of them as soon as they enter its sphere.

The scientific material of *Jurisprudence* is a chapter of history; indeed but a fragment of that chapter, as it has been treated hitherto. It ought to be *a history of the development and formation of the conception of right among men* and, independently of that history, this conception of right, as *ruler* not as *servant*, must have been discovered previously by philosophising. In its usual first and purely practical aspect, the training of *judges*, which is a subordinate occupation, it is the history of that development in the country in which we live and, if it goes deep, among the Romans, and is therefore a fragment. Its ultimate practical aim, however, is to train *legislators*, for which purpose the whole chapter would be useful; for although it is known immediately *a priori* what law must be generally, the art of finding the particular form of this law for any given time, and of adapting it thereto, requires the experience of all known time in this business. A judge's duties, as well as legislation, are practical applications of *History*. Jurisprudence has, therefore, the Encyclopaedia of History as its first Encyclopaedia, for that is the foundation on which rest it and the scientific use of the understanding in it; and the practice of jurisprudence in its highest degree is really the art of creating History, and that a happier History than the previous one. Training for practical application in life, however, falls quite outside the scope of the school; and in this matter pupils should be referred to the practising colleges, there, under supervision, but on the *responsibility* of the officials to whom they are entrusted, to prepare for future administration. For this subject, therefore, I propose a *committee*, on which the History encyclopaedist described above will have a seat and the casting vote for his part of the subject. The committee would appoint a special

encyclopaedist for the *parts* and the literature of the chapter described, would sketch the plan of study and organize the institutions for practical training independently of the scientific Academy. I hope that the resolute application of the principle not to teach orally what is in a book will make the list of lectures in this faculty shorter than it has been hitherto, although on our principles the amount to be learned has increased.

Medical science rests on *natural science*, which is the second part of what is to be learned positively ; but its present state permits the doubt, in which the writer also willingly acknowledges that he finds himself, whether from this unquestionably scientific basis any one positive conclusion in actual medical science can be made, and consequently whether this basis should be the guide in practice, as is obviously the case in jurisprudence, or whether it is only that certain general results of that fundamental science *are not contradicted* in practice and that therefore the former (the Science) is merely a *negative rule and corrective* for the latter (the application). If this is the case, as we fear, and if it must always remain so, which we also fear, there is no definite fixed bridge from science in any of its branches to practical medical science ; the latter has its particular foundation in a special *observation* which can never be *traced back to positive principles*. It must therefore be excluded from the scientific Academy, which treats carefully all branches of natural science, even Anatomy, Botany, etc., without regard for medical science and as knowledge which is to be expected of every scientifically educated man. It must be carried on wholly in a self-contained institution, without any admixture from science which is presupposed as learnt in school ; from *materia medica* onwards, for instance, which is nothing but the application of medical empiricism to Botany, etc. It is apparent what immense advantages such independence would have for natural science, which has been frequently regarded and treated hitherto as the mere handmaid of medical science, also for medical science and consequently for the whole scientific community. A committee of experts should, therefore, be appointed to answer the question raised above and to organize the institutions which the result of the answer would demand.

It is desirable and understood that such an independent institute of medical science would treat the material that would fall to its share in consequence of some definite plan founded on its Encyclopaedia according to the maxim of teaching not what is already in a book.

But, and this is not to be disregarded, the most important results of continued medical observation, the actual accomplishment of which is left for it alone, have also, as part of the total observation of Nature, influence on the progress of natural science as a whole; the scientific Academy must, therefore, not disdain it, but must put itself in a position to take note of it continually and to learn from it. The gain from this, however, will never influence the whole immediately and at once, and so belong to the encyclopaedic institution; other means, to be mentioned in due course, must therefore be devised to appropriate the gain and keep it until it is brought into the Encyclopaedia.

It has already been shown that Theology cannot be admitted to an Academy of Science unless it will solemnly give up the claim to a secret which formerly it made openly and which it has never recently formally withdrawn. If it gives up this claim, it thereby submits at once to that separation of its practical and scientific parts which has hitherto not been so clearly admitted.

To consider the former first. The primary teacher, whom formerly it aimed at training, is essentially the intermediary between the higher, scientifically educated class (for there is no higher class, and those who are not scientifically educated are People) and the lower class or the People. Quite rightly he connects his work of education mainly with religion, the root and the most general thing in all higher human training; but he ought always to introduce into this work not only religion but everything that is to be brought from higher education to the people and adapted to their condition.

Nothing prevents him from being, besides a teacher, a scholar actively working at the roots of science and advancing it, if he *will* and *can*; but this is not necessary for his profession and therefore not to be expected of him. It is sufficient for him to possess in general the art of *understanding*, and of *making himself understood* con-

cerning, scientific things, which he will have learned already in the lower school, through which he must at all events go. Further he must know the most general results of the whole range of science and have the ability, if necessary, to learn more by further reading, in which the encyclopaedias introduced into the scientific Academy will give him instruction and the necessary literary references. He must receive the necessary training in philosophising from the philosopher. For his immediate task of religious education he must first form his system of religion in the philosopher's school. To connect his instruction with the books of the Bible it will be quite sufficient to write and put into his hands a book in which the content of pure religion and morals is developed therefrom. Neither the author of this book, nor the future teacher who is to be trained thereby in biblical *application*, need be concerned much with the question whether the biblical writers really meant it in the way they say it; the people are to be kept carefully from this question, which is beyond them. The primary teacher does not need, therefore, to understand the biblical writers *in their true intended meaning;* hitherto this, although intended and frequently claimed, has undoubtedly not been the case with him and often not with his Professor in biblical exposition; we demand, therefore, nothing new, but only a confession of the true condition of things and the deliberate abandonment of an unnecessary and vain effort. Concerning *pastoral ability* too, i.e., concerning his peculiar destiny as a primary teacher in the whole human race and the means of fulfilling it, he will undoubtedly be able to obtain information from the philosopher. The particular characteristic to be expected of him, the *art* of *popularity* and its exercise in catechetical, homiletical and social institutions with members of the people, are contrary to the scientific Academy, which aims at scientific lecturing, and are, therefore, to be separated from it and most appropriately left to practising teachers, as in the case of the lawyers. The special talent of the future primary teacher is a pious heart that loves mankind, especially the People. This is the chief thing to be looked for in admitting to the profession; and especially in appointments to ecclesiastical courts, perhaps the future schools of such teachers, far

more notice should be taken of these qualities than of other glittering talents or extensive knowledge.

In the Academy the scientific remainder of this theology, which had perished as a priestly intermediary between God and man, would doff its former nature entirely and don a new one as a result of the change. It has two parts; a section disconnected from philology and a chapter from history. The oriental languages, to which the Hebrew dialect, hitherto left almost exclusively to the theologians, forms an easy and suitable introduction, comprise a very important part of the language development of the human race and are not to be overlooked in an organic survey of this development which we may hope to have some day. The hellenistic form of the Greek biblical writers belongs entirely to knowledge of the Greek language as a whole, and this language will be studied in our schools. Both maintain, instead of the surrendered and very doubtful claim to be holy languages, the much more significant claim to be human languages and once more fall within the province of the lower school, which will be ashamed of its laziness in not being able to treat generally the limited Hebrew language, when it does successfully the very rich Greek language. Moreover, the biblical writers are very significant forms of the development of the human spirit, the real value of which has not been noticed merely because a ficticious deceiver attracted the attention of one party and aroused the hatred and unqualified disrespect of the other. Henceforward, judging the matter *sine ira et studio*, we shall find it just as instructive and delightful to read Isaiah as Aeschylus, and John as Plato; and in the correct literal understanding of them, *at which scholarly study will of course aim*, even if the former as well as the latter must sometimes be *wrong*, we shall have more success than before, when they had to be right always and for the particular opinion of each new commentator, which was not to be effected without much constraint and never-ending strife. This exposition will be honest and will honestly confess what it does not understand; whereas that which proceeded from the theological principle was very dishonest. (At the same time, however, what is proposed above is not dishonest exposition; it is

not exposition at all and does not pretend to be, for such exposition is a scholar's task and does not fall within the cognizance of the People.)

The chapter of history, an important part of which theology formerly claimed almost exclusively, is *the History of the development of religious conceptions among men.* It follows from the expression used that the task is more comprehensive than theology has understood it, since account must also be taken of the religious ideas of the so-called heathen, and the scientific Academy will understand it in this extended form. Provided with these parts which belong to it and explain it, and, further, studied without any interest in a particular result and with honest love of truth, special church history will also have quite a different form, and we shall come nearer to the solution of several problems (e.g., concerning the real authors of many biblical writings, concerning their genuine or false parts, the history of the Canon, etc.) or discover exactly and know what can and cannot be ascertained in this sphere. This part of history, of course, will fall within the province of the History encyclopaedist for inclusion in his plan of study.

A committee composed of good expert theologians and preachers should be appointed to decide the chief question proposed above and, if the answer is satisfactory, to sketch a definite plan and establish a special institution for the training of future primary teachers.

27.

The individuals and committees so commissioned should be ordered to investigate fully, besides the matters mentioned already, the scientific equipment that already exists for each subject (books, art and specimen collections, scientific instruments, etc.) and the necessaries which we lack and which must be provided; to provide complete catalogues and lists of these treasures and to include the appropriate and orderly use of them in their schemes of study. If the individuals commissioned have no time for this in addition to their main work, they must be asked to appoint another expert to do it.

In this work they will have to take care on the

one hand not to harm the purity and simplicity of our institution by keeping superfluous things, either in order to lose nothing or in an attempt at external pomp and at rivalry with other learned institutions; on the other hand to spare nothing that is really necessary. External pomp will come to us if only we develop our internal affairs honestly; but deliberate consideration of this and imitation of others, from whom we should not take our example but to whom we should rather set an example, will plunge us once more into that confusion which it must be our first endeavour to ward off.

28.

By the complete solution of these problems the *teaching part* of the scientific Academy would be established for the first time. By means of the encyclopaedic lectures we could open a *university* which would be *quite an ordinary* one at first in other respects. All those lectures however, in which, always according to the teacher's discretion, continuous discourse alternates with examinations and discussions, attendance at which is *open* to all but *compulsory* upon no one, should be so spread over the first session that students and teachers too, if they wish, may hear them all and still have time, the former to read the set books and do the essays—of which more anon—the latter to mark the essays. In estimating this time more than the usual amount of industry and professional honesty should certainly be assumed in both groups; for these qualities must appear in our Academy and cannot, therefore, be introduced too soon.

29.

During the encyclopaedic lectures in the first session the philosophical teacher, like the other encyclopaedic teachers, should set a problem to his hearers in the spirit that has already been sufficiently described,—a problem such that what has been learned from the lecture or from the book is not just repeated but is made the starting-point; this will show whether the pupil has possessed himself freely of it and can do something with it in the manner of a rising artist. Any student may deal with

the problem in an essay and send it to the teacher at a definite time before the end of the session, with a sealed note containing the author's name. The teacher marks the essays and picks out the best.

The teacher of philosophy is the sole judge of the essays when the content is purely philosophical; for the crowning of those, however, which have a positively scientific content, the encyclopaedic teacher of the subject and the philosopher (later on, the philosophical class, if we have one) must combine, the *former* deciding concerning the correctness, depth and completeness of the historical knowledge assumed at this stage of instruction, the latter concerning the philosophical and artistic spirit in which the material has been treated. An essay rejected by one of them remains rejected, although the other may approve it. The need for this collaboration of the philosophical class lies in the nature of an Academy; the collaboration of historical knowledge on the other hand should guard us against *a priori* reverie instead of thorough scholarship in empirical subjects.

At the *end* of the first session the results of this marking of the essays handed in and the names of those whose essays have been approved are announced, and those of them *who wish* come together as the nucleus of a *learning part*, in the higher and better sense, of our scientific academy. Those who wish, I said; for although the preparation of an essay and its submission to the teachers' judgment seem to presuppose this wish, many other purposes might be intended in the preparation, of which more anon. Every student in our University is entitled to these purposes; whether every student *will* join who *ought* to, must therefore be left to him. Meanwhile the development of our plan will undoubtedly justify the assumption that everyone will join who ought to.

30.

They unite to form one large household, with board and lodging in common, under suitable liberal supervision. Their needs, without exception, not excluding books, clothes, writing materials, etc., are supplied to them in kind by the Board of domestic management, and during

their years of study they have nothing to do with any other domestic business, apart from the handling of a little pocket money, for which a maximum can be fixed. (The reason for this arrangement has already been mentioned ; the answer to the objection that in the University young people must learn economy too is that, if they get with us the sense of honour, the conscientiousness and the intellectual training at which we aim, economy will come of itself later ; if they do not get these from the amount of care that we expend, there is no harm if they become outwardly corrupt too, and the sooner this happens the better always.) How far such maintenance should be supplied at their own cost or given them *free at the cost of the State* we reserve for consideration later ; and in what has been said we do not mean the former unconditionally.

With the family thus produced the teachers live intimately in the way described above. These students are continually studied and their mental progress observed ; they have first access to the examinations and discussions, to intercourse with and advice from the teachers and are privileged to use the existing literary resources before anyone else. All oral discourse in the Academy depends upon their most immediate and known needs. If they use the Academy properly—and this is tested by an examination to be described later—they are preferred before all others when the highest offices of the State are filled (and hold the nobility granted them, by God's grace, because of superior talent and deserved because of worthy development of that talent).

Other students besides these, however, may share, according to their ability, the existing means of education in the institution, although strictly speaking these are only for the others, and may seek by voluntary training to reach their level ; if they succeed it will not remain unrecognized. In a sense the latter grow wild, as in a wood ; the former are carefully cultivated trees in a nursery, which must always exist and from which many noble seeds will fly even to the wood. The former are *Regulars*, and a suitable German name for them will easily be found ; the latter are *Irregulars*, mere *Companions* and *Confederates ;* and these are the two chief classes into which our student body falls.

31.

Thereafter, at the end of each session, those who have been among the Confederates should be free to apply for admission to the Regulars on the ground of successful essays (for towards the end of every session problems are set for such people). Moreover, those young natives who can prove (concerning the degree and the kind of proof something definite can be settled later) excellent ability and progress in the lower school should have the right to a place among the Regulars as soon as they enter the University.

32.

As there are no Regulars when the University begins, those who think of applying for admission to them on the ground of essays should be made to unite to form a common household, as later the Regulars do. Although this household should be under the special supervision of the institute it should be not a really public institution but a private one, and the members should live not, as may be the case under certain conditions with the Regulars, at the expense of the State, but at their own expense, the management however being in common, as with the Regulars. Those of this household who at the beginning of the second session are not admitted to the Regulars and are not therefore transferred from this household to another, cannot be prevented from continuing to live there and remaining *Candidates* for admission to the *Regulars ;* for, as pointed out in the previous paragraph, they may be more fortunate at the beginning of the following session. To these might be added, with the same claim, others who have been hitherto among the Confederates, and also newcomers from the lower school who do not bring with them the right of immediate admission to the Regulars. These constitute a third class of our students called *Novices* who are a link between the Regulars and the Confederates. In the nature of things they are already recommended to the special observation of the teachers, for the latter know that it is mainly from them that they will have to fill up the College of Regulars at the beginning of the new session.

33.

In order that the Confederates—this is not to be feared of the Novices, who acknowledge their claim to become Regulars by living together—may not always be tempted, for the sake of greater licence, to consider themselves better than the Regulars, the superiority of the latter must be made outwardly visible by a *Uniform*, which no one is entitled to wear but them and their ordinary teachers. In order that this dress may have its proper significance from the beginning, the ordinary teachers must wear the Uniform habitually as soon as the University opens. In the first session, therefore, they only and those who are in the same relationship as themselves to the University may be clothed therein; later, when the first College of Regulars has been appointed, the privilege is extended to them and likewise to all subsequent members of the College.

34.

At the same time this arrangement should help the external moral training of our pupils and promote and secure for them the respect of the rest of the public. Apart from this a thorough and intelligent study of science ennobles of itself; moreover, care will be taken to develop, by means of example and precept, love of honour and a sense of the sublime, as the real instrument for the moral training of youth; but order comes of itself into his life through the arrangements made. Thus the inner training is provided for.

When his love of honour is developed the thought that his dress marks him out, and that this dress should not be dragged about the streets in idleness or be seen in low places and among crowds but, as indicating a member of the Society, should appear only in honourable houses, will help his external training. We shall tell him which are honourable houses and seek in every way to deserve permission to introduce him to them. (For instance, although in the present state of things a youth who loves honour but has become involved in a duel may deserve pardon in certain circumstances, our pupil must not be pardoned at all *if* he goes first among people where

such a thing is possible, no matter what their birth. This will be a point of honour for the whole body. Yet they must not become cowards.)

Our pupil is secured outwardly against the chief source of contempt in life, chaos in domestic economy and the contracting of debts. Against the assumption, usually made in University towns, that when the people who commit outrages remain unknown they are also guiltless, because the student body is always the sinner, the teachers will protect themselves by saying : " Did you see our dress when the outrage took place ? If not, do not slander our pupils ; for they never go out except in this dress." The teachers will insist with all earnestness on the honour of their pupils and on all the arrangements which make it possible for them to do so consistently with their own honour.

35.

Since the Confederates are neither proper members of our institution nor really resident citizens, they are under the general police who must, without any assistance from the institution and entirely on their own responsibility, make the arrangements whereby the requisite guarantee in regard to these strangers is afforded to the rest of the citizens. The same applies to the Novices ; but, since they form a unity and have a visible bond of this unity in their domestic administration, they can give a better guarantee and negotiate through their representatives with the police, and so have their individual members subjected to more liberal legislation than the Confederates. The Academy, however, is in much closer relationship to these two classes than the rest of the citizens ; and it is not for the general police to arrange the results of this closer relationship. Consequently the necessary regulations in this respect are a matter for the institute which is the principal partner in the contract to be made. These classes have access to all the institutions set up by the school ; but since the school does not concern itself in the least either with their scientific progress or with their conduct, its right over them is limited to *protecting itself against the harm that might happen from granting such access* (for the general police protect it against other injuries).

Such harm would be : disturbance of peace and order at the lectures to which they are admitted ; injury to the respect demanded by the relationship of learner to teacher or of Confederates to those for whose sake the institution really exists ; finally, owing to the well-known conceit and absurd susceptibility of ordinary students, the resistance of teachers to cases of the first and second kind may result in other coarser insults and attacks which, being purely the result of the permission granted, must be judged, not according to general police regulations but on stricter principles.

Consequently a contract, in the form of a definite transaction, must be made between the institution and each individual, whereby the latter receives the right of admission and agrees to the conditions under which he receives it. This transaction is the *Inscription :* the conditions are the *regulations* for the Confederate which, since his relations to other citizens are a matter for the police, have to determine merely his relation to the institution, *as such.* The Novices can be put under milder regulations in this respect for the reason already mentioned in connection with the police.

The act of inscription and of swearing to the laws is a legal one and will, therefore, together with the legal business to be mentioned later, devolve most fitly upon a specially appointed *Justiciary* of the Academy.

Since the institution has no relations with the Confederates other than to permit attendance, it has no power other than the withdrawal of this permission. This can happen in *particular* or in *general.* In regard to the former every individual teacher must be free, on the responsibility of his own conscience, to refuse a Confederate, whose restlessness and inattention disturbs him or his audience, or who has insulted him or those of his pupils who are more closely associated with him, admission to his lectures for a certain time or permanently ; and, as a precaution against greater harm, the whole teaching body must support him in this solely on his evidence. The latter explains itself ; and the cases—among them this, that someone has not obeyed when expelled by a teacher from his audience—are to be determined by law. Any preliminary investigation that must be made because the

perpetrators of insulting outrages are unknown is a matter for the University Justiciary, before whose tribunal the inscribed person must appear on pain of being sent down for contempt of court. Hitherto Universities, e.g., the guardians and Senate of the University of Jena, have assumed that in such cases there is no need of strict legal proof before sentence but that strong suspicion is sufficient, because no punishment is inflicted but only a freely granted permission withdrawn because to continue it seems dangerous ; the writer is of the opinion that they are right and that we should adopt the same principle. The Justiciary, in this capacity as administrator of the rights of the institution, must protect himself and is responsible to the institution.

With the withdrawal of the inscription is naturally combined *Relegation* or expulsion from the University town and its immediate neighbourhood, partly in order to secure the members of the University against any further outrage and the vengeance of the person dismissed, partly because such a person can show no further reason for continuing to reside there. The duty of doing this falls to the police, who in this matter are not judges or revisers of the judgment but merely the executors of a judgment already pronounced ; and if they are slack in doing their duty, the University must appear as plaintiff against them.

(If there is any correctness in this view, it is clear that hitherto the administration of justice in Universities has vacillated and has done, now too much, now too little ; at one time on the supposition that the University should not do more than withdraw a permission which they have themselves given, at another because they did at the same time the work of the police and civil justice, which had nothing to do with them, finally because they had also a sense of their paternal and educative duties. Here the contradiction is solved by separating two very different classes of students ; and personal right is asserted by leaving freedom to the student no matter what the class to which he belongs.)

36.

The connection of Relegation with the withdrawal of the inscription, which is quite unobjectionable in the case

of strangers, may easily, when the students to be sent down have their homes in the University town, raise the doubt whether the University, although it undoubtedly has the right to expel them from its lecture-rooms, has also the right to drive them from home. Meanwhile since, in case this right must be denied it, the University cannot be secured against these young people, who are not less dangerous, without some special arrangement, some such special arrangement as this should be proposed: (1) that sons of the University town, if they do not already possess, as members of a lower school, a good testimonial from their teachers, must apply some time before the inscription and be observed thenceforward, and that inscription is to be denied if this observation raises doubts about them; (2) that their parents pay a specified sum as caution money, the first half of which is forfeited if their inscription is withdrawn instead of the punishment of relegation, which they are for the present spared; but that, if in future they are guilty again of any outrage against the institution, the other half also is forfeited and they are sent down notwithstanding. If parents cannot or will not pay this caution money, they must accept the situation if their sons are sent down in case of guilt; just as hitherto Professors have sometimes had to accept this when it happened to their sons before they had completed their courses; for it rests entirely in the power of every student to abstain from those actions which result in relegation and which will not number many with us, who leave to the police and the civil courts what belongs to their province.

37.

The Regulars are regarded by the State and its instrument, the general police, as a family whole, which answers as such for its members (for its Board of domestic management might indeed have to do with civil justice, but not an individual member). If wrong is done by its members the whole is to be held responsible and punished; on the other hand, the punishment of individual members is left to the family and is carried out internally; it is paternal and fraternal and should serve to educate, not to terrify. It is only when an individual has been separated

and expelled from the organisation that he can exist again as an individual and fall under the jurisdiction of the public tribunal to which he then belongs.

It is clear that, unless degradation and expulsion have taken place, none of the legal arrangements that have so far been made apply to the Regulars and that for them there is no Justiciary or Relegation or anything of the sort. Merely through expulsion they cannot become less than they would have been without incorporation in the body of Regulars, i.e., Confederates ; and as such they must first do wrong again in order to be responsible to the police or the Justiciary, into whose hands they fall henceforward. It is obvious that those cases are excepted in which a family cannot represent its members, e.g., criminal cases, but that in these too degradation must precede surrender to the judge.

The Regulars must therefore first of all find for themselves a rule, according to which the possibility of such cases is as good as destroyed and generally all precautions taken so that the police have no opportunity of taking notice of them ; then they must set up an ephoralty and a court of justice to guarantee the execution of that rule. Besides, in the house in which they live together a venerable old scholar, who was once a teacher of reputation and merit in the Academy, should dwell and live with them as the immediate father of the family. (If later the society should grow and have to be divided into several houses, it must not be broken up by the naming of different Colleges ; the bond of union must still remain outwardly visible in the common possession of one father of the family and by other means too. He is naturally president of this family court of justice. Moreover, all ordinary teachers in the institution are naturally members of it, for their own honour depends upon the honour of their pupil ; and to save their time they may sit *alternately*. Finally, in order that a real family and brotherly court of justice may be formed, members are to be appointed from among the Regulars themselves, in accordance with a principle that can easily be discovered. Its legal administration should bear the character already described, but its proceedings and sentences should be confined entirely to this association ; to communicate any of

them to others should be regarded as dishonourable and should result in immediate expulsion.

The Novices may make a similar arrangement, if they find a board of management whose guarantee the police will accept. But they have no claim to the presence of ordinary teachers on their family court of justice; they can, however, be permitted to invite as members extraordinary Professors, of whom more in due course, or other good scholars. In general, no matter how similar the Novitiate may become now or in future to the College of Regulars, the main difference still remains, that the latter are under official authority and guarantee, while the former is an institution established by private freedom, whose members have by right no greater claim than the Confederates, and have to regard the favours, which the police and the University have given them, as only a free gift, which can be taken from them again.

38.

So far we have described the origin of the *learning body* in its different grades and the ways in which it is constantly supplemented and renewed. We can now proceed to further definition of the teaching body which has already been mentioned generally.

Hitherto in Universities doctors and extraordinary professors have been allowed to experiment in lecturing and to wait for an audience to collect round them. If they have already had the right to lecture in another University, we may also grant it them. Otherwise they must do here what is customary elsewhere. The proper teachers for the Regulars and for those who are trying to become Regulars are of course the encyclopaedic teachers, who set the deciding problems, and those teachers of part of a subject who have been appointed by the encyclopaedic teachers and who, although assistants, are nevertheless *ordinary* teachers. For those whom we might always call as a body *extraordinary* Professors there remain, therefore, the Confederates, on whom to experiment. Yet not only should Regulars, and indeed the most skilful and able of these, be called upon by the encyclopaedic teacher of the subject to attend the lectures

of these professors, but he himself and other teachers should be empowered to attend them until they have obtained a definite idea of the knowledge and teaching ability of the man.

The first permission to teach lasts for only one session. At the end of it application must be made again for permission, which may be renewed or refused according to circumstances; or the teacher who is considered suitable may be appointed an ordinary assistant teacher or even an encyclopaedist, if the present one wishes to leave.

The decision in both matters, as in the judging of the essays, depends on the class in the subject as well as on the philosophical class, the former deciding the thoroughness of empirical knowledge, the latter the philosophical freedom and clearness. Here too for an affirmative judgment both votes must agree, while each class must first be agreed among itself and for itself, its vote counting here as one only. Since stronger youth is not always quite free from jealousy of the merits of others, however, just as age is sometimes accused of being opposed to every innovation, in a case of permission to lecture or in the appointment of a teacher each particular class (the necessary empirical class as well as the philosophical) must first be divided into two parts, the *council of Elders* and *that of active teachers*. Only when both parts have said "No," has the class said "No"; on the other hand, the single Yes of one council becomes the Yes of the class. The result is that neither the one's fear of innovation nor the other's jealousy can hinder progress towards what is better, and an effective counter-balance is given to both things. If both parts say "No," however, the right answer is undoubtedly "No."

(Moreover, such a division of our learned body into a Senate of Elders and of teachers will result very naturally in due course from the nature of the whole, quite regardless of the special need just mentioned.)

39.

As the institution develops, a number of the Regulars in each subject will be urged to become a seminar for

professors and to take up the work of teaching, under the supervision of the ordinary teachers. To these, if they come from the class of students and are appointed *Masters*, the right to lecture can be given in the same way and the teaching posts can very easily be filled from among them in accordance with the same principle. Of course at every stage of our development teachers who come to us from elsewhere in the way mentioned in the preceding paragraph will always be welcome and we shall seek thereby to preserve ourselves from any air of partiality.

40.

The exercise of the teacher's office, especially in accordance with our principles, demands youthful strength and skill. Now the continuance of such youthful freshness to a great age is assured to few. Moreover, the inclination of most original students of science in riper years is to set down their culture in some fixed and final form in the archives of scientific literature; and it is very desirable that this should happen and that they should be given time and quietness for it. We must not, therefore, count upon keeping teachers in our institution for more than a limited time. All those with whom the institution opens will soon long for the rest they have honourably earned, and willingly avail themselves of the time when younger talent has developed among them to fill their places adequately. All teachers who are newly appointed during the development of the institution are to be taken only for a definite time (perhaps for the period within which the student body usually renews itself) and at the end of this time both parties, the University and the teacher, may renew or cancel the contract in the manner described in paragraph 38.

41.

I make the following proposal in order to prevent in future and in our Academy in the domestic part of such proceedings the objectionable bargaining between governments and scholars that has hitherto often taken place, in that the former have sometimes tried to take advantage of a good man's embarrassment to secure his

powers and talent cheap, while the latter have sometimes not been satisfied with what they had and have supported their exaggerated demands by invitations to places abroad which they have obtained largely by cunning.

Either these teachers are natives and educated in our institution, probably as Regulars, we may expect—in which case the mother-country undoubtedly has first claim on their powers, just as *they* have a claim on her support on every occasion and throughout life; or they are foreigners who have not received their education from us. In the latter case, when they enter into any relation with us or renew any such relation let us ask them to declare whether they wish to retain their rights abroad or to have the full rights of our citizenship (*become one of us*). In the former case we must of course be satisfied if, being indispensable to us, they sell themselves to us as dearly as they can; but this contract is made only for a time; and if at the end of it we can dispense with them, they should know that then we shall trouble ourselves no more about them and they can go where they please. In the latter case the State has upon them, and they have upon the State, all the claims that exist between the State and the natives educated by us. Now in order to secure, in the latter relationship, the personal freedom of the individual and at the same time to create legal equality between the individual and the State, which has hitherto had to assure its servant lifelong maintenance but allow him to give notice at any moment, and especially in order to help the learned profession to greater morality and love of honour in matters of this sort, let us make the claim to lifelong provision, according to the subject, *equivalent to a certain fixed sum* which he who shares full citizen's rights must pay back to the State if he wishes to leave his present post. If he is worth this sum to the foreign appointing body, let them pay it and he is free; but it is to be hoped that this will not happen very often and in this way we shall be spared the settling of so many invitations.

42.

Assuming this arrangement, the question of providing for retired professors concerns only those who have full

rights of citizenship by birth or have obtained them; for not only are those who refuse these rights unprovided for on retirement, but it is a firm principle of our politics to make them superfluous as soon as possible.

Regulars who are educated by us and considered worthy of the *Mastership* at the end of their courses have first claim on the chief offices of the State; we should grant the teachers who start the Academy this claim, which we shall not be able to deny their pupils later. This claim and the ability to fill such offices are certainly not diminished by the fact that being a teacher for some years the man has acquired still greater skill in that scientific subject, the application of which in life the vacant public post demands, and incidentally greater maturity of age and experience. Rather is it desirable that all should do this and the life of the leading citizens would fall as a rule into the three ages of the learning, teaching and practising scientific artist. Far from being embarrassed therefore concerning appointments for retired teachers, we should have to establish, even if otherwise we needed no body of teachers, such a body as a nursery and reserve of greater business men, and in times of need sometimes take therefrom even him who would rather remain there.

Apart from the need of retiring teachers on the part of the State and its higher business circle, the Academy as a literary institution needs such men for itself. There is a knowledge which lies very far from the roots of the scientific system and goes into very great detail in a subject; it does not affect the general Encyclopaedia and the usual range of instruction in the scientific Academy, and without it one can be a very good teacher. Yet the need for this knowledge may arise in teacher and taught; the means of obtaining it must, therefore, exist and this is what the retired teachers are first and foremost. It may be that apart from this they work at setting down their own culture in the general literary archives, and for this leisure should be given them. Incidentally, also, teachers and taught may get advice from them on the points in which they are particularly strong; or both may on occasion ask them for lectures, it may be on an oriental root or the natural history of a

particular moss. In a word they are counsel and help to the younger people in case of need both in knowledge and in art.

Since they are no longer, however, actually ordinary teachers in the University and their present activities are simply gifts freely asked and freely given, they are an *Academy of Science* in the *modern* (really French) sense of the word ; in University matters they are the *Council of Elders* which has already been mentioned. In their deliberations the actual teaching body joins as the *Council of active teachers ;* the latter are also, therefore, naturally members of the Academy ; and the whole Academy is the *Senate* of the University, according to the two chief parts already mentioned of all the particular classes to be established.

Those retired teachers who have been promoted to other public posts remain free members of the Academy, too ; in so far as their other business allows, they are requested to take part in its deliberations as members of the Council of Elders (and they will be invited, no matter what decorations may otherwise have fallen to their lot, to honour with their persons sometimes also our uniform, which every Academician generally wears).

Honourable return to the bosom of this Academy is always open to them, no matter what fate they may have met in their political career, and there an honoured old age free from care is prepared for them ; for the character of an Academician is an *indelible character.*

43.

For the same purpose of assuring counsel and help in every literary difficulty Academicians of yet another kind should be appointed, who have never been ordinary teachers ; I mean those living storehouses of the literary world and those who are great and unique in any rare knowledge, although they have never arrived in their subject at encyclopaedic unity of outlook or at living art and are, therefore, of no use to us as ordinary teachers. We want them only in order that our ordinary teacher may sometimes consult these living books ; he will

himself give the material he obtains from them clearness and correct form for communication to his pupils.

(There died at Jena some years ago a certain B[1]. who boasted that he knew some hundreds of languages and of whom others said, not unjustly, that he was not master of a single one. In spite of this I believe it is desirable for us to have such a person too. For if anyone believed, and there really are such people, that the whole human faculty of speech is fundamentally one, that the many different languages are but further determinations and developments of this one root, developing without any admixture of caprice and according to a definite law of nature, and that this root as well as this law of nature can be discovered, and if one of our Academicians set out to solve this problem, it would not be reasonable on other grounds to expect him to know all the languages in the world. Such a person as B., however, who knew them might be kept near him and at his service, who in turn was incapable of ever thinking of such a problem and using his knowledge for its solution. We must seek therefore to store up among us the historical treasures that exist in every science, not in order to let them lie unused but in order to study them some day in an organising spirit. When we have done this, it will be time to get rid of the worthless residue; until then we will reject or despise nothing.)

When sole possession of a knowledge of oriental languages and of Church history has been taken from theology, it is scarcely to be expected that both will be absorbed, in their ultimate known details, into the encyclopaedic instruction in philology or history in our Academy. We shall scarcely need, therefore, an ordinary teacher of oriental languages or of Church history. There must always be men in our midst, however, who can take anyone, who for any reason needs it, beyond what is encyclopaedic into the ultimate details of these subjects and satisfy his need which is not to be satisfied by the mere book.

Otherwise these remarks are to be understood only as examples. The deliberations of the above-mentioned individuals and committees, who were also to advise concerning this part of our plan, will supply a systematic

1. Büttner (?)

survey of all our needs in this respect, as well as an account of the particular men we shall have to associate with us at the beginning for this purpose.

This kind of Academician, too, has all the rights of such a person and sits on the *Council of Elders.*

44.

Concerning the passage from the body of pupils to that of teachers or active practitioners :

The Regular must prove at the end of his course that its purpose has been achieved, we said above. Now, since the ultimate aim of our institution is not to communicate knowledge but to develop an art, and he who is perfect in an art is called Master, this proof will consist in him becoming a Master.

The masterpiece will most appropriately be a specimen essay on a subject, not of his own choosing, but set by the teacher of his subject and calculated to show *whether the pupil has overcome by the artistic development of himself the greatest difficulty in his individual nature,* which must of course be well known to the teacher. (If he himself chooses, he will choose what he has most facility and pleasure in ; but the triumph of art does not appear in this ; the teacher must set him what is most difficult for his nature, for to do easily what is difficult is the business of the Master.) On this essay and its principles he will be publicly examined until the teacher is fully satisfied.

Two cases are possible. Either the mastership is sought in a particular empirical subject. In this case the teacher of the subject sets the theme ; but the examination falls into two parts, the teacher of the subject, as in the earlier marking of the students' essays, investigating the knowledge and, in the case of a candidate for the mastership, testing particularly whether he has understood completely and in such detail as the oral and book instruction in the Academy enters into ; while the philosophical class extends the examination in all directions and tests the living clearness of this knowledge.

Or the candidate seeks the mastership in philosophy only, in which case theme and examination would appear, at first sight, to fall solely within the province of the

philosophical class and empiricism to have no claims on him. Philosophy, however, has no special material, but is only the means of reducing all the material of science and life to clearness and thought; and he who called himself a great philosopher, but acknowledged that he had not learnt anything else, by means of which, as a connecting link, he could introduce his philosophical spirit into life, and did not understand how to speak his philosophy directly and communicate it to others, would undoubtedly be quite useless to society and no artist but an unprofitable piece of goods. He who confines himself to philosophy must therefore prove at least his ability to communicate it and to become a skilful teacher of it; and no one can be recognised as a master in philosophy who has not proved himself at the same time a *Doctor* of it.

Moreover, it is not sufficient that he should satisfy his class at skill in lecturing; he must also be able to make himself understood to non-philosophers, such as all his pupils will be at first, if he ever does the work of a teacher in earnest. In this respect, therefore, the final judgment is transferred from his own class to the empirical classes as a whole, who may give it through representatives appointed from their midst. Here, too, on the other hand, the philosophical class decides the correctness of the contents which result from the acquisition of the art of following the laws of thought freely in philosophising; the empirical classes decide the skill and clearness in this art which he demonstrates by his exposition. Even if they form no judgment concerning what is set out, the exposition itself must at least satisfy them as masterly. Those, therefore, who think of seeking the mastership in philosophy will have had practice already in the teachers' seminar, because, apart from this, philosophical exposition must remain the most perfect and the model for all other exposition; on this point we must remain quite in earnest in our Academy.

On the other hand the empirical scholar, who thinks perhaps only of applying his knowledge practically, can be Master without being Doctor. If he claims to be the latter, too, and wants to teach in our institution, he must show his skill therein separately and satisfy both the philosophical class and that of his subject.

The Confederates, too, cannot be denied the right of claiming the Mastership. But since the Regulars, who are far better known to the teachers even on all the weak sides of their individual natures or knowledge, would thereby be at a disadvantage, the Confederates should be asked in this case, in order to restore equality, to announce their claim to the teacher of the subject and to the teacher of philosophy at least one session before promotion to the Mastership, and throughout that session to submit to all-round observation by these teachers. If at the end of the session these two teachers cannot honestly say that they know enough about these young men for the purpose, the consideration of their request must be postponed for another session, during which they remain in the same relation to these teachers as in the first session. For this trouble, which does not really come within the sphere of their work, they should pay these teachers a fee, which is forfeited whether or not they are considered worthy of the mastership.

Only by obtaining the Mastership does the Regular prove that he has made proper use of the institution and enter upon his right of first claim to the chief dignities of the State. In this respect the master from among the Confederates who has denied us closer acquaintance with his moral character and earlier moral conduct cannot be made quite equal to him. If no Master from among the Regulars makes a claim, however, we may give the other first chance, since he is a Master of Art, and hope for the best.

On those Regulars who fail for the Mastership, and on Confederates who make no claim thereto, the ordinary degree of *doctor* may be conferred and the empirical classes may decide what must be done for this. An ordinary common doctor is he who is not also a Master, like those already mentioned; and in this case we are not really serious about these two syllables, because he only can really be a doctor who is a master; and the word is used euphemistically for *doctus*, one who has learned something.

The genuine Doctors are called Masters simply and we may omit Doctor; although we might call the latter titular Doctors, in order to make the difference more distinct. The philosophical class has nothing to do with

such promotions; for in it there is only master and doctor combined. It concerns itself with the other classes only when they claim the rank of artist to which doctors of the latter kind do not aspire.

From among these the subordinate offices in the State are filled. (One used to make Masters of Arts, and in modern times, since the title of master has fallen into contempt, people have wanted to have only the title of doctor which was considered more distinguished, because it obviously means far more to be a master than a teacher. *We* have nothing to do with these Masters of Arts, because we do not admit *Arts* and count up to seven of them, but know only one, simply Art, and that an infinite one. Our master is simply *artis magister*, Master of Art, and we may expect that those who are worthy of the name will not be ashamed of it. They should therefore always be addressed as Master, without any addition and without the Mr. which only belittles, and should sign themselves, Master of Art.

We have nothing to fear from the innovation, for other universities, too, make innovations, like Jena, which began to make no more Masters of Arts but only Doctors of Philosophy, or Landshut, which now makes Doctors of Aesthetics.

This *master's degree* does not exist at present, and we cannot have it conferred upon ourselves. Undoubtedly, however, the masterpiece of the teachers who begin the Academy will be delivered when they have trained other artists. Since they may then honestly declare the latter masters, let them declare themselves masters at the same time; they receive the degree because they confer it, and may therefore use it thenceforward.)

45.

In all the essays mentioned, as well as in those for the mastership and in the examinations connected therewith, the *German* language, not Latin, is used. This is the real reason, which has never yet been clearly expressed, although the controversy has been stirred up so often.

Living art can be practised and proved only in a language which does not already of itself restrict the sphere,

but in which one may be *new* and creative; a living language and one with which, as our mother tongue, our own life is interwoven. When the Scholastics wanted to move in the Latin language with free and original thought they had to enlarge its boundaries, whereby it no longer remained the same language, and their Latin was really not Latin but one of the several neo-Latin languages that originated in the Middle Ages.

For this free activity we have our splendid German language; Latin we study expressly as the final result of language formation in an extinct people, and we must therefore leave it in this final form.

The philologist, just because he does his work in this firmly closed sphere, may use Latin and, as is very desirable, Greek too, in interpreting the classics; and pupils in our institution should be expected to have acquired the ability to speak and converse in Latin by the time they leave the lower school. Should it be necessary, e.g., when a school post is sought, for a candidate for the mastership to show that he has retained and still further developed this ability, he should do so, but only on matters that belong to that historically closed period. But where original creative thought is to be shown, the diction already formed will at one moment think for us and at another restrict our thought; let the dead language, therefore, remain far from us in this work.

46.

We pass on to the Board of domestic management in our institution. First of all it is clear that for this work an administrative body, organised into a *firm unity*, must be appointed, whose chief members at least belong to the Academy, say as retired teachers, because it is only from them that the necessary love can be expected; the rest are responsible to these and to the whole Academy. To prevent for ever the results of variations in the value of money, the income of the institution should be fixed, not in gold but in natural products, so that, e.g., the institution has to draw at a definite time from a particular payer so many bushels of corn. These are to be delivered, however, not in kind but in cash; not according to some price

fixed for ever, but in accordance with the price which this corn would actually command in the market at the time of payment. Similarly the institution has to pay its salaried officials so many bushels of corn at definite times.

47.

The two chief sources of income, on which we should have to depend at first, would be the income from the Academy's Calendar-stamp, and the income of the closed University of Halle, in so far as this is left to us; to which would be added the proceeds from the *cashier's offices* in the Corps of Regulars and later other subsidiary sources, to be mentioned afterwards. The nation must be closely connected with this matter and our institution exist very definitely as a national institution, not only because the nation pays but for far greater reasons.

We shall achieve this in the following way. Since the Corps of Regulars is the really important part of our institution, for the sake of which everything else exists, vacancies in the Corps are distributed among the districts and towns of the kingdom[1] according to the scale on which each contributes, compulsorily or voluntarily. *Vacancies,* not in the sense that only he who is a native of the district or town may have the vacancy, but such that everyone who deserves and desires one gets it without delay; and such that between the holder of the vacancy and the district or town to which it belongs a relationship grows up as between client and patron. The former, therefore, believes that, just as his native place helped him to get his natural life, this district or this town has helped him to get higher scientific life; in the successes of its *alumnus* the latter takes that share of the glory which Greek towns took from victors in the Olympic games who belonged to them; finally, the former, no matter how high he rises, is ready for the rest of his life to do grateful service in return at every opportunity and the client becomes a patron. Apart from various delicate moral relations that arise therefrom, interest and respect for science will spread throughout the nation as a characteristic

1. As e.g., is the arrangement with the vacancies in the territorial schools of Saxony; with the modifications to be described later.

that honourably distinguishes it, and which in turn may become the origin of great events. Moreover, they are not vacancies in the sense that their number is ever limited ; rather must everyone be admitted who is worthy and desires it ; but they are vacancies in the sense that those which exist and are filled are distributed among the districts, etc., according to that definite scale. Admission to the Regulars is not to be denied the *German* foreigner too (he who belongs to some other nation is not qualified for social life with us because he lacks our language), if he is worthy, especially if on admission he accepts the obligation which carries with it full citizen's rights (para. 40). In accordance with the principle, however, that only the representative of the unity of the State may deal with foreign countries, the king alone may grant this permission ; all places given to foreigners are therefore *royal*, not *territorial* vacancies. But the king should be begged not lightly and without very strong reasons to deny this permission to those who are proposed by the teaching body ; because, to say nothing of other considerations, the Prussian nation thereby proves openly its recognition of universal German brotherhood, which may also lead to important results in the future.

48.

The vacancies should be distributed according to the scale on which each part of the country contributes, I said. Regardless, therefore, of whether the administration is thereby simplified or not, because far higher things are to be considered (the actual participation of the nation in this matter and its results), the usual Calendar-rent should be entirely abolished ; on the other hand the districts and towns should tax themselves as many bushels of corn as they want to pay for this stamp, which they afterwards collect again by distributing the calendars themselves. There must be reserved to them the right of increasing or diminishing the stamp-duty according to the rise or fall in the price of corn. According to the amount of their contribution to the whole is determined their share in the right to vacancies. In case another stamp-tax already introduced is not thereby abolished—on this

point the author cannot get any information in his present position—this revenue might be increased in the following way: throughout every part of the kingdom the same weights and measures should be introduced, a reform which has been very urgent for a long time. The fixing of this, and of the means for maintaining it unchanged, is a business that belongs naturally to an Academy of Science. Agreement with this standard of weight and measure should be attested by a stamp on all weights and measures, the revenue from which would benefit the institution and be collected in the same way.

Similarly the former capital of the University of Halle would be fixed in terms of natural products and reckoned as the share in the right to fill vacancies of those who have to pay it.

49.

Since the Regulars who are educated by us must have first claim on the chief positions in the State, other Universities, if any but ours are to exist in the kingdom, must either become Academies and for this purpose form a body of Regulars in their midst, or be regarded as mere dependencies, in which not even a better nucleus works, and their pupils be inferior to ours both in merits and in rights. It is to be feared that they will not have much success with the former alternative, because we who, apart from this, cannot reckon at first on completeness even for our own needs, will certainly leave them nothing at home or abroad that is fit for an Academy. Even their best efforts, therefore, would only bring them into second place and that a very unfavourable one. The mention of this may perhaps be the occasion for opening people's eyes to a deeper truth which has hitherto been misunderstood in various ways.

The attempt to have school and university very near home, and to continue to grow up stupid in the district in which one has grown up stupid and senseless and to spend one's life there, is first and foremost in our opinion degrading to man. He ought once for all to be removed from all the leading strings with which the family, neighbourhood and country constantly hold and support him, and commence a new life in a circle of strangers with

whom he has no more weight than he is personally worth; and this right of commencing life once again independently should be infringed in no single case. Secondly, that attempt conflicts with the character of the scientific man, who needs a free outlook transcending place and time, but whom binding to the soil, which at best is pardonable in the manufacturing citizen, dishonours. Finally, the organic growth of all to one and the same citizenship is thereby hindered, and the result is simply the separation of single provinces and towns from the great whole of the State; the East Prussian, e.g., confronts the Brandenberger, the Thuringian, the Misnian, as wanting to mean something in themselves, and we must not be surprised that the Bavarian, e.g., face to face with the Prussian, does not remember their common nationality; for even the East Prussian sometimes forgets the common Prussia. No one who has grown up under such limitations has ever become a clever man or a far-seeing statesman. If this attempt were once recognised in its true nature and so comprehended as not to be treated with consideration but rejected without compassion, there would be no further reason for the existence of several Universities in the same State. It would be clear that the expression "provincial University" contains a contradiction, because the University removes the particular, and that a State should by right have but one University. If those citizens of the united State, who are not destined to get their living from the immovable clod, must once for all be mixed together for mutual stimulation, the University is the only suitable place for the purpose. Thence they may be scattered again in all directions, each to the place into which he fits, not where he was born, so that in this nobler class at least a generation of men arises who are nothing but citizens and who are at home in every part of the State.

According to these principles the other universities in the Prussian kingdom must cease and their funds be transferred to our institution. The teachers who cannot be transferred to the new institution should continue to draw their salaries or be provided for elsewhere according to their usefulness. (Some of them we should have to use as members of the Council of Elders, of the kind described

in para. 42.) These transferred funds should be distributed among the provinces to which the closed universities belong, as their shares in the right to vacancies and by way of compensation for their lost privilege of supplying internally scholars for home use. It is to be hoped that when they are properly acquainted with our plan they will accept this change willingly.

(As objections to this I may mention first of all one which would hardly be considered possible if it had not actually been made, *that of the long journey.* The very possibility of supposing young men who shun the discomfort of transport, like trees, or fear the dangers of a journey, e.g., from Königsberg to Berlin, proves how necessary it is to strengthen the courage of many members of the nation a little in this matter. On the other hand, if the expense of ordinary travel and food on this short journey frightens them so much, we might give the provinces that think themselves entitled to it a grant for travelling allowances from our funds, out of which they might pay this small expenditure for those who are too poor.

Then some people think that in such a University there might some day be a particular interesting tone and spirit which, by closing the University, we should kill quite innocently many years before its birth, and they fear that we may injure the development of splendid originality within these narrow limits. It is sufficient to answer that, when science exists, there are no longer legions of spirits, each of which has its own existence, but only one, which is to be clearly grasped in its unity, and for whose eternal all-round stimulation excellent provision is made in our institution by the very frequent renewal of the teaching staff and by the noble rivalry that is openly carried on amongst them all. We may say too that this so-called originality within local limits is not originality but rather *caricature,* which it is another aim of our institution to banish for ever, together with the bad taste that delights therein. When these objections have been removed there remains nothing but the dim feeling of striving to let nothing be lost, because all kinds of prosperity, unknown to us of course, may develop therefrom by some magic power ; with this feeling, which is something that cannot

be reduced to definite conceptions, we cannot deal in the sphere of definite conceptions.)

50.

The posts of the canons in the cathedral chapters were originally created for instruction and the income might properly be restored for this original purpose. In the same way the struggle against the unbelievers, for which purpose the Knights of St. John of Malta were founded, no longer exists; there is however the spiritual war against ignorance, folly and all their sad consequences, and this property might also be devoted to this purpose. This income would be distributed among the contributors as a right to vacancies in the same way as the revenue mentioned earlier.

I do not say that our own institution is to absorb these undoubtedly very large resources. The institution must adopt this principle of administration, that everything it needs for the achievement of its purposes is assured, but that it desires nothing it does not need; it can adopt no other principle without burdening itself with superfluous luggage and baggage. Provision will be made for the lower school, which is to be reformed at the same time, to receive its share; again, if any serious reform of popular education is ever to be made, the means necessary for the support of this purpose must also exist. We shall say only that the present time of difficulty should be used to seize this property that has been applied to other purposes, for the greater purpose of the whole educational system, and that the Academy, among others, must be free to use it, if ever its other sources are not found sufficient. Even if at first, or at any other time, the State should need this revenue for its own purposes, of which later, it would always look better if the State first seized the revenue for this immediately obvious national purpose of national education.

51.

Just as in regard to the regular vacancies the principle is that any individual who is qualified for one and desires it must have it, so in regard to *payment* the principle is that

he who can must pay, but that he who cannot pay should undoubtedly receive the vacancy free, *in proportion to his inability to pay*. It is achievement in other directions, not payment, that qualifies : the person who pays twice or thrice the amount, therefore, must nevertheless seek a vacancy as a free favour, from the king if he is a foreigner, from a district if he is a native, in order that he may know that there is something in our institution which is not to be had for money. No weight is to be assigned to the possible economic consideration that those who pay should be treated more gently in the tests of merit. Similarly, what excludes is mental inability, not inability to pay.

The payment to be made is to be reckoned on the average (best of all according to bushels of corn) by the necessaries already mentioned which are to be given to the pupil in kind, by the fees to teachers for instruction and examination for the mastership, by the use of public stores of literature, etc. The parents or guardians of the paying pupil have to pay the Board of Management caution money for the period for which he is admitted to the Institution, because he could not be expelled on account of subsequent non-payment, and yet the administration counts on him as a payer. A form for this guarantee will easily be discovered. All the things that are taken into account will be estimated according to what the pupil would pay if he had a private household, not according to what the administration pays, for it buys everything in bulk. Since this big household exists as a State institution without interference from individuals it is quite cheap, and consequently a considerable sum can be obtained to pay for free vacancies.

It is to be hoped that our rich families, whose splendour will otherwise be extinguished by the establishment of such institutions in their neighbourhood, will diligently seek admission to our Regulars and that our nobles especially will joyfully seize this opportunity of showing that it was not merely lack of competition that kept them in their previous position but that they can also maintain it in free competition with the citizen class. It might be fixed that Counts are to make double payment, as has been done hitherto in the case of college fees ; other nobles should pay an extra fee of one-half.

Free places need not be *entirely* free, because a family which cannot bear all the expenses may perhaps bear part. There may therefore be places that are quarter-, half-, three-quarters free, according to the amount of the family means.

Those, however, who are entirely without means should have absolutely free places ; and an arrangement should be made whereby, when they leave the college of Regulars for any reason whatever, they are looked after for a time and until they obtain a post.

The decision concerning such partial or complete exemptions from payment is a matter for the Board of Management of the institution, to whom for this purpose the parents or guardians of the pupil have to give satisfactory information concerning his financial circumstances. Such information must be exact, because in this matter the national sense of honour itself must be roused ; just as poverty is no disgrace, so pretended poverty and the greed which seeks to take away the proceeds of charitable foundations from those who are really poor should become a great disgrace. On the other hand the debt of those who are really poor is to be remitted in a charitable and friendly way ; it is clear, therefore, that these administrators must be honestly interested in the progress of science and must be men who genuinely love gifted youths, even if they are poor ; they must themselves be *Academicians* and, where possible, *retired teachers*.

No one except the parents or guardians and administrators mentioned need know which of the pupils has his place wholly or partially free ; they are the parties who have completed the agreement and they must be pledged to absolute silence. For, although poverty must henceforth be no disgrace, yet until this is universally recognized the paying pupil must be spared the temptation of assuming superiority over the non-paying pupil whom he knows to be alongside him. All should be placed on such equality that the little pocket-money which is perhaps necessary for the sake of decency is not given by the administration more abundantly to the richest than to the absolutely free poor. Even the pupil who is maintained free need never know it ; although we claim for the existence of the institution the gratitude of all, whether

payers or not, we want no special thanks because every talent, even without any equivalent in money, finds development with us ; for we recognise this as a duty as well as the country's own interest. The places to be allotted to the districts are therefore not boarding or free places but just places. Any place may be also a free place ; the district does not know if this is so, but takes an impartial interest in the scientific progress of its client, without knowing on what particular economic conditions he is its client.

52.

Since the deficit in the budget of the Regular's college which results from granting these exemptions must be met out of the total resources described above, while this deficit may be very variable and changeable according to whether better talent proceeds from the rich or poor classes of the nation, it is clear that nothing is fixed in this important part of the expenditure, that great resources must be at the disposal of the administration, that it has no interest in wasting these unnecessarily, that therefore it will faithfully return any possible savings to the government, which may examine the genuineness of the results of the administration through an official who should also be pledged to silence ; and finally that this whole part of the administration should remain to the rest of the public a secret which does not concern it and which it cannot understand. The first and important thing is that it is really the teaching staff which confers the privilege of being a Regular according to the essays handed in or the proficiency acquired in the lower school, without any regard or attention to financial circumstances. They may not be restricted in conferring this privilege, because we have established the principle that no excellent talent is to be excluded. A second unimportant question which the Board of Management has to deal with is how to treat, from the domestic point of view, him who has thus been appointed a Regular irrevocably. A sense of justice and regard for the national sense of honour forbids it to favour exemption unnecessarily, while the nature of the whole arrangement forbids it to deny necessity that has been proved ; it cannot, therefore, be limited in any way.

Just as little fixed is anything in the second main part of the expenditure, the payment of the teachers and other Academicians, the maintenance or provision of literary treasures and other arrangements made to promote the progress of science. For although a maximum salary can be fixed for one individual, nothing can be fixed about the number to be paid, of such very different kinds and classes ; this, like the other causes of expenditure mentioned, depends upon the condition of science at the time and, like it, is variable. In judging these things the members of the institution can recognise as the highest law only the welfare of science and of their institution ; they are those whose thorough understanding of this welfare and warm love for it can be relied on best. The consideration of this welfare also forbids them to spare unnecessary extravagance in all the departments mentioned and harmful and unworthy desire. For this part then the same result follows that we established above for the first part ; the same therefore applies to the whole.

53.

In regard to the system of payment there should be fixed (1) a salary which is paid the Academician, as such, and which may on no account be taken from him who has full citizen's rights. Since no one will easily be only an Academician this salary is to be regarded merely as a contribution, not as the means for paying all the man's suitable maintenance. (2) The member of the Council of Elders has either some other public office or one of the numerous administrative or overseer's posts, which result from the nature of our institution, for which he is specially paid ; he should also be indemnified by occasional payments for his services to us in the form of occasional lectures or other activities. If he is preparing a scholarly work, the Board of Management may grant him help or advances for this purpose. (3) The acting teacher will be specially paid according to the work he does in lectures and other exercises and examinations. The Confederates pay a fixed fee *in advance* for all these things, so far as they wish to participate therein. Thereby the industry and regularity of such a Confederate, who wants in turn to

hear his money's worth, will be very considerably encouraged ; and we may willingly give him this kind of encouragement. The Regular is free in this respect and the salary of the teacher is regarded as the contribution paid for him by the administration, and charged in the case of paying places. This fee paid by the Confederates, however, is not to be taken into account in fixing the teacher's salary, which is to be fixed as if he had to live on it together with his salary as an Academician ; this will keep him quite independent of the approval of these Confederates.

The extraordinary professors have to receive the same fee from the Confederates.

It is really the Academy itself which, as an unlimited Board of Management (para. 52), pays itself. Just as the other classes must not demand that this class should be beneath them in suitability of income, so this unavoidable relationship will impose on this class the duty of appearing before the nation as noble and moderate, not as insatiable and greedy men ; and this disposition must be inculcated in them in every way.

54.

For the first session it may be worth while to grant the encyclopaedic teachers and the other assistant teachers who are considered necessary a special payment for the work of this first session and to reserve further consideration for subsequent sessions if, as will generally happen, they have already, as Academicians, etc., a fixed permanent salary. One reason among others will be to see how things go and whether something else that would do better is not discovered meanwhile. In fixing this remuneration, when the man is not already adequately paid from another source, and we have the claim on all his powers, a reasonable standard is what might have been obtained by writing during this time. For although the reading aloud, which has sometimes been customary, of a book prepared many years before is very convenient and requires scarcely any power but that of the lungs, to do the work of a teacher as we have demanded, which among other things renders useless the greater part of the old books, should occupy all the power and time of the teacher. He who knows these

relations knows that for an author who is not unskilful lecturing in the usual circumstances is a sacrifice in the economic sense, which the good man is willing to make but which the good man does not demand unnecessarily.

55.

For the first session a public lecture room might be given to the University by the State. The students obtain *vouchers* (admission cards) in exchange for their fee from the Justiciary of the University, who is to be appointed at the very beginning because of the Inscriptions. According to these cards places are assigned to them in the room by an *ordinary servant*, who is likewise to be appointed, in a manner which has been customary at Jena since 1790 and which is well known to the writer. In the first year we have no Regulars (we may have Novices, but these are always, however, to be regarded as only Confederates), for the future Regulars, to whom perhaps in future free places will be given, remain as yet undiscovered among the general crowd of Confederates. The justiciary, therefore, in accordance with some stated principle, may also give these vouchers free and settle the matter afterwards with the teacher who lectures. Similarly a scheme should be drawn up for helping poor students with allowances, free board, etc., during this first session. The introduction, however, of the usual examinations for exhibitioners, scholars, etc., which pick out the poor student and make him conspicuous, is to be avoided even in the first year as contrary to our first principles in this matter. Later, however, the principle may be accepted that *for those who cannot or do not want to become Regulars* (in the latter case those who are to some extent maintained free must be at least *Novices*, and this point can be treated among the Novitiate in the way proposed already (para. 51) for the Regular college) *study is a pure luxury, which must be paid for, if it is permitted at all, out of private means, not at the expense of the State*, because the skill in craftsmanship necessary for subordinate occupations can be learnt far more surely and better outside the University. On the other hand, of course, if people insist on applying in the usual way the

charitable bequests made by former generations who did not see things so clearly, we can have nothing against such beneficiaries being made conspicuous in every way among the mere Confederates and a metal number being fixed to their sleeves so that the act of charity is really obvious. Only we must not treat thus anyone who may some day become a young man of honour and a Regular.

56.

The Academy of Science, scientific Academy and University which has thus grown into an organic whole must have an annual festival, at which it appears to the rest of the public in all completeness. The ceremony which naturally takes place at this festival is the account it gives of its actions during the whole year; and representatives of the nation should be present, chosen from those who are entitled to places, and representatives of the king, the two authorities to whom account has to be given. For this festival the birthday of Frederick William III, whose foundation this body will be if ever it comes into existence, should be fixed irrevocably and for ever.

57. Corollary.

The particular proposals in this scheme are not unheard-of innovations. As is to be expected in a matter which has been dealt with for so many centuries in so many countries, they have actually existed separately in one place or another and their good results, which far exceed what is usual, can be demonstrated now in various arrangements of the Universities of Tübingen. Oxford and Cambridge, and of the territorial schools (Fürstenschulen) of Saxony. The present scheme can claim originality only in that it has obtained a clear conception of the real purpose of all these separate arrangements, has deduced them again completely from this conception and has thus woven them into an organic whole; and if this is so, it deserves no blame.

The main objection it has to fear is that of impracticability. In considering this we must not ask the class that has already been sufficiently described from all sides and

which, moreover, is honourable and has been warmly honoured by us, because, even if it were alone in the world, it would maintain its assertion of absolutely impracticability. We ourselves admit that at first the realisation will be very incomplete, but we believe that we may certainly reckon that if only a beginning is made progress will become ever better. Even if we have to fear that a proper beginning will not be made, however, we must not fail to make the attempt; because at the very worst we shall have nothing poorer than a university of the traditional German kind.

The following are the general characteristics of thoroughness in a scheme, which is not content to be merely a beautiful dream, but demands actual and immediate realisation. In the first place it does not let the actual world alone and want to go its own way, but takes it into account throughout, assuming, however, that the world shall become different and not remain as it is, that in the process the world shall accommodate itself to it, not it to the world, and that according to the extent of the relationship it influences the other relations of life too and is in turn supported and raised by them. Finally, once started, it does not continually need new stimuli from its master but continues of itself and shapes itself to greater perfection, according to need. If the question of its applicability is to be decided, therefore, this plan should be examined in the light of these characteristics.

Third Chapter.

Of the means whereby our scientific Academy shall obtain influence over a scientific universe.

58.

The scientific life which has once started in our Academy is not just to be *repeated* in each future generation as it was before; much less is it to grope round in uncertainty and so be exposed to relapses for the worse; but it is to progress to greater perfection with sure

consciousness and in accordance with some rule. That this may be possible, the Academy must set down somewhere distinctly and intelligibly the degree of perfection that has been attained at a certain time ; the fresh new life begins its development at this stage of perfection. A *book* will be the best means of preserving this progress.

59.

But the real life of scientific art, which consists in immediate practice, advances from every successful development to a new one ; and each of these developments, as the firm foundation of the subsequent new one, is to be set down in the book. It follows, therefore, that the book itself should be a progressive, *periodical* work. They are *annual chronicles* of the progress of scientific art in the Academy. When progress has been made, these chronicles record it definitely for the next and all succeeding generations ; if scientific art were not infinite, they would found, when it had ended, a *History* of this perfected art.

60.

Art develops in two ways ; on the one hand, like all life, it remains living and never stiffens or petrifies ; on the other hand, this *continuous* life *progresses* to higher power and development. The latter again occurs in two ways ; first of all in itself and intensively, in *degree ;* secondly externally and extensively, in that it absorbs more and more of the material appropriate to it and, by permeating it, organises it with itself, i.e., in extent. Scientific material is dead, so long as it exists separately and without any visible connection with a totality of knowledge, and is left simply to the memory, in the hope of future use. It is alive and organised when it is connected with something else and becomes an indispensable part of some greater whole that is discovered. If this whole, which is already discovered and exists in the annual chronicles, is clearly conceived (clearness, however, is something that must be raised to the infinite) so that the parts combine still more closely and grow together, art has gained intensively. If the existing conception

of unity goes further and embraces an element that has hitherto remained separate, art gains extensively. Both kinds of progress support each other and prepare the way for each other. The *enlargement* of the conception makes its *clarification* easier, its *clarification* facilitates its *enlargement.*

These are the facts, however, concerning the above-mentioned periodical *stimulation* of scientific life, which in itself is not progress, either intensive or extensive. Independent, in respect of material, of the deliberate and artistic development, and the more so the higher the degree of that development, the mental life of the human race advances of itself, as if in accordance with some unknown natural law. Language is concentrated, fancy is raised, the swiftness of the power of comprehension increases, taste becomes more delicate; and so in a later generation forms *die,* which were the true expression of the life of an earlier one. Consequently, that to which no higher inner perfection can be given, must often be taken out of its dead external form and put into that of the present generation. (We make our thoughts clearer by the following examples:—Philosophy itself, as the purest, most immaterial form, which is also treated in oral discourse as a pure means of developing the art of philosophising, nevertheless aims, in regard to the steady progress of science, at *a book* which sets down the achievements of the correct application of the laws of thought as a fixed and permanent result. Now in the first place—this is not directly what we want to say, but a preliminary thereto—if such a book existed, every individual who wanted to be a philosopher, using perhaps that book as a guide, would nevertheless always have to apply the laws of thought *himself* and in his own *person* and the book could in no way free him from that work. On the other hand, he would have this advantage therefrom; if his thought led him to a result other than was contained in the book, he would either be able to prove distinctly and definitely what mistake in the application of the laws of thought had been made in the book, which had produced this result different from his own; or he would know for certain that, so long as he could not do so, he was not clear in his own thought; he would have to assume that

his result might be just as wrong as that in the book and would have no right to set down in general literature his conclusion, which may possibly be wrong, in place of another, which of course may also be wrong. At most he might keep this conclusion of his, definitely as not sufficiently established, for further investigation by some clearer thinker in the future. This then would be the result of the existing book for science ; in the first case, sure expansion ; in the second, preservation from blind groping and that conceit which wants its unproved assertions to be worth more than other assertions perhaps proved, because it is incapable of grasping the proof. At present we speak mainly of the former, not of the latter. Even if the philosophical book preserved were so constituted that it could not be improved either in contents or in degree of clearness, it would always need to be *refreshed* by the new life of the time.)

61.

What has been described so far would be the *art-book* of the Academy. Now this art shows itself, and its life develops, in the organisation of some material. In so far as this material is already actually organised, it is absorbed into the art and into its book and there is no need of a special book for it ; but in so far as it is not yet understood and therefore contains a further task for the Academy, this task must be set down somewhere in definite form, and the Academy needs a *Material-book* in addition to its art-book. Now part of this is already in the existing literature and this the Academy must *know*. The arrangements necessary for this have already been mentioned in the previous chapter, and progress in this knowledge can be conceived only as the completion of such knowledge of the existing literature, the better arrangement of its general index and the making it more useful for an easier survey of the whole, an aim towards which our Academy is always to be directed. The large material-book which already exists in this way shall itself develop ; in the first place, because its external form is refreshed and renewed, secondly because its content is partly corrected and purged of mistakes and

partly continually expanded and enlarged. This expansion takes place through fresh discoveries in the field of History and Natural science; when they first appear, these discoveries may not of course be fit for absorption into the unity but must nevertheless be preserved until several are added thereto. By these fresh discoveries the circle of the material-book is once more extended, whilst its core is ever more restricted and absorbed by the Art-book.

This development, both of the material-book and of the art-book, can take place either *with us* or *with others*: in the latter case we have to absorb the results into our Academy and our book, in order that the whole book of the human race and its scientific progress may maintain its unity.

To the development of this scientific book belong also those endeavours to improve it which are as yet only attempts and have not become so established that they can be set down in a book. We must also make arrangements to get to know these attempts if they are made by others, and not to withdraw from the observation of others if we make them ourselves.

62.

In order to make ourselves fully understood concerning the progress of the scientific art, which is to be set down in the art-book, we state our thoughts in an example.

Suppose man were destined to see that universal history is not something casual that can be dispensed with, but has to answer a definite question, that forces itself on the human race, according to definite question-heads that are likewise already in the human mind, such as these: how our race has gradually risen to a human mode of life, to lawfulness, to wisdom, to religion and whatever else the development to true manhood may consist in,—now partially, then falling back to assimilate other, hitherto neglected modes of training. Suppose also that some definite and unchangeable answers to these questions had been obtained. Then man would also see that the periods hitherto marked off according to the rise or fall of great kingdoms, according to battles and treaties of peace, lists of regents, etc., were but

provisional aids, intended for a mode of thought which is affected only by shock to the external sense, in order for the time being to hold the field for that better result. Only with those periods which conform more closely to the interest of human curiosity would one connect history, which would carry along with it of course those other less significant periods too, in order that the picture might reflect fully the actual texture of life. For instance, we should no longer say: the plough was invented in the reign of so and so, but the other way round: when the plough was invented, so and so ruled, whose life perhaps influenced the further adventures of the plough, with the subsequent history of which alone we are concerned here. Thereby the art of history would undoubtedly have developed; because henceforth we should know exactly what we had to ask and what we had to attend to in it; it would be clearly understood.

This would also change the whole treatment of history in our Academy. Previously its special task has been to *discover* this clear conception and the fixed data which a survey of the events by its guidance gives; and the combined work of our Academy has consisted in that discovery. Now it exists; it is set down in the book, which our pupil himself may read. Hitherto he had to read a book divided according to other periods; even now he cannot be altogether exempted from this, but he will remember it more easily than his predecessor, for he has a guide of greater power. The art which is to be carried on in our Academy receives another task in regard to history; undoubtedly that of studying these data still further and combining them, and so clearly understanding more of the material of facts that so far have not been understood.

It is the same in all other subjects. Art digs ever deeper into hitherto invisible worlds; it sets down in the art-book the spoil it has won in the shaft now opened, as the starting point and instrument of its further treatment.

In our annual chronicles of the progress of art in our Academy, therefore, should be set down (1), as the chief parts and as epoch-making, the encyclopaedic views of each of our teachers on his subject; briefly, of course,

and in general terms. If, and this also is to be expected, this clear and permanent account must not be demanded of him while he is doing his teaching work, he cannot very well be excused on his retirement and must take this into account during his practice.

(2) Since our pupils are also to read books, and we do not intend to tell them anything that is already equally well put in a book, the teacher's encyclopaedic account must also contain a statement of the reading he prescribes. Such reading may at first be of books that already exist and in this case it will be sufficient to quote these.

Later, however, we must have reading books printed specially for our pupils (a *collection of writings* in every single subject, like the *corpus juris*, which has hitherto been the only one) partly in order to improve the possibly obsolete external form, partly, and mainly, because of the entire change in the starting-point of the art to be actually *carried on* by us, due to its development. We shall have to remember that the improvement cannot depend on the estimate of one individual, but several must recognize the fitness of an individual for this purpose ; because the living spirit of the age does not express itself wholly in anyone and many a man is tempted to regard his own spirit as it. In regard to the change of starting-point, just as in teaching we have the principle, not to say what is already printed, so in writing we have the principle, not to print a second time what has been printed once. If the need for these special reading books should ever arise, we shall not lack means to supply it ; and we may very well demand specimens from those who wish to become master or doctor with us.

Every subsequent encyclopaedic account must excel the preceding one either *formally* in clearness and ease, or *materially* in wide comprehension of the material ; otherwise it should not be accepted, and this would be a proof that the art now stagnates with us. In them we should have a *continuous and closely connected succession* of advances in science, which might serve posterity in turn as the means to much greater advances ; for posterity might survey a considerable part of it and perhaps discover the *law* of this progress. In the *reading book*, which advances with that progress and in accordance with its

law and which must not be included in the annual chronicles but may exist independently, we should have an external proof and an interpretation of the annual chronicles.

As on the one hand the reading book developed owing to the raising of the point of view, on the other it would diminish owing to the rejection of material sufficiently treated. We make this clear by means of the same example of History. Suppose that, owing to the standpoint indicated for History being understood, we give up also the aim of learning *Psychology* or *political science* in History—aims which we might easily consider as misrepresentations for avoiding the difficulty of stating clearly, when confronted by the philosopher, an aim for its study—because we understand that we may attain these aims much more cheaply by means of philosophy, but that the *art* of government, which is quite different from the *science* of government conceived by means of philosophising, is an easy and automatic addition to the correct study of history. If we give up these aims, we shall be happy to be spared the trouble of a number of investigations which help only the psychological or political aim. (So long as it is a question of investigating the style of beard of a certain Kaiser in order to decide the genuineness of a certain document, the investigation must be pursued thoroughly in every direction. But if the genuineness or spuriousness of the document has been established decisively for all time as a result of the completion of that investigation, the beard may be abandoned for ever; all the more so, if we are ourselves no longer interested in the genuineness or spuriousness of the document because what is to be decided thereby has meanwhile been decided elsewhere. Of course for this purpose we must agree that in all subjects there is certainty and a definite incontestable mode of proof and must not suppose the perfectibility of the human race to consist in blind groping and in the movement of each generation within the same circle.)

When, therefore, we have no other means of deciding the value of a particular opinion, except that it was the opinion of a certain old philosopher, and still doubt whether the opinion was not rather the result of his

state of health than of his speculation, the question whether he was depressed or not is of course most important. If, however, we can settle the disputed value in some other way, we may leave the philosopher and his state of health quietly alone.

63.

In addition to this first and important part of the annual chronicles, the encyclopaedic accounts of the teachers, there is another part which belongs essentially to the first, the essays of the pupils. For there is to be shown not only the art of the whole school in the treatment of scientific material, but also the special art of the teachers in making artists out of the material supplied to them in the form of pupils, and also, if possible, the progress of this art. Concerning their methods of teaching their encyclopaedic account will give the necessary information, without any explicit announcement. Concerning many other means that cannot be properly described in words they may be silent and just practise them; but their *work*, the artist who proceeds from their hands, they may show.

At first of course, and in the first years, we shall have nothing of this kind to show; but the annual chronicles must nevertheless set themselves a more definite beginning, because otherwise the matter may never proceed further than the promise. This beginning might be at the commencement of the second session and it should comprise: (1) the encyclopaedic views of the teachers appointed in each subject, who will undoubtedly have made written plans when preparing those lectures which are for the most part new to them, and have improved them during the oral discourse and the exercises undertaken with the pupils. (2) The specimen essays of the students which have been approved and whose authors have been given permission to apply to become Regulars. If the latter should prove too lengthy, only the most successful might be chosen from the successful and the others mentioned only in general terms with appropriate praise.

(At the same time the second point would be the

indispensable public account of the teachers who first fill up the ranks of the Regulars that they act in this matter according to fixed principles and not arbitrarily ; likewise instructions to students and their parents concerning *the least* that will be demanded of them when they claim later to become Regulars. The least ; for it might happen that the first time, in order to establish a corps of Regulars that is not too weak in numbers, the procedure would have to be according to principles rather less strict than subsequently.)

Of these parts, teachers' supplements to their encyclopaedic views and specimen essays of new candidates for the Regularship, the annual chronicles would consist also at the beginning of the third, fourth, etc., sessions, until we could communicate the essays of those who had received the Mastership from us, and so leave unpublished the essays of the pupils. It is with this that the teacher's proper account of his teaching art first commences.

Here begins also the proper account of the whole Academy concerning the development of teaching ability and of the training of artists in it. If the essays of the future masters, apart from the elevation of the conception itself (for which see the *preceding* paragraph) become in *Form* clearer, more skilful, freer, easier, than those of earlier masters, the art is advancing ; the opposite of this would be a proof that it was failing in this respect at least, and the whole Academy would have to assemble and make arrangements lest the common weal should suffer harm.

In the other exercises to be undertaken with the pupils, but more especially in these annual chronicles, a teacher and others also can see already whether some other teaching genius, more youthful and more skilled, is growing up alongside him ; and he has then to retire without delay and leave his chair to the newcomer. He remains ever the real father of this study and the permanent adviser and monitor in it.

The conception, here sketched, of such annual chronicles would be prefaced to their first part with such clearness as to satisfy the general public, and in this introduction we should pledge ourselves and our posterity for ever, before the world and future generations, to all the principles there set down.

64.

The development of the material-book by means of us proceeds of course as elsewhere. There are only these points to note. In the first place, it is not to be expected of any of our Academicians that, in order to make his existence known or to obtain an honorarium from some ill-informed bookseller, he will write what is written, and make an eleventh book by collecting from ten others. If one of them were to do these things, the whole Academy would have to save the common honour and ward off from itself the disgrace of the individual. Secondly, enlargements of the material-book by our Academicians must be directed above all towards the immediate needs of our Academy and be intended to meet these needs ; and works of this kind should be given the preference over others. In case of such need we might also invite foreigners to help by offering a *prize* : the Academician himself is too great for the prize ; besides, to supply the need of the Family, if he can, is his duty as well as his pleasure, and those who belong to the Council of Elders are really appointed for this business in regard to literature, too.

We must absorb into our scheme as an essential element, however, part of the developing material-book and organise its regular pursuit. I mean setting down the new discoveries for history and natural science made in our Academy, to the latter of which belongs also any discovery in the practice of medicine which promises scientific information concerning nature. Although we intend to exclude altogether from us the practice of medicine, we must have for this latter purpose therefore one man or several among our Academicians. It is our duty as well as our privilege, as soon as these discoveries have become valid enough to be written about definitely, not to keep them within our community but to make them known to the public outside who are to help us treat this new material. *Annual chronicles of the scientific discoveries in our Academy* must therefore be planned. Whether the material will prove so abundant as to need an independent periodical or whether these annual chronicles shall be combined with the work that is to be mentioned later,

the Academy's library, may be decided when it comes to actual realization. So much is clear, that we can publish no volume in continuation of these annual chronicles if we have discovered nothing new meanwhile, and that they cannot therefore have definite times for their appearance.

65.

Another chief object of our Academy's consideration is the use of material- and art-books other than our own and developing elsewhere; and the making of these useful to those of our Academicians who because of other occupations have no time to read purely at random (the practising teachers and students), by those of us who have time (the Council of Elders).

For this it is necessary in the first place that one should know this progress historically, i.e., the works that have just appeared. For this purpose there now appears at Leipzig the well-known list of new publications as a catalogue of the goods offered for sale there; the provision of the list is of course a matter for the seller of the goods. It may have been a good thing that there were more skilled pens to paraphrase this list; but this was and remained always a purely business matter for the use of buyer and seller; and a general literary gazette can claim no higher value than that of a journal of luxury and of fashions. These inferior workmen let themselves be persuaded by ill-informed flatterers that they were discharging at the same time the business of criticism and that this might be combined with the purely business consideration of *criticizing adversely the whole list of new publications*. Once this idea had grown up, even those who were quite capable of doing the work of criticism were sometimes misled into throwing a better word into that unworthy context. These things are in our day one of the most fruitful sources of literary and other corruption, and because of this a greater amount of ridicule has fallen on hacks and makers of such paraphrases of the list than they had the power to deserve. Since the fondness of our readers still seems to incline to literary gazettes of this kind and, so far as is known to the writer, the real reason for their objectionableness is seldom clearly expressed and

faced, we say again definitely that our plan expects the following points to be understood. Even if, and we leave this undecided here, the age might presume to criticize the age, this criticism should not at least be exercised on all newly-published books as the single ones come into our hands, because such a plan itself presupposes an absolutely uncritical, unphilosophical, purposeless spirit that is not susceptible to unity and can create only something purposeless and confused. Criticism must be exercised rather on *whole classes and kinds of books*, which have previously been distinguished in accordance with inner criteria. The plan of reviewing everything issued from the press obviously proves consideration for equal justice towards all publishers as suppliers of goods, just as it is the publishers who insist most on the completeness of the literary gazettes and complain openly of oppression if one of their articles has remained unnoticed. The business aim is therefore the important one which decides the plan and the fundamental law of such enterprises; the critical aim, however, has been added later as a pretext, and people have never seriously considered whether it is even possible to combine the two aims.

May such confusion, which would destroy our Academy and its nature at the very beginning, be kept far from our Academy at least!

Otherwise, in heaven's name let such a complete paraphrase of the list of new publications appear in the capital of our kingdom, near the seat of the Academy. This would be very advisable even if only to keep from our less well-instructed fellow-citizens the inflated mongrel kinds that appear elsewhere. Let it be a private enterprise for one, perhaps the academic, bookseller. It is a matter of manual labour, for which the unparaphrased Leipzig list may serve as the basis. The reviewer guarantees as eye-witness that the book has actually appeared and that he has seen it; this is its title, it costs so much; and then he has printed the table of contents and some passage from the book. He should consult those classes in the Academy who have to scan these books for other reasons concerning the choice of passages and also concerning books that are to be left out altogether; a general supervision and censorship of this catalogue

should be entrusted to these classes, each in its own subject. Let the person who undertakes the business keep for this purpose some Confederates, although quite uneducated merchants' apprentices could do the business too.

On the other hand this is what would very properly devolve on the Academy as such in regard to the external increase in literature :

(1) The members of the Council of Elders inspect completely, each in his subject, the addition to the books on the subject that has resulted from the last fair ; if the literature of the Germans continues to retain for a long time its old characteristics, this will be done mainly by scanning the table of contents, the index and the introduction and by skimming a few pages. If in the process one sees something that does not really fall within the province of his subject and will only be lost in it, he should point it out to him to whose subject it really belongs.

(2) Anything in this increase in books that is an advance, i.e., an improvement or an expansion of the material-book in this subject, or an enhancement of the art-book, is set down in another periodical which one might call *annual chronicles of the progress of literature* or the *library of the Academy*. Whatever is mere repetition of something already known is passed over in silence. Relapses into errors already exposed should be indicated in case it should be feared that a member of our Academy might be deceived thereby. Since such a survey sets out from the previous literature in the subject, which will already have its fixed divisions, it may very properly keep to these, as the main clues, showing how each of these parts has been enriched, and in this way introduce the book, in which the enrichment lies, because of the content, not the content because of the book, as the paraphrase of the Fair catalogue does.

Books in which there is nothing new, except that they might have value in freshening the former literature on the subject, and which ought not therefore to exist at all, are completely omitted from this library. It would be quite appropriate for such books, according to the statement of these reviewers in the library, whom one would have to ask on this point, to be omitted from the Fair catalogue too,

in order that, just as we ourselves forego mere book-making, we may also prevent our less well-informed fellow-citizens from supporting other printing-houses by their purchases. Let the public know that they certainly do not need what even our Fair catalogue omits.

This library is the library of *our Academy* and is written in the first instance for its use. None of our teachers or pupils needs to bother about the above-mentioned ransacking of all the rubbish that is occasioned by the Fair ; even the old academician and collaborator in our library need bother only with what falls to his share ; others have taken over the rest for him. Our Academician has therefore to read only this library and finds in it definite reference to any new publications he has to read besides. For him, therefore, this library is of course *criticism*, separation of what is from what is not to be read in all the newest books.

If the general public, and among them the authors and publishers of all these newest books, wish to read this library, although it is not written for love of them, they are quite at liberty to do so. If they also wish to regard it as universal criticism valid for them too, they do so on their own responsibility. We at least, limiting ourselves to our own people, have never made such an arrogant claim, to force our judgment on everyone ; if, however, it forces itself upon their consciousness, this is all the more honourable a witness for us. Whatever the result, we have nothing to do with authors or publishers, for we have never pledged ourselves to anything with them.

(It is probable that because we do not grope blindly, but proceed according to a definite plan, we shall very soon obtain great authority and that this will work powerfully towards the improvement of literature. Yet even this result is but an incidental one, at which we do not aim ; for, too modest to wish to take upon our shoulders the salvation of the whole world, we think first of all only of our own salvation.)

66.

There now remain only the above-mentioned institutions whereby we receive early information concerning those efforts of other scientific bodies which have not

yet received sufficient definiteness to be set down in the book, and whereby we put these bodies in the position to take note of similar efforts of ours. The proposal in this matter would be : (1) that we should choose a special friend and representative from among the members of all the important Academies and Universities in Germany as well as abroad ; on the other hand we should allow and invite them to do the same with us. These representatives should be asked to communicate by correspondence everything of the kind just mentioned that happens in their locality and which they believe might interest the allied Academy. (2) In order, however, that we may be in the position to see with our own eyes deeper than these foreign reports, which are only to arouse our first attention, and see even what they may pass over in silence, young men from our midst shall be sent to them, if possible uninterruptedly, and remain there some time ; when they return they will tell us orally how everything was. They are sent in the first instance to our representatives who help them by word and deed. Of course we do the same for allied communities and treat their people as we wish ours to be treated by them. Thus, we undoubtedly desire that ours shall receive unlimited admission to all the scientific exercises of the foreigners and must therefore give them the same admission with us. But we do not desire that on these visits the foreign eyeglass be foisted on our people but that they use their own eyes, as trained by us. We are therefore just as little authorised or, if we should be justified in considering our sight better, bound to lend it to our guests ; they should have brought ability to see with them. Our fellow-citizens who are used for these missions, as well as all our Academicians, must study the necessary policy in this matter ; the former, e.g., need not think audibly about the foreigner but may let themselves be informed while they keep the true thoughts of their hearts to themselves until they return to us.

The people who are best qualified for these scientific missions are Regulars who have been successfully trained by us, and in this way they may very appropriately fill in the time between ceasing to be Regulars and entering the Academy.

Sons belonging to the University town and particu-

larly those of our Academicians, would be especially useful for this business and should indeed be preferred, if they are as well qualified as others ; provided, of course, that they fulfil the chief condition of being successful Regulars. This is not a *personal privilege*, for such no birth confers with us ; it is rather *making them equal to the others* and *compensation* for the University town being in their native place, and really because they have never yet come out of the family circle into a completely independent life, and so have lost hitherto the above-mentioned advantages that are connected therewith.

67. Corollary.

Our Academy, considered in and for itself, shows in the realization indicated by us the picture of a perfect State ; honest interaction of the different powers which are welded together to organic unity and completeness for the promotion of a common purpose. In it the real statesman sees ever present and existing that form which he endeavours to give his material too, and accustoms to it his eye, which is henceforward to be satisfied by nothing else.

The same Academy shows, in its union with the other scientific bodies that are outside it, the picture of the perfectly correct relationship of States. All, remaining otherwise in themselves alone, closed and independent, strive with all their might for the same prize, the promotion of science and of scientific art ; but their rivalry is necessarily honourable, and no one can misjudge or detract from a victory won without robbing itself of the profit of victory, which is common to all and yet remains whole in spite of infinite division. Their rivalry is friendly ; the injured self-respect of the conquered rises again at once in joy at the common gain, and the momentary jealousy quickly changes to thanks to the promoter of the common weal.

This form of an organic union of mankind, that consists of nothing but different individuals, science can realize first of all in its province, and far in advance of the sphere of the remaining human affairs. It is a single republic ; first of all because the interest, which in this

sphere can separate, divide and keep apart what is to be united, does not rule here nearly so urgently and imperiously as the interest of sensuous self-preservation which divides and persecutes in the domain of the State ; secondly, because the very element which Science treats ennobles the disposition and makes self-seeking disgraceful. It is a union of republics ; because all know exactly and understand what they really want ; whereas the political dissensions of peoples and world-devastating wars are very often based on the most confused and obscure of all possible ideas. In this earlier realization of the form that is the aim of all human relationships science is a prophecy, guarantee and pledge that the rest will also some day be formed in this way ; it is the radiant arc of the union which arches in clear heaven over the heads of frightened peoples.

Whilst it still promises, however, it already fulfils and is forced to fulfil. The sole source of all human guilt, as of all evil, is its confusion concerning the real object of its will. Its sole remedy, therefore, is clearness concerning that object ; a clearness which, since it does not grasp things that remain foreign to us but lays hold of the innermost root of our life, our will, also influences life directly. Now every scientific body must want this clearness round about it, in its own interest, and must promote it with all its might. It must, therefore, according as it gets some consistency within itself, continue to flow incessantly towards the organisation of an education for the nation, as its own foundation, towards clearness and spiritual freedom, and so prepare for and make possible the renovation of all human relationships. With this mention of national education we are back again at the end of our first chapter and so close the circle which has been traversed to the end.

(*b*) Ideas for the Internal Organisation of the University of Erlangen.

[Towards the end of 1804 Fichte was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Erlangen, on condition that he might reside in Berlin during the winter and lecture at

Erlangen only in summer. He began his lectures there in May, 1805, and was commissioned by Hardenberg, the minister, to devise plans for a gradual reorganisation of the University, which the latter had long desired. Fichte drew up his plan during the winter of 1805-1806; in all probability it would have been influential in the subsequent development of the University, but the outbreak of war with France in the autumn of 1806 caused the reorganisation to be postponed and when peace was restored by the treaty of Tilsit, in July, 1807, Erlangen ceased to belong to Prussia.

In this plan the same fundamental ideas appear which were afterwards developed by Fichte in his scheme for the new University at Berlin and which are there given in full. The "Ideas" should therefore be read in conjunction with the "Deduced Scheme." In the translation, which is from the posthumous Works, Vol. III, pp. 275-294, two passages are omitted—one which deals with an annual chronicle of the progress of scientific art in the University, similar to that described in Chapter III of the "Deduced Scheme," and one which discusses the competition between the various Universities in Germany and some of the teachers whom Fichte would like to have in the reorganised University of Erlangen.]

Ideas for the internal organisation of the University of Erlangen.

Written in Winter, 1805-6.

The chief aim of all the following proposals is no less than to create somewhere for the first time an Academy that is really an Academy. Only in the conception of this aim are the particular proposals intelligible and an organic whole, and only as an organic whole can they be grasped and realized.

The usual practice in all Academies makes them quite superfluous and destroys their nature. The teacher simply continues to read his lectures, without entering into communication with the pupil, just as he might give his lecture before empty walls. The pupil, if he comes at all, listens as he feels inclined, and is pleased with whatever

he retains of the lecture. Why did not the young man remain at home and get the journals or the book in which what his teacher says will undoubtedly appear? He could read them there more comfortably, and might go over again and assimilate completely, with a saving of time, money and confusion, whatever his attention was diverted from or whatever he did not understand and whatever for that reason the teacher does not tell him once again? As it is, he gets into a state of dreaming resignation, in which he lets himself become whatever he may, like a plant which we bring into a certain atmosphere in order that there it may grow as it can.

Let no allusion be made here to the practical exercises that have also been introduced into Universities; for they are mostly independent and are far removed from making what is really theoretical generally and universally practical.

In this way the Academy merely repeats the contents of books and that in a very strange and imperfect manner; and thereby it becomes quite superfluous.

If, therefore, the Academy is really to exist, it must achieve something which neither a book nor anything in the world but itself can achieve.

It must be a school of the *art of using the understanding scientifically*: it must make practical and a living possession of the pupil everything that can stand in a book theoretically and dead.

Every lecture in the Academy must be changed from *continuous discourse*, which is the form it has in a book, to *mutual discussion*. The pupil must also express himself, in order that the teacher may get to know him and connect his own conversation exactly to his pupil's. Similarly the pupils must express themselves to one another on scientific matters, in order that the view and the success of each may become the gain of all, and that there may be not isolated pupils wrapped up in themselves but a whole body of learners well known to the teacher and apprehended by him as a whole.

[Then follow points *re* a scientific journal for the University and for the State, which are already noted under the Berlin project.]

In my opinion it is a wrong endeavour to have the University as near as possible to the school which has been attended and to the home of one's parents, and to want to continue to grow up in the sphere in which one has grown up. This endeavour must not be encouraged at all either in the parents or in the young people. If it originated in the youth who had been left free in the matter it would characterize him already as a timid and unimaginative being. The more ardent spirit is attracted by distance and wants to try himself also on the unknown which he faces with courage.

[He then goes on to discuss the competition between various universities in Germany and some of the people he would have called to teach in the reorganised University of Erlangen.]

It is strange that, although we have preaching institutions for practising the art of popular lecturing, it has occurred to no one to cultivate the art of scientific lecturing too, as if this comes of itself and can be presupposed without further ado in everyone who knows but the things that have already been mentioned. This proves that it does not occur to them that the Academy is anything but the dead contents of books, and consequently our discourse returns once more to the point from which it started at the very beginning.

(*c*) Concerning the Only Possible Disturbance of Academic Freedom.

[This is the title of the inaugural lecture which Fichte delivered as Rector of the University of Berlin, on October 19th, 1811. In the course of the lecture he considers what a University is and deduces from his definition the characteristics of the internal organisation of a University, including the essential elements and limitations of true academic freedom. Only these sections are translated from the Works, Volume VI, pp. 449-476; they should be read in conjunction with the "Deduced Scheme" and the "Ideas," because they help to complete Fichte's theory of University education.]

Concerning the only possible disturbance of academic freedom. 1812.

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What then is the University? Insight into its nature is based on the following principles. The whole world exists solely in order that the supernatural, the Godhead, may be displayed in it, and displayed indeed by means of conscious freedom. This supernatural certainly reveals itself of itself and appears, as it is, to the capacity for freedom, to human understanding; but as this understanding develops to ever greater clearness, this picture of the divine likewise appears in it continually in greater clearness and purity. The uninterrupted and steady progress of the intellectual education of our race is, therefore, the sole condition under which the supernatural, as the model of creation, can continually appear in mankind in new and fresh transfiguration, and can be exhibited by mankind in the external world. This continual development of the understanding is the sole means by which the human race fulfils its destiny and whereby each generation wins its place in the series of generations. The University, however, is the institution expressly devised to secure the non-interruption and steadiness of this progress; because it is the place where each generation hands on, consciously and according to a principle, its highest intellectual education to the succeeding generation, in order that the latter may extend it and hand it on thus extended to its successor, and so on to the end of time. All this, however, is solely with the intention that the divine may ever appear in the human in fresh clearness and that the connection of both, and the living influence of the former on the latter, may be maintained. But for this aim even intellectual education, although it is the greatest among the things of nought and the point of immediate union between what is nought and what truly exists, is in fact simply null and void. Now if the University is this, it is clear that it is the most important institution and the most holy thing which the human race possesses. Since the education given there preserves in its final results at least and hands on everything divine that ever burst forth in mankind, the real

nature of mankind lives there its uninterrupted life, far above everything transitory; and the University is the visible representation of the immortality of our race, because it lets nothing perish that truly exists. Since beyond this knowledge in the new additions to its contents the Godhead is ever developing new and fresh life, all separation between the supernatural and the worldly is ended in the University, and the University is the visible representation of the unity of the World, as the manifestation of God, and God himself.

The proper internal organisation of a University follows from the definition of a University which has been stated. On the one hand: all the intellectual culture of the age and all the means and objects of this culture must be fully reflected in the teachers who represent the age that is handing on its culture, and each individual teacher must not only excel his age in his subject but also possess the ability and skill to express himself completely and intimately. On the other hand there must be, as the representatives of the age to which is handed on the highest culture of the present age, pupils who have been suitably prepared, by means of the instruction already received, for the stage at which university instruction begins and must begin, if it is to end in the highest. If the University is once established by gathering together and uniting these two fundamental parts and maintained henceforward in this its real existence, it continues of itself on its proper course and needs in this respect no help from outside. Rather are such external influences and interferences harmful, and disturbing to the intended progress of intellectual culture. If, therefore, a University is to achieve its purpose and be really what it pretends to be, it must be left to itself thenceforward; it needs, and rightly demands, complete external freedom, academic freedom in the widest sense of the word.

The present age shall communicate unreservedly the culture which it has won independently to the future age, in order that the latter may build further thereon. No limit, therefore, should be set to the teacher's instruction; nor should any subject be indicated to him as an exception, on which he is not to be free to think and to communicate his independent thought with the same

freedom from limitation to the pupil in the University who has been suitably prepared for it. The student of the University, as a representative of the second generation, shall give himself wholly and unreservedly to the instruction offered to him. The personal freedom, therefore, that belongs to him already as a man must be guaranteed to him, to determine for himself his outward mode of life within the limits of law and of good custom as he finds most suitable for his purpose, and within these limits to test in every way his thought that is now developing. During his course of study he must be exempted from other civil burdens and demands, in order to devote all his time and strength to his immediate and most sacred purpose. It is desirable to free him from the complications of strict legal procedure and to place him under as simple a tribunal as possible. Finally, since the ultimate purpose of all his studying is that the divine may appear in him and manifest itself in some new way, and since for this purpose he must be maintained in moral simplicity and innocence, in which alone the Godhead can be reflected, the final and highest aim of the University demands, I say, that radically corrupting scandals and temptations which are beyond the powers of one who is not yet trained should be kept entirely out of the student's way. These are briefly the important elements of the academic freedom which a University rightly claims. . . . . .

V. THE THEORY OF THE STATE.

(*a*) The Theory of the State; or the Relationship of the Primitive State to the Kingdom of Reason.

[This is the title of lectures delivered by Fichte at the University of Berlin in the summer of 1813, a few months before his death. In Chapter III he discusses the establishment of the ideal State, the kingdom of reason, and raises the question of the rulers of that State, which he answers by proving that they must be chosen by the teachers from the teaching body itself. Later in the same chapter he

discusses the problem of family education, and much later he describes the kingdom of reason in greater detail and considers the relationship of education to the foundation and maintenance of this kingdom. In these lectures we have the final form of Fichte's reflections on educational theory, and the gradual approximation to Plato's ideas is apparent. The translation is based on the text in the Works, Vol. IV, pp. 369-600 ; only those parts have been translated which deal with education.]

The Theory of the State ; or the relationship of the primitive State to the kingdom of reason. 1813.

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CHAPTER III. The establishment of the kingdom of reason.

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The answer to the question : Who has a right to be sovereign, follows more definitely : The highest human understanding and, since this does not exist at any time, the highest human understanding at the time among the people.

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Who is this ? No one can be permitted to declare himself the person. . . . . It must be discovered through the matter itself. The truth must appear of itself. . . . . .

(3) What would this appearance be ? Answer—he possesses it[1] who is able to lead others to objective knowledge. But how does he prove that it is objective knowledge, that he is not perhaps rediscovering only his own individuality ? Answer :—When he succeeds with several, and indeed with everyone on whom he tries the experiment. For knowledge grows according to a law out of evidence that reveals itself and by which he is convinced who carries out a certain construction. This law, like the law of construction which conditions the manifestation of the former, is universally valid. When

1. (*sc.* this understanding.)

such a person says: Construct in this manner and you will be convinced by this evidence; and when this proves true to him who does so, he gives visible proof of this his art that he has universally valid understanding and understanding of this understanding. Whether this is conceded to him in words or not, the fact, perhaps the mode and strength of its denial, proves it. They have advanced; power of understanding has developed in them.

(4) Now the *real* teacher gives this proof when he actually develops universally valid understanding in others.

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Result: Only the teacher in the sense described shows universally valid understanding in deed; and there is no other means, no standard but that.

If, therefore, a just sovereign is to be possible in a people, there must be teachers among this people and from them only shall the sovereign be chosen or set up. Our sphere is more definite; a class is assigned us which does not establish itself but which makes itself in deed *by God's grace*. (The only thing that is truly the grace of God is the universally valid scientific understanding; and the sole outward manifestation of this grace is the act of real successful teaching.) The appointment of the sovereign is again referred beyond all human caprice to where it belongs, to the inscrutable decree of God; and this is done intelligibly at least, i.e., because we see that after all the understanding does exist and is concerned with what is absolutely actually given. . . . . .

The existence of a class of teachers conditions in the progress of the kingdom the existence of a just sovereignty.

But the just uniting of men into a people under the rule of the kingdom assumes, as was strictly proved above, an education to insight into right in general, and consequently a class of teachers; so that here our theory has influence.

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The highest *universally valid* understanding shall rule; this cannot mean, however, that the whole class of teachers, which has not the unity of a person, is to rule.

Concerning this understanding only those can judge who have it ; it is to him, therefore, whom they (the teachers) recognize as the highest among themselves, that they submit. He himself has contributed to this submission only by deed, and he has done this voluntarily. Their judgment, however, is necessarily the judgment of the community ; the class of teachers therefore has to appoint as ruler from their midst him who has shown himself the highest understanding by deed before the highest judge.

Now whether this is to be one person or a Senate appointed by a collective vote, I shall not say but leave undetermined. The conception includes a final umpire in all the affairs of the people, whose decision brooks no appeal and must be put into operation at once as a motive of action for all ; it remains undecided here whether the decision be that of a single person or be by agreement or by majority. The class of teachers must decide this too and determine the constitution, i.e., the law of the kingdom, how the decision is to be made that is to bind all absolutely. This law itself should be only temporary and alterable ; there is no harm in this, for the immortal legislator among the people, the class of teachers, has been discovered.

This is enough on that subject. Practical instruction might stop at this point, up to which it is strictly demonstrable. The class of teachers has to appoint the sovereign from itself ; but the law can never determine whether it is to be one person or several ; this must be mainly a matter of judgment. What teacher, in an age which is avowedly not ripe for this to be put into practice—such am I here,—will forestall in this judgment the class of all the teachers of the age which will be ripe therefor, to whom he must attribute, without the blindest stubbornness, a much more comprehensive understanding, because they have built upon his principles and developed them by fuller application in succeeding ages :—who will forestall them and want to legislate! From the earliest times until now we have had drawn up a number of imaginary republics. This was easy when everything depended on caprice which offered an unlimited field to the imagination. We have put a stop to caprice by means of a law of reason

and shown the class which shall stop it for ever; how could we, therefore, acting honourably, want to increase such pictures? In order that it may not appear as if I fear this investigation and shirk it, and give you an example of such evasion,—particularly because this is necessary for full information on the subject, I will show later what may be validly demonstrated by way of premise to the judging of such questions concerning the constitution.

At present we must explain more fully the sole just rule of the class of teachers and show what is really contained in this conception.

The teaching profession, combined into organic unity, if this can be realized, rightly rules the second class; it has wholly produced it and, therefore, knows it intimately, realizes what it needs, what it can accomplish, and what it is good for. Above we spoke of two chief classes, owners and non-owners; here there are two, teachers and those who have been educated by teachers.

(1) The second is the *product* of the first *in so far as* it exists at all. The first is the one that divides and consequently the one that puts every single person into one class or the other. Let this happen. Much is contained therein which is scarcely known to you but which follows directly therefrom. Undoubtedly the main formation of the kingdom takes place in this way. (*a*) In this number of citizens there is need for a definite number—to be fixed by calculation—for government, administration, teaching—divided among the different branches, grades and tasks—the remainder compose the working class and are divided among the different classes thereof. These are subsequent divisions; the first division into two classes remains the original and main division. (*b*) By what means is this main division to be determined? First of all—shall we assume that individuals are born different in a manner known but unintelligible to us; that, as Plato says, some ages are golden, others silver or bronze—that those are an aristocracy by birth who are born more intelligent? (They do not say so, but we should have to in our system.) What sheer and gross nonsense this may be, in some other place. In truth these are the facts: Individuals are *given* in such numbers;

this is pure fact, impenetrable to conception. But then the understanding is applied ; individuals are given in this connection to the people as its members ; they are not recognizable except in general as free, as having rights, and as all being simply equal in this respect, without any exception and any difference that might be based on their descent. To recognize actually the difference due to birth, if there is such a thing, is henceforth a matter for the judging understanding ; but this difference can be recognized only by its different relations to the same universally applied education. The first requisite, therefore, would be that all should be admitted to the same common education. This should give the training that each needs who is to be a citizen of this kingdom, at this time and at this stage of its development. Universal popular education. Now this education will undoubtedly prove which individuals are satisfied with this instruction, which can embrace only the results and final general consequences of the deeper and comprehensive insight of the understanding which is possible and actually exists in the teachers, and which are not satisfied therewith but rise higher to a notion of greater reasons and demand these. In this way the pupils of the common education separate themselves ; by their original destiny. Here is decided who was born noble or ignoble, by an obvious fact, which the teaching profession does not create (for all have had the same schooling) but which they simply recognise and take as it is.

The former fall into the second class and are now trained in its arts ; here particular ability for this or that class will show itself. The latter are further trained for intellectual knowledge ; this continued education will show more clearly which subordinate or prominent places they will have to fill according to the mental training to be achieved. The teachers will also have to decide the subsequent division into classes, founded on the first main division. It is clear, therefore, as I asserted, that the existence of the second class is a product of the teaching profession, because the whole division into classes and occupations, and the assigning of each individual to the appropriate one, depends entirely on the final and unimpeachable decision of the teaching profession, which

must of course take the responsibility for doing this to the best of its knowledge and conviction.

(The innate intellectual talent that is shown in instruction determines the position which each occupies in the kingdom; *every* position without exception, not merely the chief place. The son of the lowest may come to the highest position, the son of the highest to the lowest; that is to say, birth does not prevent it. . . . . .)

(2) *The second class is also a product of the first in that it, and the whole kingdom in general, is as it is.* First of all: the teachers know the education of the second class completely, for it proceeds from them just as it is. (It would be the greatest disgrace to them if there were for the people other sources of culture besides their schools, such as books, intercourse with others from other and better schools, tradition, which is frequently the case in our time. All the culture of which the people is capable in this age must exist in their school.) General intellectual knowledge of right, morality, religion, in order to equip the *free* man: technical skill and the amount of nature knowledge necessary for its practice, in order that each may be able to maintain his place as a citizen. They see, therefore, the whole vital power of their people, as their product;—and its exact *boundaries;* what it can and cannot do, in short *reality*. In the teachers' school, which this class likewise superintends, the *law*, the aim, is further developed. The clearer this is, the more certainly does it discover the point which must now be followed, and has it in its power to educate thereto; knows what must be averted at all costs and what there is no hurry about.

In short: the life of the time and its power cannot be other than what they know; for they have *made* it; they need no other means of knowledge than their school. They might perhaps have been able to do something better and that would be the mistake; but no mistake is possible concerning the reality.

Similarly they can never demand an impossible and unsuitable advance; for they have to educate thereto. If the demand is unsuitable, the unsuitability would show itself in school before it could be demanded from life; and they would then have time to rectify the mistake by

inserting the intermediate stage that had been omitted. . . . . .

We notice that in this order of things all education proceeds simply and solely from the family. Generally speaking there is no education which is not in the separate families. The particular point in this analysis is to see the differences between our organisation of man, which is based by the understanding on the conception of freedom, and that given in this natural condition. Here one of these differences appears. There—education in the family; therefore unequal education, according as the families are dissimilar. With us—absolutely equal education of all by means of universal popular education. All disputes in this matter originate in the one party adopting the primitive arrangement and being enthusiastic about it, the other the idea of the relationship. Such a dispute breaks out when one of the opposites is voiced—and then the idea of *understanding* always begins to dispute the right of possession and of prescription with the idea of *existence.* Popular education is demanded by Pestalozzi and others, the condition, however, being the taking of the children from the family. On the other side others rise and complain of the severing of the holiest bonds. Such a dispute can be settled only by knowing and appreciating the reason of one's opponent (often better than he does himself), by first doing it full justice in order to compare one's own with it.

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The kingdom of justice demanded by reason and the kingdom of heaven on earth promised by Christianity is one and the same. The latter, therefore, guarantees the former. The *fact* is undoubted. Only as an extra, and primarily for our own information and adjustment concerning what is contained therein, do we now consider the "*how.*"

We begin with a more exact description of this kingdom.

The kingdom of heaven is a theocracy in the clear consciousness of everyone and through this consciousness; as the kingdom of ancient times, with which history began, was a theocracy for the blind belief of all. Everyone is to

obey God alone according to his own clear insight into God's will with him; and he is to obey man, only in consequence of his clear insight that the voice of this man is not the voice of *man* but of *God*. All power over the will of man other than that of each man's conscience is to cease. How can such a system be conceived *on earth and in the present world* and under its laws? That is the question.

(1) The fundamental law of this world is that men are born with undeveloped understanding. The experience of the past has proved that this understanding does not develop of itself (and in accordance with some natural law, as the body grows into the human form) into correct insight into the will of God, but that for this purpose an art is needed which has hitherto succeeded only with a few favoured ones. It is clear, therefore, that the possibility of such a system presupposes that *all* are educated to be able to see God's will with them clearly; and since *all* without exception who are born are to be educated to this insight, without difference (without presupposing any particular gifts or affinity with the super-sensuous) it is clear that there must be a sure infallible art of this human education which achieves its purpose with every given individual.

(2) So long as the world remains under this rule, so long will death and birth continue; hence the necessity for educating posterity. There must be a continually existing institution for this education; this educational institution is, therefore, an element which accompanies the kingdom in its continuance and is inseparable from it.

(3) This education is easily determined by its general aim. Everyone is to understand clearly God's will with him and subordinate himself in clear self-perception, which can represent no difference in it, to that universal law of the spiritual world. This presupposes the clear general view, that man is subject to the will of God and that without obedience he is nothing and does not really exist at all. Now this view is that of Christianity or of philosophy, which are synonymous in this connection. The necessary education must, therefore, possess the art of bringing all men without exception infallibly to this view and, in order that this may be possible, of forming men

from the beginning out of what is common to all, in such a way that this knowledge may be imparted to them with certainty. (As yet this art has not been discovered; as yet instruction in philosophy relies on chance, on an affinity; its possession is, however, a preliminary condition of that kingdom.) This is *generally* what everyone must receive by means of education.

(4) Everyone is to subordinate himself in self-perception to this universal law in order to know God's will with him. The presupposition understood *a priori* by reason is that every free individual has assigned to him in the divine world-plan his definite place, which is not the place of anyone else living at the same time in the same community, for the divine will cannot conflict with itself. If only, therefore, all clearly understand the will of God concerning these their places, no conflict of strength can take place among them, which would have to be settled by a code of laws.[1] Everyone is to know his place clearly, and then all will work therein for the common purpose without any conflict among themselves.

(5) Meanwhile, apart from this education of man, to which we shall return and which is the subjection of man's inborn nature to the idea, and thereby to the will of God,—there remains for man as a mission from the divine will the subjection of *external* nature, of the material world to the idea. Now in God's plan the place of everyone whom he does not destine for education must be assigned in this subjection of nature, and everyone must know his place.

(6) The extension of the rule of reason over nature proceeds step by step. By means of combined power control must first be won over it in a particular point; then only is it possible to advance from that point to further victory in accordance with a clear conception of the purpose by the whole race. In this regular treatment, therefore, two things are needed:—

(*a*) An understanding which superintends the combined work on nature, and always knows the point at which regular progress must be made in its subjection; and

(*b*) Combined powers working under the guidance of

1. For God is not a God of confusion, but of peace, as in all churches of the Saints. 1 *Corinth.* 14, 33.

this understanding. This understanding need not exist in all, for then all would have in this respect one and the same understanding ; but it is sufficient if it always exists in the world whilst the world remains under this rule. All the powers of the individual, however, must get their direction from its plan. This understanding, therefore, will actually exist, not in all, but only in individuals, and the majority[1] will in this respect have to follow the insight of the minority. Since, however, in this matter they follow only their own view, there will necessarily arise a common and absolutely similar consciousness in all, whether called to the first business of guidance or to the second of obedience to guidance. If the majority see this in relation to themselves, and further if they see what is borne in upon them in their idea of God, that this deficiency in their intellectual talent, and on the other hand its possession by the minority, is also God's decree, then they know clearly that they do not obey the order of the minority, but solely the natural law, which is recognised as God's law, of their different intellectual talents.

(7) How is the intellectual insight just demanded and the subordination of each individual to that fundamental law to be possible ? In this way, I say. Apart from that religious-moral education there must be communicated to all a definite picture and a survey of the present work of freedom on nature, as the second main part of universal education. This falls naturally into two parts, knowledge of nature and knowledge of human power, in so far as it has developed hitherto. If this picture is brought before the pupil and properly grasped by him, two results only can follow : either his understanding is thereby satisfied and appeased, or the given picture becomes creative in him of another that is higher and new. The latter proves the divine summons to this individual to guide the progress and the extension of the rule of the understanding ; the former denies him this vocation and directs him to take part in what has hitherto been the common work.

On the other hand the fact that education is a sure art,

1. He says "latter" and "former," but these terms are most ambiguous and misleading, because "latter" would strictly apply to "individuals," and "former" to "all," which is not what Fichte means.

since only on condition that it is this can it warrant the certainty of its judgment, guarantees that the creative ability, which really exists, is not hidden and does not appear when the class is already decided, and that therefore the conclusion from its non-appearance in education to its non-existence is correct and infallible. The prevailing education does not stimulate human power in its depths and in its ultimate source, and does not continue this stimulation in systematic order, as power develops according to its law ; it influences when it hits the mark, like the teacher's own education, and therefore involves his desire and love. Slumbering talent, therefore, may easily be hidden from it, but not from that systematic art of education which the existence of the kingdom of which we are speaking presupposes.

For the purpose of the particular branch of this work education has given him a picture of the whole, and tests his ability according to the guidance which the pupil's nature supplies, especially his inclination—for inclination testifies here to ability, especially as the imagination is not misled by opinions. This shows best for what his nature or God destines him. The choice of a particular occupation finishes his education, which thereby pronounces itself ended ; he is now a free member of the community, for hitherto he has been under the discipline of education. So long as this choice is not made, education is not finished and the man remains a minor. His spiritual individuality is not yet ripe, separate and acknowledged ; he has none, therefore, in a kingdom of clear understanding, but remains in the undifferentiated mass, out of which individuals are trained first by the art of education under God's guidance. Education is here an investigation of the divine will.

(8) Education itself devolves upon the second class of creative spirits. In the first place one is really sure only that he understands life in the spirit and in its law for whose eyes even nature, that is lifeless and closed by its law, changes into spiritual development. Secondly, future generations are to be educated, not just to repeat the life of the immediately preceding one, but perhaps to some new development thereof with nature ; the educator, therefore, who is not merely to repeat the

picture of existing education but to educate for progress, must know definitely how this generation may progress in the cultivation of nature. These educators organize themselves by nomination into a ruling and teaching corporation, everywhere relying upon the individuality shown in education.

(9) Knowing is not doing, is not cheerful submission which desires nothing else. How shall we assure ourselves of their will? I say this question is quite justified in our world and our education, in which no knowledge can ever be produced with certainty, but the usual knowledge is only a leaving undecided, because one has nothing against it, without any real submission of the will thereto, because knowledge is not continued as far as combination with the will. It is not justified, however, where the whole man is educated as a unit, on which depends the existence of the kingdom. Also it can already be indicated on what this certainty of the determination of the will depends. Man sees that, without this surrender of his will to the divine, *he is nothing: he sees this vividly*, so that he is filled with the feeling of this nothingness; but no one wishes to be nothing; we all cling to existence. We, too: only it appears to us as an illusion; to remove the illusion let him have the perfect art; man is then robbed of all support. This is the real and the only compulsion exercised on him by education; but it takes the place of all other kinds of compulsion.

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(11) . . . . . The community of scholars is the teaching corporation of Christianity, of the kingdom of God, the established society from whose uninterrupted continuance will proceed those rulers and educators in the kingdom described. Whether it recognises itself as such in its individual members or not, it proceeds thence and thither; in the middle of a long road we may easily lose sight of the beginning and the end. Just because of the difficulty which philosophy will find in making itself acceptable and because the real cause of this difficulty, a defect in the spiritual eye itself, cannot be hidden from it, it carries with it the problem of the art of training this eye for the purpose, i.e., the art of education.

Since this art is applied to the human eye as such and universally, once it is discovered the difference in this respect between learned and illiterate vanishes. (The first inventors are creative; but what has once been invented becomes something known which is to be given to all. It seems strange at present to teach peasant children philosophy in school; but it is not more strange than the fact would have appeared to the first person who began to understand it, that they should actually receive a conception of the unity of God and of his relationship to us as a kind Father.) The immediate problem is this art of educating man, whose final aim, whose *starting point*—to recognize *itself* as spirit, and whose means of understanding itself are supplied first by philosophy. (Our generation has already actually expressed it in Pestalozzi. Its *main characteristic is infallibility*. Formerly children were induced to learn by psychologically mechanical means; now by the conception of their own activity and its rule.)

Then we need such a thorough survey of nature and of the relationship of human power to it (of needs and their subordination) that a common plan for a united community working at nature may be evolved therefrom. The generation is striving with all its might for such insight into nature and has been distinguished by successful discoveries for penetrating its depths.

This course, begun by the teaching community and grown to this height, now guarantees of itself its continuance, its development and the attainment of its aim without any external assistance or stimulation (it is our concern to see this guarantee everywhere). The knowledge is truly of the divine spirit in that it lives on itself, holds fast the man whom it has once seized and develops in him according to its law. It is impossible for one who has been filled with it to be bad and to serve sensuous ends, to become lazy and to desert. He who does so has never loved knowledge for its own sake and has never had it, but has only grasped its traditions for the sake of some external purpose. Moreover, it proclaims itself, not as a personal possession but as common property; it stimulates to communication, and he who has grasped a truth cannot rest until others besides himself have also

grasped it. It necessarily develops to the end in this way according to the law of the understanding. We may say that the progress and increase of knowledge, once it takes root in a permanent school for scholars and provided the external conditions for the continuance of such a school are given, is entirely removed from human freedom and caprice. It is spiritual life which forms itself and persons from and through itself. This inner law is now to be seen quite vividly.

(12) Progress is assured, I said, if only the external conditions for a permanent school for scholars are given. This shows us that we have considered only from one side, as we also said, the conditions of the kingdom of God and what guarantees its appearance. The question remains; whether these external conditions will also be given and what guarantees this to us? But since that depends on this, if this cannot be proved, what was proved first also falls to the ground. Who guarantees maintenance, rest and leisure to the school for scholars? Further, we have shown that those who have already been seized by knowledge cannot desert again, but we wish to bring all to knowledge; who then assists it to spread and brings into the school of knowledge those who have no desire at all (like every natural man)?

Looked at from another side: By means of the kingdom all other right to compel vanishes (because opposition in it is no longer possible); there vanishes completely all equality due to *birth*, to family (all are but one), and to personal property (all are landed proprietors and joint participators); in short all the phenomena of the ancient State which have been transmitted to modern times. But compulsion, among other things to support these determinations of the traditional State, is with us and continues; what then are its conditions, especially under the government of a God who is preparing his kingdom? If these conditions vanish, does he vanish and how does he himself vanish? How does the State that is of this world disintegrate in favour of the kingdom of God? This is the second part, the remainder of our investigation.

. . . . . .

Now, however, it is beginning to be clear and will become ever clearer, the more understanding spreads, that the surest means to might and wealth in a State is to have the most intelligent and educated subjects. This will give them, from the side of nature-knowledge and of the development of art, a lasting interest in the maintenance, improvement and development even of the school; they will not be able to have enough schools. Let them trouble, not about Christians, but about skilled workmen and husbandmen, which all depends on intellectual knowledge. The teachers, however, guided by the spirit described above and seeing that the latter does not exist without the former, will educate the former in order to produce the latter and will proceed according to the art of the whole. Already it has happened in this way.

. . . . . .

(3) This principal compulsion becomes unnecessary, as soon as there are among the people no more parents who have to be compelled to hand their children over to the school and maintain them by their contributions. The art of education has given the first public proof of its success when it has spread among the nation such love of intellectual education that one knows no other way of expressing his love for those who are born of him and, on the other hand, abandons the desire to have them around him as the expression of that love. Because this influence is contained in the very art of education, it is certain, as definitely as that this art cannot decay but must develop by practice, that it will last and that, once the need for this compulsion has been removed, it can never recur. Already it has become clear that, the inevitable result of universal popular education being that everyone will know his particular vocation and love to fulfil it, henceforth every other kind of compulsion for the avoidance of injustice is abolished, because injustice and the temptation thereto no longer exists.

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(*b*) Appendix to the Theory of the State.

[This is an appendix to Chapter III of the Theory of the State, and should be read in conjunction therewith; it is in three parts, of which only the first, "On the establishment of the kingdom of reason," concerns us here. In the extracts translated from Part I, Fichte discusses the principle of compulsion in education and the question of the rôle of the family in education. The Text is in the Works, Vol. VII, pp. 574-589.]

Appendix to the Theory of the State.[1] 1813.

I. *On the establishment of the kingdom of reason.*

. . . . . .

Observe—this is clever: *compulsion* itself is education—i.e., education to understanding of moral destiny. . . .

The principle is now quite easy that the State, with all its compulsory measures, must regard itself as an educational institution for making compulsion unnecessary.

. . . . . .

What the sphere (*sc.* of individual activity) is, we must let nature decide; spiritual nature, not the caprice of accidental birth and of inheritance. It is not noble birth or parentage that decides, but the talent that is shown in education.

. . . . . .

The reasons for what I (*sc.* the educator) am now doing you will see afterwards. (We must warn against the false principle in education and government, of wanting to argue immediately.) . . . . . .

In the first place the most general and permanent aim (*sc.* of the kingdom) is popular education for understanding what is right. . . . . The aim here is

1. Especially to Chapter III.

voluntary understanding. This understanding, however, is conditioned by that which education must first produce; therefore man must first *believe*. . . . . .

The education of all, as the first condition, is relevant here. The life of man is *society* and his right is the most perfect society which he can imagine. I want to be a man —it is the aim of the kingdom to see that full justice is done to me.

Compulsion is justified only by education for future understanding; only thus can he who compels take the responsibility for it. He can be, therefore, only the most educated person or the one whom all consider the most educated. On that ground alone can he obtain the right to power. . . . . .

There remains the question of the necessary establishment of a republic of scholars which shall choose from its midst the sovereign ruler. He will always be an elderly man; but he has reflected on the State throughout his lifetime, in accordance with his idea and the immediate circumstances in which this is realized. He knows the State and what is immediately necessary. The chief government officials, the ministers, must also proceed from this highest sphere of intelligence. Systematic popular education and government are one: the legislature expresses what they have been educated to and prepares for the new education. They have already proved themselves the best educators of the people; this gives them the right and the claim to rule the people too. The highest ruler can proceed, therefore, only from the council of these highest educators; they themselves have to choose him from among themselves. . . . . .

Everything else wants to *make mechanical*, I want to set free. Education to clearness is education to freedom; for only in *clearness* is *freedom*. . . . . .

Now a new investigation. What is there in the education to freedom of the people as an organic whole? A community of freedom which has, like a living body, its particular organs, its guiding eye, its hands and feet? These must separate themselves by means of education from the given *mass*, which must therefore be completely penetrated by education. No one is assumed (according

to Plato's idea) to be golden or iron ; he has first to be put to the test.

. . . . . .

The educators take the place of the parents. Reduced to its lowest terms, the question should be put thus : Has every father a *natural* right to be an educator, and to reap the love and devotion contained in this relationship ? This right would have to lie in control over nature : children are literally nature. Now it is quite absurd not to hand them over to those who are better and properly skilled. Such a right for everyone, therefore, merely because he is a father, is to be denied. . . . . It may be that in certain circumstances family education is good ; but you have no *right* to that ; and this most important of all institutions cannot be left to chance. . . . . .

Everyone has the *right* to receive the best possible education ; but family education is never the best, because it cannot be guided by the clearest understanding.

. . . . . .

The State can plan, not another *child-factory*—here Nature remains—but certainly another *educational factory*.